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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
“People do not enter relationships as tabula rasa, they bring with them a 
history of social experiences and a unique set of expectations, beliefs, goals, and 
actions that guide how they interact with others and how they construe their 
social world” (Collins, Guichard, Ford, & Feeney, 2004, p. 196). 
 
Humans are social beings entering a variety of interactions that naturally 
evolve into all kinds of relationships, ranging from superficial connections to 
interdependent close relationships. We are born into some relationships, others 
we develop later in life. As we mature, we spend an increasingly amount of time 
reflecting on our relational experiences and devote much energy to creating and 
maintaining successful personal relationships, which has become one of the most 
important aspirations of the modern individual. Being a core element of daily 
interpersonal life, the study of close relationships has sparked the interest of 
many researchers. When studying close relationships, a range of questions may 
arise. What makes some people more special to us than others? Why are 
maladaptive behavioural patterns learned from the past often perpetuated in 
present-day encounters with new people? Why do some people easily get 
distressed by minor relationship events, while others remain coldly unaffected 
and seem emotionally aloof? How come that some people are so keenly focused 
on negative affective experiences that they do not notice the loving and caring 
signals sent by their relationship partner? Why do some people feel 
uncomfortable with closeness, whereas others crave intimacy and never seem to 
get enough? How come that some relationship-experiences make us feel 
vulnerable and worthless or make us doubt about the other’s love and affection? 
During the past decades, relationship researchers have devoted considerable 
attention to understanding individual differences in the way people process 
information and behave in their social environments. These efforts have resulted 
in a growing body of work that includes detailed theories about the role of 
cognitive, affective, and motivational variables in relationship processes. 
Although a variety of factors have been identified as contributing to individual 
differences in relationship functioning, many researchers have hypothesized that 
such differences stem largely from an individual’s history of relationship 
experiences. One theoretical perspective that has been highly influential in 
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explaining the effects of close relationships on the processing of social 
information and social behaviour is attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1982).  
According to this theory, past relationship experiences translate into mental 
representations that shape cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses in 
later relationships. Such attachment ‘schemas’ are assumed to influence whether 
and how individuals selectively attend to emotional and attachment figure-
related information, how they behave towards their attachment figure, and how 
they think about themselves and others. Traditionally, these attachment 
phenomena have been studied by directly asking people about their thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviour in close relationships. Yet, recent theories and evidence 
indicate that conscious processes and explicit beliefs may reflect only a small 
part of relationship functioning because much of what happens between 
relationship partners is likely to occur at an automatic level (see Chen, 
Fitzimons, & Andersen, 2007). This fits with a broader trend in contemporary 
psychology emphasizing that many processes, including attentional orienting 
(e.g., Shiffrin, & Schneider, 1977), emotional appraisal (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), 
attitude activation (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), 
social perception (e.g., Bargh, 1994), and even goal-directed behaviour (e.g., 
Bargh, 1990), do not necessarily require conscious control. In the present 
research project, we aimed at incorporating these ideas into the study of adult 
attachment by focussing on implicit (i.e., automatically activated) 
representations and cognitive-motivational processes that underlie individual 
differences in attachment functioning. 
In this introduction, we discuss various aspects of the theory and evidence on 
attachment representations and processes. Before narrowing down to the 
theoretical assumptions directly relevant to the present dissertation, we first 
provide some general background information that is useful for situating our line 
of research into a broader perspective. We begin with an overview of theory and 
research on child attachment as a point of departure for understanding how 
attachment representations and processes may be characterized in adulthood. 
Next, we proceed to a description of measurement issues, followed by a 
definition of attachment relationships. From there, we discuss the model on 
attachment system dynamics in terms of working models and attachment 
strategies and then briefly lay out some basic ideas regarding automatic and 
controlled processes in relation to attachment. Finally, we conclude with a 
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discussion of the specific topics that the present research aimed at investigating, 
namely attention, action tendencies, goals, and the attachment self-concept. 
ADULT ATTACHMENT: BACKGROUND 
 “Attachment theory regards the propensity to make intimate emotional 
bonds to particular individuals as a basic component of human nature, already 
present in germinal form in the neonate and continuing through adult life into 
old age.” (Bowlby, 1988, p. 120-121) 
From Child Attachment to Adult Attachment 
Attachment theory was originally formulated by John Bowlby (1969, 1973, 
1980, 1988) who attempted to describe and explain how and why infants get 
emotionally attached to their primary caregivers and emotionally distressed 
when separated from them. Bowlby postulated that infants are born with a 
repertoire of behaviours organized within a behavioural motivational system that 
serves the function of protection, and hence survival, by regulating proximity to 
the caregiver when confronted with distress. His theory was extended in 
important directions by Mary Ainsworth and colleagues (1978) who delineated 
individual differences in attachment patterns by observing the behaviour of 
young infants in response to separation from and reunion with the caregiver (i.e., 
the well-known Strange Situation procedure). Children exhibiting a secure 
attachment style are somewhat distressed during separations from the mother, 
but recover quickly, react with joy and affection, and are easily soothed upon 
reunion. Anxiously attached children are observed to be highly distressed during 
separations and show anger and resistance when the mother returns. Yet, at the 
same time, they yearn for physical contact and comfort. These dynamics result in 
contradictory and ambivalent responses towards the mother. Avoidant infants, on 
the other hand, are marked by little distress when separated from the mother and 
tend to avoid proximity when she returns.  
Drawing on home observations, Ainsworth et al. (1978) further concluded 
that these attachment behaviours are often adaptive in light of parental 
responses. Specifically, it was found that the mothers of secure infants were 
emotionally available and consistently responsive to their children’s signals of 
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distress and proximity seeking. As a result, secure children are less concerned 
with security attainment and display a more open and flexible attitude towards 
exploring the environment. In the case of anxiously attached children, the 
mothers were observed to be unpredictable and inconsistent in their care, which 
partially reinforces the child’s attempts to seek proximity and security because 
they sometimes succeed in their proximity-seeking efforts. Consequently, such 
children become highly sensitive to potential unavailability and maximize their 
efforts to remain in close contact with the caregiver. The mothers of avoidant 
children were observed to be emotionally rigid and overly rejecting towards the 
child’s proximity seeking behaviour. In addition, these mothers were found to 
discourage emotional expressiveness during the Strange Situation Test by 
withdrawing from their infants during moments of strong negative affect 
(Grossmann, Grossmann, & Schwan, 1986). In reaction to these rejecting 
responses, avoidant children have learned to suppress their needs and feelings of 
distress and give up their proximity-seeking efforts. Main and Solomon (1986) 
later added a fourth attachment pattern, namely disorganized attachment, in 
order to describe the behaviour of children who display chaotic behaviour and 
unusual fluctuations between anxiety and avoidance (i.e., contradictory 
tendencies to escape from and approach the attachment figure). This pattern of 
behaviour is assumed to result from hostile, frightening, and unpredictable 
behaviour on the part of the (often traumatized) attachment figure, who is unable 
to provide adequate care. In summary, the evidence on child attachment styles 
suggests that, driven by the goal of security attainment, children develop 
emotional and behavioural regulation strategies that are adaptively tuned to the 
types of parenting they encounter. Note, however, that the quality of attachment 
is not determined solely by social learning mechanisms, but is also strongly 
influenced by infant characteristics such as temperament (e.g., emotional 
reactivity; most likely in interaction with parental responses) (e.g., Kochanska, 
1998; Mangelsdorf, Gunnar, Kestenbaum, Lang, & Andreas, 1990).   
 Certainly one of the most central ideas in Bowlby’s attachment theory is that, 
over time, children internalize repeated interactions with the caregiver into 
mental representations. These internal working models can be regarded as 
knowledge structures that are stored in one’s long-term associative memory 
network and include beliefs about the self and others. When a child repeatedly 
experiences that his/her attachment behaviour is successful in eliciting care and 
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proximity from the attachment figure, this is likely to result in the development 
of positive beliefs about one’s own competence and lovability, and a view of 
others as available and responsive. In the case of inconsistent or rejecting care, 
on the other hand, children are more likely to develop insecure self- and other-
models. According to the theory, these working models continue to guide 
behaviour and affect in later relationships outside the family. That is, as people 
build new relationships, they often behave in ways that are consistent with how 
they expect to be treated by others and they use these models to interpret the 
goals or intentions of their relationship partners. Although the biological 
function of the attachment system is probably most critical during the early 
phases of life, Bowlby argued that attachment processes continue to influence 
close relationships across the life span. However, it wasn’t until the late 80’s that 
researchers explicitly adopted an attachment theory perspective for 
understanding adult romantic love (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) and started to 
conduct systematic research on attachment in adolescence and adulthood.  
Adult Attachment Styles: Measurement Issues 
 From the beginning of attachment research, the individual-differences 
component of attachment theory has attracted most research attention. As such, a 
broad range of studies have focused on identifying individual differences in 
attachment style and their influence on inter- and intrapersonal processes. When 
Hazan and Shaver (1987) began their work on romantic attachment, they 
adopted Ainsworth’s three-category scheme as a framework for understanding 
individual differences in adult romantic relationships and developed a measure 
to asses the secure, anxious, and avoidant attachment styles. Bartholomew and 
Horowitz (1991) later expanded this model by delineating four prototypic 
attachment patterns that can be placed in a two-dimensional space defined by the 
valence of people’s self- and other-representations. The working model of self 
refers to how worthy and lovable the self is in the eyes of the attachment figure, 
whereas the working model of other refers to the degree to which others are 
perceived as being available and responsive to one’s needs (Bowlby, 1969, 
1982). Secure individuals typically have positive views of self and others. They 
find it relatively easy to become emotionally close to others, and feel 
comfortable depending on others and having others depending on them. 
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Preoccupied individuals are assumed to have a positive self-model and a 
negative other-model. They desire extreme intimacy with others, but find that 
others are reluctant to get as close as they would like. The avoidant style is 
divided into two types. Dismissing individuals are described as having a positive 
self-model and a negative other-model. They are assumed to feel comfortable 
without close emotional relationships, place great emphasis on independence and 
self-reliance, and prefer not to depend on others or have others depending on 
them. Fearful individuals, on the other hand, are assumed to have a negative 
view of both self and others. They feel uncomfortable with getting close to 
others because they fear that they will be hurt; yet, they do acknowledge wanting 
emotionally close relationships. An important difference between both types of 
attachment avoidance is that dismissing individuals are believed to adopt an 
avoidant orientation as a means to maintain a defensive sense of self-reliance 
and independence, whereas fearful individuals would be behaviourally avoidant 
because they fear interpersonal rejection (Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994). As 
such, the fearful pattern also shows great overlap with attachment anxiety. In 
accordance with their model, Bartholomew and Horowitz developed a forced-
choice measure (the Relationships Questionnaire; RQ) consisting of four 
paragraphs that describe each of the four attachment prototypes. Later, Griffin 
and Bartholomew (1994) decomposed the paragraphs into a multi-item scale, 
namely the Relationship Styles Questionnaire.  
During the course of years, several other measures have been developed, 
drawing on various classification systems containing three, four, or even five 
factors (e.g., Adult Attachment Scale, Collins & Read, 1990; Attachment Styles 
Questionnaire, Feeney, Noller, & Hanrahan, 1994). In order to provide a more 
unified approach to the study of attachment-style differences and to maximize 
internal consistency, Brennan, Clark, and Shaver (1998) constructed a new 
measure, namely the Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (ECR), by 
combining all known self-report measures of attachment, factor analyzing the 
items using taxometric methods, and retaining 36 items that represent two 
orthogonal higher-order factors. These factors were labelled as attachment 
anxiety and attachment avoidance, which refers to the, respectively, emotional 
and behavioural content of the items. The anxiety dimension represents fear of 
abandonment and rejection by significant others, whereas the avoidance 
dimension assesses the tendency to maintain emotional distance and 
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independence from others. People can have low scores on the two dimensions 
(i.e., secure attachment), high scores on both, or high scores on one of both. It is 
now commonly accepted that these two dimensions underlie individual 
differences in attachment and it is also widely recommended to use the ECR or 
ECR-revised questionnaires. Regarding the latter, a few of the original items of 
the ECR are replaced to improve the discriminative value of the questionnaire 
(Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000). Whereas categorical measures of attachment 
style have been found to be relatively unstable, multi-item scales such as the 
ECR(-R) generally show adequate test-retest reliability (see Fraley et al., 2000). 
In the present dissertation, we therefore adopted a dimensional approach to 
measure attachment differences and consistently used the ECR-revised. 
Although it has been suggested to rely no longer on the categorical attachment 
schemes, the four-group approach of Bartholomew can still provide an 
interesting framework for understanding the results of several studies. Also note 
that Griffin and Bartholomew already recognised the two-dimensional view on 
attachment by indicating that the self- and other-dimensions map onto 
attachment anxiety and avoidance, respectively. Moreover, the Relationships 
Questionnaire can be adjusted to provide continuous ratings of the four 
attachment types, instead of forcing participants into a certain attachment pattern 
(see Fraley & Waller, 1998).  
Finally, two concluding remarks on the measurement of attachment styles. 
Over the years, researchers have used a diverse array of instruments for 
measuring attachment styles.1 This impairs the interpretation and comparability 
of findings across studies, especially with regard to attachment avoidance. That 
is, it is not always clear whether the avoidant style in three-category measures 
reflects a single avoidant pattern (i.e., dismissing) or an anxious-avoidant pattern 
(i.e., fearful). This has nevertheless important implications for understanding the 
                                                     
1 Self-report measures are most frequently used within the social-psychology perspective on 
attachment. Another research tradition, which is rooted in developmental psychology, primarily 
relies on interview methods for measuring attachment styles. Most common within the narrative 
tradition, is the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) which is a semi-structured, clinical interview 
that measures an individual’s current state of mind regarding attachment-relevant experiences 
during childhood (George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985). The coding of the AAI puts more emphasis on 
discourse properties (i.e., coherence, anger, believability) rather than the propositional content of 
the interview (Hesse, 1999), and is based on several continuous scales that are used to classify 
individuals into three attachment categories (i.e., secure, preoccupied, and dismissive). 
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obtained results. As a second remark, we would like to mention that, throughout 
this dissertation, we use the terms secure, anxious, and avoidant individuals for 
reasons of clarity and brevity. However, these labels should not be interpreted in 
discrete terms, but rather as regions in a continuously distributed two-
dimensional space. 
Stability of Attachment Styles and Multiple Working Models 
 Bowlby maintained that early working models of self and others serve as 
templates for later relationships, which implies that attachment patterns 
established during childhood should be stable across the life span (Bowlby, 
1969, 1988). In relation to this, working models have been conceptualized as 
cognitive scripts or schemas (we will elaborate on this later in the introduction) 
that influence relationship functioning by means of their (presumably automatic) 
activation and their assimilative influences on information processing in 
attachment-relevant situations (see Baldwin, 1992, 1995). In other words, people 
will seek out experiences that confirm their working models and perceive, 
interpret, and behave upon new information in light of previous beliefs and 
expectations about self and others, which eventually results in a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. As such, individual differences in attachment style are assumed to 
reflect chronically accessible working models. There is supporting evidence for 
the stability of attachment patterns (based on retrospective studies and some 
follow-up studies; e.g., Hamilton, 2000; Waters, Merrick, Treboux, Crowel, & 
Albersheim, 2000). However, the observed correlations between child and adult 
attachment styles are moderate at best. It is therefore more plausible to assume 
that attachment styles are malleable. That is, change can result via sustained 
disconfirming evidence that contradicts the internal working models developed 
early in life. Accordingly, attachment styles can be modified in response to 
positive and negative attachment experiences.  
This does, however, not necessarily imply that working models are revised 
and eventually overwritten by new experiences. It could also be that early 
working models will continue to influence relationship functioning and coexist 
with newly developed working models (Fraley, 2002). Given that, as we mature, 
most people have a variety of interpersonal experiences with more than one 
significant other, it is likely that we possess multiple mental models representing 
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different ways of relating to others. Logically, some models will be more 
available and accessible than others, mainly depending on the amount of 
experience and the amount of exemplars that fit the model (Baldwin, 1992; 
Baldwin, Keelan, Fehr, Enss, & Koh-Rangarajoo, 1996). In this context, Collins 
and Read (1994) proposed that attachment styles are organized in a hierarchical 
structure. At the top of this hierarchy is the global attachment style, which 
represents generalized information about repeated interaction patterns in a 
variety of attachment relationships. At a lower level are relationship-specific 
attachment styles that may or may not be congruent with one’s general 
attachment style. It is thus possible to have a secure attachment style towards 
one relationship partner (e.g., mother) and an insecure attachment towards 
another (e.g., romantic partner). Accordingly, attachment-related thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviour are likely to differ depending on the specific 
relationship. Therefore, the studies reported in this dissertation consistently 
assessed individual differences in attachment at a specific level (i.e., regarding 
one specific relationship partner).  
Defining an Attachment Figure and an Attachment Relationship 
Given that adults have multiple interaction partners, it is highly relevant to 
make explicit the defining characteristics of an attachment figure. According to 
the theory, an attachment figure is (1) a target of proximity maintenance, (2) 
functions as a safe haven in times of need (i.e., providing protection, comfort, 
and support), and (3) serves as a secure base from which non-attachment 
behaviour is engaged (e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 1994). During childhood, parents 
are likely to be the primary attachment figure. In adolescence and adulthood, a 
wide variety of people can serve attachment functions, including close friends, 
romantic partners, colleagues, etc. Although parents are likely to stay attachment 
figures during adolescence and adulthood, their function as a primary attachment 
figure will usually change in the benefit of close friends and romantic partners 
(Allen & Land, 1999; Fraley & Davis, 1997; Rowe & Carnelley, 2005). Because 
in the studies reported in this dissertation the samples comprised of adolescents 
and young adults, we were careful in distinguishing attachment figures from 
non-attachment figures by using the WHOTO scale that consist of six items 
referring to the proximity seeking, secure base, and safe haven functions of an 
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attachment figure (Hazan & Zeifman, 1994; Fraley & Davis, 1997). A person 
was labelled as an attachment figure if he/she served all three attachment 
functions.   
Drawing on Bowlby’s original ideas, Mikulincer and Shaver (2007) further 
argued that an attachment interaction and an attachment bond have unique 
features as well. In their view, an interaction can be defined only as an 
“attachment interaction” if one person is threatened or distressed. Threat can be 
related to conditions of the person, conditions of the environment, and conditions 
of the attachment relationship (Bowlby, 1973). Accordingly, an attachment bond 
and attachment behaviour would become most evident in the context of distress, 
because there is no need to seek care from others when there is no threat 
involved, at least not for the purpose of protection. In the absence of distress, 
interactions may be more affiliative, exploratory, or sexual. As a result, many 
studies have used distress primes to study attachment processes, ranging from 
visualisation of threatening scenario’s (e.g., Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum, & 
Malishkevich, 2002) to subliminal priming of threatening words (e.g., 
Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Nachmias, & Woddis, 2000; Mikulincer, Gillath, & 
Shaver, 2002).  
A MODEL OF ATTACHMENT SYSTEM FUNCTIONING 
 The impetus for the line of research in this dissertation is a model by 
Mikulincer and Shaver (2003, 2007; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002) that 
systematically integrates the original ideas of Bowlby on the attachment 
behavioural system into a control-system model that puts forward some clear and 
verifiable assumptions. Drawing on emotion and appraisal theories (Frijda, 1986; 
Lazarus, 1991) and feedback-control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Powers, 
1973), Mikulincer and Shaver conceptualized a model that emphasizes the 
underlying dynamics of attachment processes and representations in terms of 
emotion regulation and behavioural self-regulation. The model is presented in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION   19 
In broad strokes, three modules can be distinguished that are mutually 
connected through self-regulatory feedback loops, driven by the goal of security 
and protection.  
 
 
Fig 1. The attachment behavioural system (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002; Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2003) 
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In a first module, information about environmental changes will be 
processed, which includes the appraisal and monitoring of (internal or external) 
threat stimuli that can activate the attachment system. A second module involves 
the appraisal of attachment figure availability and (memories about past) 
responses to one’s proximity seeking attempts. In a third module, the utility of 
one’s behaviour will be appraised in light of its progress towards security 
attainment so that, in the case of a continuing goal-discrepancy, the individual 
can adjust his/her behaviour and/or goals. Furthermore, Mikulincer and Shaver 
described three different strategies (i.e., primary or security-based strategies, 
hyperactivating and deactivating strategies) that result from and influence each 
of these appraisals. The three attachment strategies can be linked to the different 
attachment orientations that were described earlier (i.e., secure, anxious, 
avoidant attachment). Hence, in addition to focusing on the normative aspects of 
relationship functioning, the model also includes an individual-differences 
component. We will now explain the model in more detail. 
Perceived dangers and threats are assumed to activate the attachment system 
and motivate people to seek proximity towards their attachment figure as a 
means to attain the set-goal of felt security. Once the attachment system has been 
activated, this results in a subjective appraisal of attachment figure availability. 
When the attachment figure is perceived as available, reliable, caring, and 
responsive to one’s proximity seeking efforts, the individual is likely to 
experience distress reduction and felt security, which will end the activation of 
the attachment system and promote the engagement in other activities. This 
sequence corresponds with the primary attachment strategy and is characteristic 
of secure attachment. However, when the attachment figure is perceived as 
unavailable, unresponsive, and unable or unwilling to provide a secure base, the 
primary attachment strategy will be disrupted because the set-goal of security is 
not attained. In other words, attachment figure unavailability induces a goal-
incongruent state that intensifies negative emotions. In response to this 
continuing distress, people can make behavioural adjustments to attain felt 
security by adopting secondary attachment strategies that focus on persisting or 
disengaging from proximity seeking. Hyperactivating strategies are 
characteristic of anxiously attached individuals, who stay committed to 
proximity goals by exaggerating the primary attachment strategy. The latter is 
manifested in intense monitoring of threat and (potential) signs of attachment 
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figure unavailability and strong efforts to maintain proximity. The main goal of 
hyperactivating strategies is to get the unavailable attachment figure as yet to be 
responsive and supportive. As a result, their attachment system is assumed to be 
chronically active and should end its activation only when the attachment figure 
is perceived as paying sufficient attention and security-enhancing proximity is 
attained. Deactivating strategies, on the other hand, are indicated by 
disengagement from proximity goals and the promotion of independence and 
self-reliance. These strategies are most likely associated with avoidant 
attachment and are characterized by the dismissal of threat, the suppression or 
inhibition of attachment needs and vulnerabilities, and the inhibition of 
proximity seeking behaviour. Such avoidance-oriented strategies primarily aim 
at defensively deactivating the attachment system.  
According to the model, secure attachment represents the normative sequence 
for reducing distress and anxiety. Hyperactivating and deactivating strategies, on 
the other hand, give rise to insecurities and vulnerabilities because they obtain 
their goals through relying on psychological defences that distort information 
processing, affect-regulation, and behaviour. The model also posits that it is 
possible to adopt both hyperactivating and deactivating strategies in parallel, 
which corresponds with fearful avoidance (see Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). 
The latter is characterized by high levels of anxiety and avoidance and a lack of 
viable coping actions, because fearful avoidance would derive from a failure to 
achieve any of the goals of the different attachment strategies.   
Attachment Working Models: Representations and Processes 
Importantly, Bowlby’s working-model concept can also be integrated into 
this model on attachment system dynamics. In fact, given that attachment 
working models are built within the context of the attachment behavioural 
system, they are assumed to contain the history of experiences of that system and 
reflect the underlying regulatory actions of attachment strategies. As such, 
working models should not be regarded as including only static beliefs about the 
self and others, but rather as dynamic and functional concepts associated with 
information processing (i.e., attention, interpretation, and memory), emotional 
appraisal, motivational actions (i.e., goal setting, goal pursuit) and behaviour. 
This indicates that working models and attachment strategies have an 
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interdependent and reciprocal relationship and thus jointly influence the 
regulation of the attachment system. More specifically, the attachment 
behavioural system operates by means of several beliefs and goals that are stored 
in working models and influence cognitive, affective, and behavioural processes. 
Hence, a clear test of the attachment system model requires tapping into these 
representations and their interaction with attachment processes. This was in fact 
the main objective underlying the present research project. In the following 
paragraph, we will specify in greater detail what is currently known about 
attachment working models and their influence on regulatory processes. 
The concept of working models is interesting from a social-cognitive 
perspective, because it is similar to concepts such as ‘cognitive scripts’ and 
‘social schemas’ (cfr. Baldwin, 1992, 1995). Accordingly, attachment working 
models have been conceptualised as cognitive-affective structures that contain a 
network of memories, beliefs, and goals, which are automatically activated in 
response to attachment-relevant cues. Once activated, they are assumed to play a 
critical role in directing the cognitive, affective, and behavioural processes that 
contribute to the activation and regulation of the attachment system (Collins et 
al., 2004). The influence of attachment schemas on cognitive processes fits with 
a common idea in social-cognitive research that prior knowledge will 
automatically influence information processing (i.e., attention, interpretation, 
and memory), social construal, and so on.  
The role of attachment schemas in guiding emotional responses has thus far 
received most empirical attention. In line with emotion and appraisal theories 
(e.g., Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1988), it has been argued that people will 
automatically appraise (attachment-related) environmental changes in relation to 
(inter)personal goals that are stored in working models (Shaver, Schwartz, 
Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). In general, people will react with positive affect if a 
goal is attained or facilitated and with negative affect if a goal is blocked. The 
resulting emotions have an impact on further information processing, action 
tendencies, physiological changes, and so on. Interestingly, the role of working 
models in the generation, regulation, and expression of emotions can also be 
framed in terms of primary and secondary appraisals. The primary appraisal 
process evaluates whether the environmental change is worthy of attention and 
whether it is relevant to one’s goals and beliefs. In a secondary appraisal, the 
event will be evaluated in light of one’s coping potential - which includes one’s 
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own power and the power to recruit help from others - and expectations about 
the outcome (Scherer, 1988, 2001). Eventually, this secondary appraisal can 
change the phenomenology of the emotion by evoking a reappraisal of the input 
stimuli. Both primary and secondary appraisals are thus likely influenced by 
attachment working models that can alter or suppress emotional responding by 
interfering with the detection of potential threat, emotional appraisals, and so on.  
Finally, working models will also influence behaviour by providing plans and 
action tendencies associated with attaining attachment-related goals. This 
implies that behavioural strategies are automatically evoked in response to 
particular appraisals that activate attachment working models. In relation to this, 
it is noteworthy that much of the social-psychological research on attachment is 
guided by a variant of the classic diathesis-stress model, according to which 
attachment working models will influence attachment-related behaviour 
primarily under conditions of stress or threat (Fraley & Shaver, 1997, 1998; 
Simpson & Rholes, 1998). 
Individual Differences in Attachment: Cognitive, Emotional, and Behavioural 
Responses 
As described earlier, attachment working models shape cognitive, emotional, 
and behavioural responses in attachment-relevant contexts. In most of the 
attachment research, working models have been treated as an individual-
difference variable that is assessed via self-report measures (e.g., Hazan & 
Shaver, 1987). In this section, we will describe some of the characteristics of 
attachment-style differences that have received empirical support and are 
relevant to the research reported in this dissertation. For a more complete and 
detailed overview, we refer to a recent book by Mikulincer and Shaver (2007) 
that provides an impressive review of the thousands of studies on adult 
attachment, published over the past 20 years. The studies that are directly 
relevant to the present research will be described in more detail in the 
corresponding chapters.  
Secure individuals are assumed to regulate emotions in a constructive way by 
engaging in problem-solving, cognitive reappraisal, and proximity-related 
responses. In relation to the theory, it has been demonstrated that secure 
individuals automatically activate proximity-related thoughts (Mikulincer, et al., 
24  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
2000) and mental representations of the attachment figure (Mikulincer, et al., 
2002) in response to distress-cues. They are also found to seek support from the 
attachment figure (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 
1992), to rely on problem-focused coping (e.g., Mikulincer & Florian, 1998), 
and to keep a balance between relying on others and relying on themselves when 
coping with distress (e.g., Scharf, 2001). Additionally, they are believed to 
attend to and express distress without distortions, because they are confident that 
they can manage distress successfully. As such, they often reappraise the threat 
as a challenge, which eventually results in a reduction of it stressful effects. In 
this context, secure individuals have been found to display more hopeful and 
positive appraisals and stronger ego-resilience (e.g., Kerns & Stevens, 1996; 
Birnbaum, Orr, Mikulincer, & Florian, 1997). In addition to seeking support 
from others, secure individuals may also rely on what Mikulincer and Shaver 
(2004) call ‘security-based self-representations’. Such representations are 
assumed to evolve from soothing interactions with the attachment figure and 
contain positive feelings and beliefs about the self as capable of dealing with 
distress. Accordingly, when confronted with threat, a secure individual does not 
necessarily need to rely on the attachment figure, but can also evoke security-
based self-representations that assist in reducing distress. 
Attachment anxiety is marked by intense distress reactions and overwhelming 
experiences of negative emotions. According to the theory, anxious individuals 
are guided by an unfulfilled wish to gain attention and support from the 
attachment figure, which causes them to intensify the expression of emotions 
that emphasize their vulnerability and helplessness (e.g., distress, sadness, and 
fear). This is likely to result in a dysregulation of negative emotions, which is 
manifested in hypervigilance to internal and external signals of threat, 
catastrophic appraisals, rumination on threatening thoughts, insistent proximity 
seeking efforts, and negative beliefs about their own competence for regulating 
distress. As a result, their attachment system is assumed to be chronically 
activated (i.e., in both threatening and non-threatening contexts). Empirical 
support has been obtained for several of these assumptions. For example, 
individuals characterized by attachment anxiety have been found to 
automatically activate proximity-thoughts and -worries in response to both threat 
and non-threat primes (Mikulincer et al., 2000; 2002b). They tend to rely on 
emotion-focused coping-strategies, exaggerate their distress reactions (e.g., 
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Maunder, Lancee, Nolan, Hunter, & Tannenbaum, 2006), are unable to suppress 
threat-related thoughts (Fraley & Shaver, 1997), and appraise threat as extreme 
and coping resources as deficient (e.g. Birnbaum, Orr, Mikulincer, & Florian, 
1997; Mikulincer & Florian, 1995, 1998). Furthermore, they display intense 
wishes for security and proximity (see Baldwin, Fehr, Keedian, Seidel, & 
Thompson, 1993; Gillath, Mikulincer, Fitzsimons, Shaver, Schachner, & Barg, 
2006), which are however not manifested in actual proximity seeking behaviour. 
That is, so far, behavioural observation studies failed to find a significant 
relation between attachment anxiety and support seeking. This lack of 
association has been explained by referring to their ambivalence and doubts 
about attachment figure availability (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Simpson et al., 
1992).   
Attachment avoidance is characterized by the inhibition, denial, and 
suppression of emotional states that are incongruent with the goal of down-
regulating the attachment system (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). It is further 
assumed that avoidant individuals divert attention away from threat-related 
material, suppress attachment-related behaviour as a means to minimize 
closeness and interdependence, and prefer to rely on themselves when coping 
with distress. In relation to the theory, research has confirmed that avoidant 
individuals rely on distance-coping strategies, appraise their coping resources as 
adequate, report lower levels of support seeking, exhibit less desire for 
closeness, and inhibit (actual) proximity seeking behaviour, especially in the 
context of distress (e.g., Gilllath et al., 2006; Mikulincer et al., 2000; Fraley & 
Shaver, 1998). It has also been found that avoidant defences are effective in 
suppressing separation-related thoughts, as indicated by less interference of 
separation-related thoughts following a suppression-task and lower skin 
conductance during suppression (Fraley & Shaver, 1997). Based on these 
findings, it has been concluded that the defensive strategies underlying 
attachment avoidance can operate fairly effortlessly and without taxing cognitive 
resources. On the other hand, there is growing evidence that avoidant defensive 
strategies are not always successful in inhibiting the experience and expression 
of negative emotions and that the efficacy of such strategies can become 
attenuated over time, in highly stressful situations, and when concurrent tasks are 
imposed. That is, when confronted with severe and persistent distress such as, 
for example, a divorce (Birnbaum et al., 1997) or wartime separations (e.g., 
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Cafferty, Davis, Medway, O'Hearn, & Chappell, 1994), avoidant individuals do 
report high levels of distress and even rely on emotion-focused coping (also 
Berant, Mikulincer, & Florian, 2001). Their emotional reactivity could also be 
demonstrated in studies examining physiological reactions in response to stress 
cues. It has been found, for example, that avoidant individuals display 
heightened physiological arousal (skin conductance, hart rate, and blood 
pressure) when recalling a stressful situation (Diamond, Hicks, & Otter-
Henderson, 2006), when discussing relationship problems (Kim, 2006) and when 
watching a film on relationship distress (Maunder et al., 2006). Using brain 
imaging techniques, Gillath, Bunge, Shaver, Wendelken, and Mikulincer (2005) 
added to this line of research by demonstrating that avoidant individuals failed in 
fully deactivating the cingulate cortex and the lateral prefrontal cortex - that are 
normally used to down-regulate negative emotions - when suppressing negative 
(attachment-related) thoughts and emotions. Some studies even found a 
dissociation between avoidant’s self-reports and their physiological responses 
(when discussing painful childhood memories during the AAI, Dozier & Kobak, 
1992) and projective responses on the Thematic Apperception Test (regarding 
death-related anxiety, Mikulincer, Florian, & Tolmacz, 1990). Given that the 
emotional reaction patterns of avoidant individuals seem to differ depending on 
the level at which they were measured, the above studies may suggest that the 
defensive strategies of avoidant individuals are specifically oriented at blocking 
the ‘conscious’ experience and expression of emotions. On the other hand, there 
is also evidence that the regulatory mechanisms underlying avoidant attachment 
do not interfere only with self-reported responses, but also operate at the 
automatic level. For example, it has been found that avoidant individuals display 
lower cognitive activation of separation-related thoughts on the Stroop colour 
naming and lexical decision task, which are both indirect measurement 
procedures (Mikulincer et al., 2000; Mikulincer, Dolev, & Shaver, 2004). Note, 
however, that their defences seemed to collapse when a cognitive load was 
imposed (as indicated by higher accessibility of proximity worries and 
separation thoughts). Other evidence stems from a study by Fraley, Garner, and 
Shaver (2000) in which participants listened to an interview about the loss of a 
close partner and were asked to recall details about the interview. When 
analyzing the forgetting curves, it appeared that avoidant individuals had initially 
encoded less information about the interview, which was taken as evidence that 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION   27 
avoidant defences act pre-emptively by blocking threatening stimuli from further 
information processing. Another interesting observation is that avoidant 
responses depend on the nature of the threat prime. For example, Mikulincer and 
colleagues (2002) showed that attachment avoidance was associated with lower 
accessibility of the name of the attachment figure only when primed 
(subliminally) with a separation word, but not when primed with a failure word.  
 
The above overview suggests that the attachment system is primarily 
involved in the regulation of negative emotions. Given that attachment strategies 
have been developed in the context of distress and thus mainly serve distress-
alleviating functions, it has indeed been argued that distress is the most 
important trigger of the attachment system (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). 
Nevertheless, it is likely that positive emotions will also play a role in the 
regulation of the attachment system, because positive emotions contribute to 
shaping and enhancing attachment bonds, assist in mood-regulation, and result 
from the achievement of attachment-related goals. Furthermore, there is no 
doubt that people experience both positive (e.g., acceptance, love, joy) and 
negative (e.g., fear, anger, frustration) emotions in their attachment relationships. 
Although much less is known about the regulation of positive affect as a function 
of attachment, a few studies have been directed at examining the moderating role 
of attachment style in the experience of and reactions to positive affect (e.g., 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005; Mikulincer & Sheffi, 2000). It has been theorized 
that secure individuals appraise positive affect as reinforcing, which may cause 
them to engage in flexible cognitive processing when being in a positive mood. 
Avoidantly attached individuals, on the other hand, are assumed to suppress 
positive emotions, because emotions of joy and happiness promote interpersonal 
closeness and represent goal-incongruent information. As a result, avoidant 
individuals will react to positive affect with cognitive closure in order to prevent 
that such affect will influence further information-processing. Anxious 
individuals would also appraise positive affect as a goal-incongruent state, 
because it reminds them of what they believe they do not have. Furthermore, 
given that their attachment system is assumed to be chronically activated, they 
are less likely to engage in relaxed exploration following a positive affect 
induction. In relation to these hypotheses, research has demonstrated that secure 
individuals react to positive affect with broader mental categorization and better 
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performance in creative problem-solving tasks. Avoidant individuals, on the 
other hand, were found to be unaffected by positive affect inductions, whereas 
anxious individuals failed to report positive mood and displayed worse 
performance on problem-solving tasks after the induction of positive affect 
(Mikulincer & Sheffi, 2000).  
AUTOMATIC AND CONTROLLED PROCESSES IN ADULT ATTACHMENT 
 Traditionally, most of the evidence on (interindividual differences in) the 
content of working models stems from studies relying on self-report 
questionnaires. Although such measures can be extremely useful for identifying 
conscious representations that people can introspect and articulate, many aspects 
of working models are assumed to lie outside conscious awareness and are 
therefore not available for reflection and report. Moreover, even when people are 
capable of providing accurate reports of their thoughts, feelings, and behaviour 
in their relationships, they may sometimes be motivated to distort these thoughts 
and feelings in the service of self-regulation and self-presentation (Collins, et al., 
2004). Also note that self-report measures are unable to tap into the automatic 
processes that underlie attachment strategies and working models. Over the past 
10 years, attachment researchers have therefore shown increased interest in 
social-cognitive methods that allow investigating attachment processes and 
representations at the automatic level. This evolution was also driven by (1) a 
more general trend towards integrating social-cognition research with the study 
of relationship phenomena (Reis & Downey, 1999), (2) the broader interest in 
research on automaticity, (3) the popularity of implicit measures, which are 
assumed to be less prone to social desirability biases and other self-protective 
distortions compared to self-report measures (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003), and (4) 
the specific need for a more direct test of hypotheses derived from attachment 
theory in which several claims are made about the automatic nature of 
attachment-related processes. This last point is crucial because attachment 
strategies and underlying working models have repeatedly been described as 
habitual, over-learned structures that can operate in an automatic mode (e.g., 
Bowlby, 1969; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 2007). Hence, more empirical 
research is needed to investigate whether attachment strategies do indeed operate 
at the automatic level and whether attachment-related representations can be 
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activated automatically and can have an automatic influence on cognition, affect, 
and behaviour. Before we go more deeply into the specific research questions of 
this dissertation, we first describe some general notions about the role of 
automaticity in attachment system functioning. Afterwards, we will define what 
is meant by the term ‘automaticity’ and illustrate how this definition can be 
applied to attachment theory and research.  
The Role of Automaticity in Attachment 
Several researchers have explicitly mentioned the role of automatic processes 
and automatically activated representations in the context of attachment. Bowlby 
already recognized that working models can influence attachment processes in a 
defensive, self-protective fashion (Bowlby, 1980; see also Cassidy & Kobak, 
1988; Main, 1991). He also emphasized that working models are strengthened by 
practice and repetition and eventually begin to function automatically. 
Accordingly, working models are assumed to ‘unconsciously’ bias information 
processing, interpersonal expectations, and the construction of plans for dealing 
with distress. It is through these automatic influences that working models are 
believed to perpetuate in attachment system functioning. Baldwin (1992) further 
elaborated on Bowlby’s idea of working models by conceptualizing the latter as 
relational schemas that are automatically activated in attachment-relevant 
situations and produce (automatic) schema-like effects. He introduced the 
notions of accessibility and availability in the attachment literature and gave the 
impetus for applying social cognitive tools to the study of implicit attachment-
related representations.  
In describing their model on attachment system dynamics, Mikulincer and 
Shaver (2003, 2007) did clearly put more emphasis on attachment processes and 
strategies, rather than on the content of attachment schemas. According to their 
model, attachment strategies can operate either consciously or unconsciously and 
either deliberately or automatically. Moreover, they claim that attachment 
strategies can operate in parallel, synchronously, or in conflicting ways at 
conscious and unconscious levels. Although not explicitly mentioned in their 
writings, the latter would be particularly the case for avoidant individuals, 
because avoidant defences are most likely driven by self-protective motives 
(Cassidy & Kobak, 1988; Fraley, Davis, & Shaver, 1998). Recall that several 
30  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
studies have indeed demonstrated that avoidant responses differ at different 
levels of measurement (i.e., self-report, physiological indices, and indirect 
measures; cfr. supra). This does not imply, however, that such defensive 
processes cannot exist to some extent in all individuals. Finally, it is worth 
noting that many of the processes involved in attachment system functioning - 
such as perception, attention, interpretation, evaluation, and so on - have been 
shown to work well without conscious control (Bargh & Barndollar, 1996). 
Defining Automaticity  
Given that automatic processes and representations are assumed to play a key 
role in the functioning of the attachment system, it is most relevant to define 
what is meant by ‘automaticity’, because many views exist regarding the 
definition of this concept.  
In defining automaticity, we follow the view of Moors and De Houwer 
(2006) who provided an impressive analysis of the automaticity-concept and its 
component features. They argue against the view that automatic and controlled 
processes are mutually exclusive, with all automatic processes having the same 
features and all controlled processes having the opposite. In contrast, many 
processes contain both automatic and controlled features, and for that reason 
they recommend to deconstruct any process into its component features [i.e., 
(un)intentional, goal-(in)dependent, (un)controlled, autonomous, purely 
stimulus-driven, (un)conscious, (non)efficient and fast(slow)].2 To label a 
process as automatic, it is important to specify which features apply to the 
process and to which degree they are present. In other words, a process may be 
considered automatic in varying senses and to varying degrees, depending on the 
particular features it meets. 
Applying this analysis to the conceptualization of adult attachment has clear 
heuristic potential. First of all, it points to several misconceptions in attachment 
research about the role of automatic processes. For example, confusion exists 
between the terms ‘automatic’ and ‘unconscious’ and often these are used 
interchangeably (also note the current debate on whether self-report measures or 
the AAI are able to tap unconscious processes, e.g., Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). 
                                                     
2 For a more detailed discussion of what these features mean, how they are related, and how 
they can be assessed, we refer to their paper. 
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However, according to the aforementioned analysis on automaticity, 
unconsciousness may be a feature of automatic processes, but not all automatic 
processes need to be unconscious. Secondly, the analysis of Moors and De 
Houwer (2006) could also provide a useful framework for understanding and 
interpreting the existing evidence on automatic attachment processes. For 
instance, the defensive strategies of avoidant individuals may be considered as 
dependent on the goal of self-protection, self-reliance, and independence, while 
operating automatically in the sense that these individuals do not engage in self-
regulatory strategies (e.g., suppressing emotional reactions or adopting avoidant 
tendencies) with great intention, control, or awareness. In relation to this, we 
refer to several studies in which avoidant individuals have been shown to display 
heightened physiological reactivity to emotional stimuli, even when the goal to 
prevent the occurrence of this emotional reaction is present (e.g., Diamond et al., 
2006; Dozier & Kobak, 1992). Other interesting evidence stems from studies 
using a dual-task paradigm, revealing that avoidant individuals showed faster 
reaction times on words reflecting proximity worries (in a Stroop colour naming 
task) when a cognitive load was imposed compared to when no load was present 
(e.g., Mikulincer et al., 2000, also see Mikulincer, et al., 2004). This suggests 
that the activation of proximity worries occurs efficiently, whereas the 
suppression of proximity worries does not operate in an efficient manner. 
Suppression may, however, still function automatically, in the sense that 
avoidant individuals do not intentionally or controllably engage in suppression 
and are usually not aware of this interference. These examples indicate that it 
makes no sense to consider deactivating strategies as yielding purely automatic 
or purely controlled processes; an idea that is nevertheless implicitly present in 
(early) thinking about defensive attachment strategies. That is, the deactivating 
strategies underlying attachment avoidance have repeatedly been described as 
being under conscious control, because such strategies would require attentional 
resources to override automatic reactions (e.g., Mikulincer et al., 2000). The 
above reported analysis made clear, however, that defensive strategies may be 
regarded as slow, non-efficient, and goal-dependent, but can still be called 
automatic in the sense that they may possess one or more of the other 
automaticity features, such as being unintentional, uncontrolled, or unconscious. 
Clearly, this also applies to the other attachment strategies and processes.  
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The automatic activation of working models and their automatic influence on 
information processing, affect, and behaviour can also be analysed according to 
this feature-based approach. Working models are generally conceived as 
chronically accessible knowledge structures that have frequently been activated 
over time (see Baldwin et al., 1996; Collins et al., 2004). In addition, 
contemporary research has shown that working models can also be activated on 
a temporary basis using different priming techniques (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1993; 
Pierce & Lydon, 2001; Rowe & Carnelley, 2003).3 Regardless of whether these 
mental models are chronically activated or manipulated in the lab, participants 
are typically not aware or consciously intend to activate or rely on these working 
models when making judgements or planning behaviour. Moreover, working 
models are likely to exert their influence in an uncontrollable and efficient 
manner. An important implication of the automatic activation of working models 
is that people tend to pursue goals and strategies that they have relied on in the 
past to provide them with security, regardless of whether those strategies are 
adaptive within their current interpersonal environment. In other words, people 
often rely on over-learned schemas at the expense of conducting more controlled 
and effortful processing of information.  
Interplay Between Automatic and Controlled Processes 
Although (certain aspects of) working models are believed to operate without 
conscious awareness, their content and outcome can still be reflected in 
conscious experiences. That is, we can become aware of how we think, feel, and 
behave in close relationships, and consciously reflect on the plausibility and 
suitability of these feelings, worries, wishes, plans, or behaviours in certain 
situations. Also note that we can become aware of the end-products of emotion 
and behavioural regulation processes (such as attention, appraisal, goal pursuit 
and so on), while remaining unaware of these processes itself. In this respect, 
Perugini and Banse (2007) emphasized that deliberative factors must play an 
important role in human functioning because the evidence on automaticity can 
explain only a fraction of the total variance in behaviour. This indicates that 
information processing and behaviour can have both automatic and deliberate 
                                                     
3 Note that such priming studies have provided direct evidence that working models do 
function as cognitive structures that produce schema-like effects.  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION   33 
determinants and that a range of factors can determine the relative influence of 
these two processes (e.g., Bargh, 1994, 1997; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Yet, 
because the study of explicit attachment processes has thus far been 
overrepresented in attachment research, the present research project was 
primarily concerned with measuring the implicit features of working models and 
attachment strategies.  
AUTOMATIC ATTACHMENT PROCESSES AND REPRESENTATIONS 
The introduction has thus far provided a brief review of the major 
propositions of attachment theory and identified the specific components of 
working models and attachment strategies that form the basis of individual 
differences in attachment style. We have discussed how working models and 
related strategies can be conceptualized, how they are developed and 
perpetuated, how they are involved in cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
responding, and in what sense and to which degree their activation and use can 
be called automatic. In providing this overview, we have explained that current 
thinking on attachment is based on a well-defined model on attachment-system 
dynamics that yields many clear and testable assumptions. The impressive 
amount of empirical convergence, stemming from multiple methods, points to 
the plausibility and validity of attachment theory. However, further theoretical 
refinement and empirical research is needed to confirm several assumptions of 
attachment theory that have not yet been tested, especially regarding the 
automatic nature of attachment-related representations and their influence on 
cognitive, affective, and motivational processes.  
Measuring Automatic Processes and Representations 
The aim of the present research project was twofold. A first aim was to 
investigate attachment-style differences in implicit (i.e., automatically activated) 
attachment-representations. As reported above, many aspects of attachment 
working models operate automatically and are not necessarily available for 
reflection and report. Therefore, self-report questionnaires, in which participants 
are directly asked about their thoughts, feelings, or attitudes, can provide only 
limited information on the content of working models. Furthermore, self-report 
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measures may produce biased results because they are subject to demand 
characteristics, evaluation apprehension, and social desirability (Greenwald et 
al., 2002). To overcome these disadvantages, research on attachment-related 
representations could benefit from the use of so-called ‘implicit’ measures. 
Drawing on Moors and De Houwer’s (2006) feature-based approach on 
automaticity, an implicit or automatic measure can be defined as “a 
measurement outcome that reflects the to-be-measured construct by virtue of 
processes that are uncontrolled, unintentional, goal-independent, purely-
stimulus-driven, autonomous, unconscious, efficient, or fast” (De Houwer & 
Moors, 2007, p.188-189). During the past decade, attachment researchers have 
started to rely on such implicit measures to explore attachment-related constructs 
at the automatic level. These measures include implicit memory tasks, semantic 
and affective priming techniques, the lexical decision task, and the Implicit 
Association Task (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1993; Mikulincer et al., 2000, 2002; 
Zayas & Shoda, 2005). Implicit measures produce outcomes that can be called 
automatic in the sense that respondents do not consciously intend to activate a 
certain attitude or cognition, or in the sense that they cannot control (i.e., stop, 
change, or alter) the translation of the construct into the measurement outcome 
(e.g., the evidence on faking in the IAT, Steffens, 2004). As such, implicit 
measures are assumed to be less easily distorted by forces that might motivate 
false responding. Furthermore, it is assumed that these measures operate 
efficiently, using a minimum of attentional resources. Although current 
attachment research has moved towards exploring the implicit features of 
working models, the majority of this research does not tap directly into the goals 
and beliefs that are automatically activated in response to attachment-relevant 
cues. That is, most of these studies have relied on the lexical decision task for 
measuring the accessibility of cognitive representations, which is just one 
possible tool for investigating attachment-related beliefs under conditions of 
automaticity. In fact, accessibility is a rather remote index of the presence of 
certain representations. For instance, although the presence of a belief “security 
is good” should lead to a high accessibility of the concept “security”, one cannot 
simply infer the presence of the belief on the basis of an observed accessibility 
of the concept. This is because the accessibility could result for other beliefs 
(e.g., “security is bad”) or factors other beliefs (e.g., the mere activation of 
“security” without a link with “good”). Therefore, we looked for implicit 
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measures that would provide less remote indices of attachment representations. 
Given their central role in shaping attachment behaviour, the specific 
representations we focused on were interpersonal goals and representations of 
the self in relation to others. 
In addition to exploring the content of an individual’s working model, we 
were also interested in measuring the influence of representational models on the 
processes that are involved in the activation and regulation of the attachment 
system. Hence, a second aim of the present research project was to explore the 
relation between individual differences in attachment working models and 
attachment-related cognitive and behavioural processes, namely attention and 
behavioural action tendencies. Given that self-report questionnaires can tap only 
into the end-products of information processing, but not into the processes itself, 
we used indirect measures that are able to capture these processes under 
conditions of automaticity. That is, attentional and behavioural processes were 
inferred from a participant’s performance on experimental paradigms that are 
better suited to measure automatic attachment-related processes. 
Beyond the question of individual differences, the studies reported in this 
dissertation were also interested in examining the automatic influence of distress 
on attachment processes and representations. Therefore, we induced (in several 
of our studies) a distress prime before administering the experimental paradigms. 
Whereas previous studies often relied on subliminal priming, we used a priming 
procedure in which participants were asked to consciously visualize and reflect 
on a certain (distressing) situation (also see Mikulincer, et al., 2002). When 
using subliminal priming, it is clear that participants are unaware of its effect on 
subsequent information processing. When using a more explicit visualisation 
task, it could be argued that the distress-prime requires conscious reflection, 
which may interfere with the processing of attachment-cues. However, its 
activation and subsequent effects can still be called automatic in the sense that 
they occur efficiently and in the absence of intention, awareness, and control.  
Two final notes concerning the use of explicit and implicit measures in 
attachment research. First, in addition to theoretical reasons, there are also 
methodological reasons for relying on other measures than self-report. That is, 
the items of attachment style questionnaires often show overlap with the items of 
questionnaires on attachment correlates such as self-disclosure, interdependence, 
anxiety, self-esteem, etc. Therefore, part of the observed relationships may be 
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attributed to shared method variance or shared social desirability. In this respect, 
reaction time measures could be useful to provide independent evidence on the 
relation between attachment styles and several relationship variables. Secondly, 
the above overview may give the impression that self-report measures cannot 
provide valid information on attachment-related beliefs. However, we want to 
emphasize that this is not the case. Given that both implicit and explicit 
processes and representations are involved in attachment system functioning, it 
is essential to apply both direct and indirect measurement procedures to the 
study of attachment dynamics.  
In the following sections, we will briefly lay out the theoretical 
assumptions, the empirical evidence, and the specific research questions on 
the attachment-related processes and representations we focused on in this 
dissertation, namely attention, action tendencies, goals and self-representations.  
ATTACHMENT PROCESSES 
Cognitive Response Patterns: Attachment and Attention 
One of the assumptions of attachment theory that has received little empirical 
consideration so far concerns the relation between individual differences in 
attachment style and attentional processing. This is remarkable given that 
selective attention is assumed to be a key strategy for regulating affect and as 
such plays a central role in attachment system functioning. Because research on 
the attachment-attention link would contribute to a general understanding of 
attachment functioning and reveal clinically relevant information, the first part of 
this dissertation aimed at addressing the lack of research in this area by 
conducting a series of studies that examined the proposed hypotheses on 
attention allocation as a function of attachment style. 
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1982) puts great emphasis on the role of 
attentional processes in the etiology and maintenance of characteristic 
relationship behaviour that forms the basis of an individual’s attachment 
orientation. Specifically, the theory suggests that attachment-related differences 
in attentional biases result from an individual’s learning history, represent 
implicit strategies for regulating emotional distress and proximity, and assist in 
the perpetuation of one’s attachment style. Accordingly, it can be expected that 
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attachment working models provide an orienting framework for directing 
attentional resources towards or away from attachment-relevant cues and as such 
bias further information processing in a goal-relevant and expectation-consistent 
manner (see Collins et al., 2004). These propositions fit with the general idea in 
cognitive psychology that individuals guide attention to information that is 
relevant to their currently active goals and consistent with their existing attitudes 
and expectations (e.g., Bargh, 1984; Srull & Wyer, 1986). Theoretical 
predictions on attentional orienting are most explicitly developed for attachment 
anxiety and avoidance. Anxiously attached individuals are assumed to be 
hypervigilant towards negative, threatening information and would be constantly 
monitoring their attachment figure’s whereabouts. Their threat- and rejection-
oriented focus would keep them vigilant for signs of disapproval by others and 
incline them to notice “evidence that confirms their fears while overlooking 
information that is inconsistent with their expectations” (Collins & Read, 1994, 
p. 72). The attentional focus of avoidant individuals should be characterized by a 
very different pattern. Their motivation to reduce attachment-relevant affect and 
suppress attachment needs would incline them to direct attention away from 
stimuli that might cause unwanted activation of the attachment system, such as 
attachment figure-related cues or emotionally threatening information (e.g., 
Bowlby, 1988; Fraley, Davis, & Shaver, 1998). In the case of secure attachment, 
predictions are less clear.4 On the one hand, secure individuals can be expected 
to avoid threat-related information, due to their low levels of anxiety. On the 
other hand, they may also attend to this kind of information because they are 
assumed to be cognitively open to explore (even goal-incongruent) emotional 
stimuli (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007, Zeijlmans Van Emmichoven, van 
Ijzendoorn, deRuiter, & Brosschot, 2003). In this respect, it is worth noting that 
attachment theory puts the greatest emphasis on the relation between attention 
and attachment insecurity, because particularly insecure attachment orientations 
would be characterized and maintained by attentional biases. Accordingly, it can 
                                                     
4 Throughout this dissertation, our hypotheses on attachment-style differences in cognitive-
motivational processes and implicit representations focus primarily on attachment anxiety, 
avoidance, and security. In the case of high anxious-high avoidant individuals, predictions are less 
clear. On the one hand, their affect-regulation mechanisms might reflect their high levels of 
anxiety (e.g., vigilance to threat). On the other hand, their responses might also reflect their 
avoidance-oriented tendencies (and thus block cognitive access to and processing of emotional, 
attachment-relevant information).  
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also be expected that secure individuals will show no attentional bias at all. In 
addition, given that the attachment system is primarily concerned with the 
regulation of threatening information, no clear-cut predictions can be made on 
attentional effects involving positive stimuli. However, it could be that 
insecurely attached individuals will direct attention away from positive, 
attachment-relevant information, because positive attachment experiences may 
be appraised as unobtainable and thus frustrating (see Gray & McNaughton, 
2000).  
According to the model on attachment system dynamics, attention may serve 
two important functions in the regulation of the attachment system: (1) the 
triggering of the attachment system by directing attention to threatening and 
emotional information and (2) the regulation of proximity by directing attention 
to attachment figure-related cues. There is, however, little direct evidence on the 
role of selective attention in the context of attachment. Although several 
researchers have interpreted their results in terms of attachment-related 
attentional processes, most of these studies have focused on related aspects such 
as memory biases, and relied on methods that cannot provide a rigorous or 
unambiguous test of attentional orienting. Regarding the research on memory 
biases, evidence is most consistent for avoidant individuals who show 
difficulties recalling (especially negative) attachment-related experiences 
(Edelstein, 2006; Fraley et al., 2000; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995). In relation to 
this, Fraley et al. proposed that avoidant individuals’ memory deficits result from 
attentional mechanisms that limit the processing of potentially threatening 
stimuli (Fraley et al., 2000). Furthermore, researchers using a morph-movie 
paradigm - in which a series of facial expressions ranging in intensity are 
presented - have also interpreted their results as reflecting attentionally mediated 
biases associated with attachment style (Niedenthal, Brauer, Robin, & Ines-ker, 
2002; Fraley, Niedenthal, Marks, Brumbaugh, & Vicary, 2006). Note, however, 
that this method may be more closely related to interpretational, rather than 
attentional, processes. Other studies adopted a categorical approach for 
measuring attachment styles and/or relied on an emotional Stroop task for 
measuring attention (Edelstein & Gillath, 2008; Zeijlmans Van Emmichoven, et 
al., 2003), which also suffers from interpretative difficulties regarding the study 
of attentional processes (Mogg, Bradley, Dixon, Fisher, Twelftree, & 
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McWilliams, 2000).5 These examples make clear that most studies to date have 
focused on the possible effects of attention, rather than measuring attention 
allocation directly. As such, they can provide only suggestive, but not 
conclusive, evidence on selective attention as a function of attachment. More 
valid tests are thus needed to investigate the assumed relationships between 
attachment style and attention to emotional information. Moreover, no research 
to date has investigated the role of attention in regulating proximity goals by 
focusing on attention to attachment figure-related cues.  
Because little is known about attachment-related differences in attention, the 
general attentional bias literature could be informative for research on the link 
between attachment and attention to emotional information. An important 
finding in this literature is that high-anxious individuals preferentially allocate 
attention to threat-related information (see Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1997, for a review), whereas low-anxious individuals sometimes 
direct their attention away from threat (e.g., Bradley et al., 1997, MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Several models have been proposed to clarify the role 
of selective attention in the development of anxiety disorders. Initially, schema- 
and associative-network theories were prominent in explaining selective 
attention associated with anxiety (e.g., Williams et al., 1997). According to these 
theories, high-anxious individuals would possess threat schemas that are more 
elaborated and thus more readily activated by threat-cues than those of low-
anxious individuals (Beck, 1976). Such threat schemas are assumed to guide 
attention towards schema-congruent information, which leads to the 
confirmation and intensification of those schemas and eventually contributes to 
the maintenance of anxiety. Recall that this schema-idea is closely related to the 
concept of working models which are also likely to perpetuate through positive 
feedback loops (e.g., Fraley & Waller, 1998). That is, people are assumed to 
automatically - in the sense of unintentionally, uncontrollably, unconsciously, 
and efficiently (see Moors & De Houwer, 2006) - encode information in terms of 
their past attachment experiences that are mentally represented in working 
models, creating a confirmation bias. Over the years, schema-theories have been 
criticized and other models have been put forward (e.g., Mathews, & 
                                                     
5 The studies directly relevant to our research questions will be described in more detail in the 
corresponding chapters. 
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Mackintosh, 1998; Eysenck, 1992, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). Probably most directly related to the 
present research is the model of Eysenck (1997), who postulated that attentional 
biases are a function of both anxiety and defensiveness. His idea is based on the 
observation that so-called ‘repressors’- defined as scoring low on anxiety and 
high on defensiveness - display greater physiological arousal in response to 
threat, compared with true low-anxious and high-anxious individuals, while 
reporting little subjective experience of distress (Weinberger, 1990; Weinberger, 
Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). Eysenck suggested that this discrepancy may be 
explained by their attentional pattern that would be characterized by attentional 
avoidance of internal and external threat-cues. Although there has been some 
discussion about the extent to which repressive coping and attachment avoidance 
are related (despite the conceptual and empirical overlap, see Fraley, et al., 
1998), the idea that attentional biases differ depending on the level of both 
anxiety and defensiveness, is intuitively appealing in terms of attachment theory.  
In addition to providing evidence on the relation between attachment style 
and attention to threatening and emotional information, the present research 
project also aimed at investigating the role of attention in regulating proximity, 
once the attachment system has been activated. According to attachment theory, 
the experience of threat evokes attentional responses that vary according the 
goals one is likely to adopt. More specifically, it is assumed that the encounter 
with threat automatically activates security-goals, which in turn drive the 
perceiver’s attention towards a goal-helpful object - such as the attachment 
figure - who can provide feelings of comfort and reduce negative affect (also see 
Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004). These attentional patterns are likely 
influenced by one’s chronically active (sub-)goals that are stored in attachment 
working models (cfr. infra). Hence, when confronted with attachment figure-
related cues, the attentional pattern of anxious individuals should be driven by 
proximity goals oriented towards the attachment figure, whereas avoidant 
individuals would orient attention away from such cues.   
To assess individual differences in attentional biases for emotional 
information, a variety of experimental methods have been used, including 
dichotic listening (Cherry, 1953), modified emotional Stroop (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1985), eye tracking (Bradley, Mogg, Millar, 2000), visual dot-probe 
(MacLeod et al., 1986), and exogenous cueing tasks (Posner, 1980). In the 
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present series of studies, we have relied on the dot-probe and exogenous cueing 
tasks, because these are most widely used in the attentional bias literature and 
provide a more direct measure of spatial attention (compared to for example the 
emotional Stroop task). The procedure of these tasks will be described in detail 
in the corresponding chapters. Attentional effects may vary as a function of the 
specific stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), which can range from 20 to 3000 ms. 
This is consistent with theory and research suggesting that attention is a complex 
behaviour occurring in stages (e.g., Posner, 1995). Given its wide-spread use in 
the literature, we used an SOA of 500 ms in our studies. Furthermore, we used 
pictures and words as stimulus material, because both types of stimuli may elicit 
different attentional effects. That is, pictures are assumed to be more potent 
threat signals than words, because they would represent a biologically prepared 
and less conditioned form of threat (e.g., LeDoux, 1995; Ohman, 1993). On the 
other hand, pictures cannot unambiguously represent socially complex emotions 
such as rejection, feelings of abandonment and so on, which are highly relevant 
emotions in attachment research. Therefore, we have selected verbal stimulus 
material as well. Finally, because individuals are most likely to direct their 
attention towards information that is most relevant to their current concerns and 
produces the greatest degree of schema-activation (e.g., Higgins & King, 1981), 
we expected that the attentional biases associated with attachment working 
models will be most evident for interpersonal, attachment-relevant information.  
Behavioural Response Patterns: Attachment and Automatic Action Tendencies  
Another part of the model on attachment system dynamics that needs further 
examination concerns attachment-style differences in behavioural action 
tendencies. Individuals are expected to have encoded as part of their working 
models a set of goals that are associated with concrete plans and action 
tendencies for regulating and attaining these goals (see Collins et al., 2004). 
Research has shown that goals can be activated automatically by situational cues 
and in turn automatically influence affective and behavioural processing (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Ferguson, et al., 2007). People are thus likely to 
pursue goals with little awareness, intention, effort, or control, and automatically 
initiate and regulate plans and behaviour in ways designed to fulfil active goals 
(e.g, Bargh, 1990; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001). 
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In this section, we focus specifically on the attachment-related behavioural 
responses that result from goal-activation. In the following section, we will 
discuss in more detail the underlying behavioural goals that are part of 
attachment working models.  
Given that behavioural strategies are contingent on one’s history of 
attachment experiences, it is likely that one’s attachment style will bias the kind 
of goals and action tendencies that people habitually pursue in their attachment 
relationships. In other words, attachment working models will automatically 
elicit behavioural tendencies that reflect the beliefs, goals, and interpersonal 
expectations that comprise these models. Being a core element in attachment 
system functioning, the present research focused specifically on proximity-
seeking behaviour, which is the primary attachment strategy for attaining felt 
security. In relation to this, the theory predicts that attachment security is 
associated with seeking proximity towards the attachment figure when feeling 
distressed. Anxious individuals are assumed to intensify their proximity-seeking 
efforts and persistently pursue excessive closeness with the attachment figure. 
Avoidant individuals, on the other hand, are expected to inhibit the expression of 
proximity seeking as a means to maintain autonomy and interpersonal distance, 
especially in the context of distress. Most of the evidence stemming from self-
report and behavioural observation studies could confirm the predicted 
behavioural responses associated with secure and avoidant attachment (e.g., 
Carnelley, Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1996; Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Simpson, et al., 
1992). However, no support was found for the assumed heightened proximity-
seeking behaviour in anxious individuals, although it has been demonstrated that 
attachment anxiety does relate to proximity goals (e.g., Gillath, et al., 2006). In 
order to explain this discrepancy, we believe it is useful to make a distinction 
between the level of action tendencies and the level of actual behaviour, an idea 
that stems from the approach-avoidance motivation literature (see Carver & 
Scheier, 1981, 1998; Carver, 2006; Elliot, 2006). In fact, integrating this 
literature with current ideas on attachment may be most interesting from both a 
theoretical and empirical point of view.  
It is generally assumed that behaviour is built from two distinct kinds of 
action tendencies, namely approach and avoidance, which are driven by 
approach and avoidance goals. Approach goals are desirable conditions that 
people wish to attain, which motivates regulatory efforts to reduce the 
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discrepancy between one’s current and desired goal-state. Avoidance goals, on 
the other hand, are undesirable conditions that people wish to evade (i.e., ‘anti-
goals’), which facilitates discrepancy-enlarging loops. The idea that behaviour is 
driven by approach and avoidance goals is inherently present in the model on 
attachment system functioning. That is, proximity seeking can be conceptualized 
as a goal-directed action tendency aimed at reducing the discrepancy between 
one’s actual (i.e., distress, insecurity) and desired (i.e., security) state. Within 
this motivational view, attachment anxiety would be characterized by approach 
goals that drive approach tendencies oriented towards the attachment figure, 
whereas attachment avoidance would be driven by avoidance tendencies away 
from the attachment figure. These action tendencies are likely to operate 
automatically and may or may not be translated directly into overt behavioural 
responses. That is, several other competing goals (and resulting appraisals) may 
obscure the relation between action tendencies and actual behaviour. Hence, in 
order to gain deeper insight into the behavioural responses associated with 
different attachment styles, it is most important to focus not only on behaviour, 
but also on its proximal determinants, namely goals and action tendencies.  
Identifying individual differences in plans and action tendencies that operate 
at the automatic level requires the use of experimental paradigms. Other 
measures such as self-report and behavioural observation are less suitable for 
assessing automatic behavioural tendencies. As described earlier, self-report 
questionnaires are unable to measure behavioural responses at the process-level, 
but can tap only into the outcome of a certain process. Furthermore, the 
observation of behaviour may also impose a constraint on the study of automatic 
action tendencies because the actual manifestation of behaviour is likely to be 
determined by both controlled and automatic processes. Hence, in order to draw 
firm conclusions on the presumed automatic nature of proximity-seeking 
tendencies, it is essential to study these behavioural strategies under conditions 
of automaticity whereby the likelihood that controlled processes influence the 
outcome are reduced at minimum.  
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ATTACHMENT REPRESENTATIONS 
Attachment-Related Goals 
 As already described in the previous section, goals are an integral part of 
attachment working models. During the past decades, motivational research has 
shown that goals are cognitive structures representing the desired end-state that 
people want to attain. Such mental representations can be activated without 
conscious intention, thus automatically (e.g., Bargh, 1990; Bargh et al., 2001; 
Ferguson, et al., 2007). Given that goals provide an orienting framework for the 
direction of cognitive resources and behaviour (e.g., Srull, & Wyer, 1986), it is 
likely that goals play a key role in the regulation of attachment-related affect. 
Hence, in order to understand the underlying source of the attentional patterns, 
appraisals, distress-reactions, and proximity behaviour associated with 
attachment-style differences, it is essential to examine the goals that drive these 
attachment processes. 
In the case of the attachment system, several goal-states can be delineated 
including security, self-protection, proximity, independence, distance, etc. Given 
that these goals have been developed in light of past attachment experiences, 
important attachment-style differences can be expected in the goal-
representations associated with attachment working models. Attachment theory 
predicts that secure individuals desire intimate attachment relationships and seek 
a balance between closeness and autonomy. Anxious individuals also desire 
intimate relationships, but their negative self-view and their additional need for 
approval may lead them to seek extreme levels of closeness and lower levels of 
autonomy. Avoidant individuals, on the other hand, are assumed to limit 
intimacy and pursue self-protective motives such as self-reliance, independence 
and (emotional/physical) distance. Given the safety-regulation function of the 
attachment system, both secure and insecure attachment strategies are primarily 
driven by the overarching goal of felt-security. As such, goals exist in a goal-
hierarchy, in which security functions as a higher-level goal that can be attained 
through the pursuit of lower-level or sub-goals. Normatively, security will be 
attained through seeking proximity towards the attachment figure. However, 
because insecure individuals have repeatedly experienced that proximity goals 
and their associated action tendencies failed in achieving security, they needed to 
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reorganize their value-system. In this context, Carver and Scheier (1998) have 
suggested that, in the face of adversity, people are likely to interrupt their 
behaviour and assess the likelihood of attaining the goal, which is based on 
retrieving ‘chronic expectancies’ from memory. If the expectancies towards 
success are sufficiently positive (‘hope’), one will continue pursuing the goal. 
However, if one has negative expectations, one is likely to withdraw from goal-
pursuit. Applied to attachment differences, it appears that avoidant individuals 
have disengaged from proximity goals and adopted alternative goals (i.e., 
distance and independence) to achieve security. Anxious individuals, in contrast, 
hold on to proximity goals, which would imply that they have positive 
expectancies regarding goal-attainment. However, it is equally plausible to 
assume that anxious individuals do hold pessimistic appraisals of goal-pursuit, 
but stay committed to the (unattainable) goal because they have no alternative to 
achieve security due to their sense of self as weak and vulnerable. This variation 
in how people attempt to achieve felt security may arise from differences in 
social learning histories (cfr. supra). Given that avoidant individuals have 
repeatedly experienced rejection in the past, they have learned to suppress their 
proximity-seeking efforts. As a result, they are less sensitive to positive 
outcomes and place less value at attachment needs, because they are chronically 
concerned with reducing their fear of intimacy and maintaining their well-
practiced defences (Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000). Attachment anxiety, in 
contrast, would originate from a history of inconsistent, and thus sometimes 
positive, responses from their attachment figure. Given that their proximity-
seeking efforts are sometimes successful in attaining security, proximity goals 
have been acquired based on a partial reinforcement schedule which makes them 
insensitive to extinction 
Of particular interest are the anxious and avoidant patterns of attachment 
which are thought to reflect opposing strategies for regulating emotions and 
behaviour. The above overview makes clear that the working models associated 
with attachment anxiety and avoidance include opposite goals (i.e., proximity 
versus distance goals) that are likely to result in opposite cognitive, affective, 
and behavioural responses. Although there is little empirical work that directly 
assesses the goal-structures associated with attachment anxiety and avoidance, a 
few studies point to some important patterns. Research has confirmed that 
attachment avoidance is indeed associated with the pursuit of distance and 
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personal control, whereas attachment anxiety is related to proximity and security 
goals (e.g., Carnelley, Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1996; Rom & Mikulincer, 2003). 
There is also evidence demonstrating that attachment-related goals can be 
activated automatically (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1993; Gillath et al., 2006; 
Mikulincer, 1998a). Nevertheless, most of the research on automatic attachment 
goals did not tap directly into the specific goal-representations that promote or 
inhibit proximity behaviour, but rather focused on the automatic activation of 
goal-related knowledge in response to particular contexts and/or measured the 
accessibility of goals (as inferred from the lexical decision times to identify goal-
related words). More empirical research is thus needed that directly assesses the 
implicit motivational constructs associated with attachment style-differences. To 
address this need for additional research, the Implicit Association Test could be a 
useful tool for examining the automatic pursuit and evaluation of proximity and 
distance goals as mental representations of desired end-states, which are stored 
in attachment working models.  
Attachment-Related Self-Representations 
 According to the original writings of Bolwby (1969), knowledge about the 
self and others constitute one of the most important components of attachment 
working models. Such beliefs stem from past attachment experiences and play a 
crucial role in guiding emotional appraisals and shaping attachment behaviour. 
Research on this topic is thus of central theoretical relevance. Recall that because 
attachment security has evolved from repeated interactions with an available, 
caring, and supportive attachment figure, these individuals are expected to 
perceive themselves as worthy of love and others as available and reliable. 
Insecure individuals, on the other hand, have experienced frustrating interactions 
with an unavailable, inconsistent, or rejecting attachment figure, which is 
assumed to result in the development of vulnerable and unstable self- and other-
evaluations that are contingent on relationship-experiences and strongly 
influenced by defensive, distorting biases (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Anxious 
individuals are believed to have intense doubts about their own self-worth, 
lovability and competence, and would hold negative or rather ambivalent 
appraisals of their attachment figure. Avoidant individuals, on the other hand, are 
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assumed to perceive themselves as self-competent and self-efficient, and would 
hold negative beliefs about others’ traits and intentions.  
At present, a large body of evidence stemming from self-report studies has 
provided (partial) support for the predicted associations between attachment 
styles and global positive and negative self- and other-views (e.g., Griffin & 
Bartholomew, 1994, Collins & Read, 1994; for an overview, see Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2007). However, because people are especially prone to make biased 
and self-protective judgements when evaluating themselves and others (e.g., 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), and because working models are likely to exert an 
automatic influence on these judgements (e.g., Collins et al., 2004), attachment 
researchers have started to rely on implicit measures to explore whether 
attachment style-differences relate to implicit evaluations of self and others. 
Using the lexical decision task and emotional Stroop task, these studies have 
revealed the important information that self-representations may vary across 
context and level of responding, especially in the case of attachment avoidance 
(see Mikulincer, 1995, 1998b; Mikulincer, et al., 2004). The main conclusion of 
these studies was that the positive self-view of avoidant individuals should be 
regarded as less stable and less authentic than that of secure individuals, and 
should be interpreted as a defensive and strategic attempt to convince others of 
their competence and self-efficacy (Mikulincer, 1998b). The fact that implicit 
measures were able to reveal unique and valuable information on the defensive 
nature of avoidant individuals’ self-view encourages further use of those 
measures in research on attachment-related constructs. 
Even though response-latency paradigms, such as the lexical decision task 
and emotional Stroop, have proven to be useful for examining the implicit 
features of working models, they do not allow one to tap directly into the 
automatic positive or negative evaluations associated with self and others. For 
this purpose, affective priming techniques may be better suited. However, 
previous research using such techniques failed to find significant (or 
theoretically expected) differences in automatic attitudes towards significant 
others (Banse, 1999, 2001). Another tool that could be useful for investigating 
attachment-differences in self- and other-evaluations is the Implicit Association 
Test. The latter has proven to be a valid measure of implicit self-esteem 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and has shown to be more reliable for assessing 
individual differences than most other implicit measures (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & 
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Pennebaker, 2000). In recent studies, Zayas and Shoda (2005) and Banse and 
Kowalick (2007) did indeed demonstrate that the IAT is able to capture 
attachment-related differences in automatic reactions towards the attachment 
figure. More precisely, both studies showed that securely attached individuals 
(as measured by the RQ) automatically associate their attachment figure with a 
more positive evaluation. In addition, the results of Zayas and Shoda also 
revealed a significant association between attachment avoidance (as measured 
with the ECR) and a more negative implicit evaluation of the attachment figure. 
Importantly, the Zayas and Shoda study also measured automatic self-
evaluations. However, they failed to find a significant relationship with 
attachment style.  
Although the IAT and other implicit measures hold promise for investigating 
implicit beliefs in the context of attachment, current research on automatic self- 
and other-evaluations is limited in important ways. More specifically, most of 
the studies to date did not create the right conditions in terms of situational 
context and stimulus material. More research is thus needed to further explore 
the role of implicit self- and other-beliefs in attachment system functioning. The 
study presented in this dissertation took a first step in this endeavour by focusing 
specifically on the implicit attachment self-concept, as measured by the IAT, and 
its relation with individual differences in attachment style. Drawing more closely 
on the original predictions of attachment theory and current (social-cognitive) 
ideas on the self-concept, we aimed at providing a more direct test of 
attachment-related differences in implicit self-evaluations.  
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
Because more direct tests are needed to investigate implicit attachment-
related representations and automatic cognitive-motivational processes, we have 
conducted a series of studies exploring attachment-style differences in attention, 
action tendencies, goals, and self-representations. These studies have been 
subdivided into two main parts.  
 
In the first part of this dissertation, we present four chapters that examine the 
influence of attachment working models on automatic attachment processes. 
Chapters 1 to 3 investigated attachment-related differences in attentional 
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processing and Chapter 4 focused specifically on automatic action tendencies. 
The above literature-review suggests that selective attention to relationship-
relevant information plays a crucial role in the activation and regulation of the 
attachment system and has important implications for emotional functioning in 
close relationships. Yet, little research has thus far been conducted in this area. 
Therefore, the first series of studies reported in this dissertation examined the 
role of selective attention as a strategy for regulating attachment-related distress 
and proximity to the attachment figure. In Chapter 1, we examined the relation 
between individual differences in attachment style and selective attention to 
threat, using a dot-probe task presenting (attachment-related and general) 
positive and threatening words. In a related study, which is presented in Chapter 
2, we aimed at replicating and extending the results of Chapter 1 using more 
potent threat cues, namely pictures of emotional face expressions, and another 
attentional task, namely an emotional modification of the exogenous cueing task. 
In Chapter 3, four experiments are reported that investigated the role of 
attention in regulating (psychological) proximity towards the attachment figure, 
using a dot-probe task in which the names of the participant, the attachment 
figure, an acquaintance, and a neutral person were presented. In addition to 
investigating proximity seeking at the cognitive level, the present research was 
also interested in investigating this central regulatory process at the behavioural 
level. To better understand attachment-related behavioural responses, we argued 
that it may be useful to conceptualize proximity seeking as an automatic 
approach-avoidance tendency. In Chapter 4, we present two studies in which we 
investigated the relation between individual differences in attachment style and 
automatic approach-avoidance tendencies. For this purpose, we adopted an 
approach-avoidance SRC task in which participants made symbolic approach 
and avoidance movements towards or away from attachment figure- and 
acquaintance-related cues.  
 
In the second part of this dissertation, two chapters are presented that explore 
attachment-style differences in automatically activated attachment-related 
representations. The existing literature suggests that adults with different 
attachment styles differ in the content of their working models. So far, most of 
the research on this topic has relied on explicit, self-report measures. However, 
in the literature-review reported above, we have provided several theoretical and 
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empirical reasons for measuring both implicit and explicit features of working 
models. More research is thus needed that directly assesses implicit attachment 
representations. Because goals and self-representations are central components 
of the attachment behavioural system, this research project focused on these 
specific representations and investigated their relation with individual 
differences in attachment style. Chapter 5 documents three studies that aimed at 
tapping into the behavioural goals underlying attachment anxiety and avoidance, 
namely proximity and distance, and measured these goals both at the implicit 
(using the IAT) and explicit level (using self-report questionnaires). The study 
reported in Chapter 6 focused on attachment-style differences in the implicit 
attachment self-concept. We adapted the design of a previous study on implicit 
self-evaluations using the IAT, in an attempt to increase the validity of this task 
as a tool for investigating attachment working models. 
 
The various chapters presented in this dissertation are an exact copy of the 
original manuscripts. The dissertation ends with a general discussion of the 
presented research, in which our most relevant findings will be summarized and 
discussed in terms of their theoretical implications. Finally, we point to the 
limitations of our work and formulate a number of guidelines for future research. 
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ABSTRACT  
In the present study, we examined selective attention for emotional word 
stimuli as a function of individual differences in attachment style. Participants 
completed a dot-probe task in which a general threat, attachment-related threat, 
general positive, or attachment-related positive word was presented together 
with a neutral word. Results showed that attachment anxiety and avoidance were 
associated with an attentional bias away from attachment threat words. This 
attentional avoidance effect was best predicted by the interaction between 
attachment anxiety and avoidance, and not by their unique main effects. The 
findings are discussed in relation to attachment theory and the general literature 
on attentional biases. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Based on Dewitte, M., Koster, E. H. W., De Houwer, J., & Buysse, A. (2007). Attentive 
processing of threat and adult attachment: A dot-probe study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
45, 1307-1317. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An important assumption of attachment theory is that early attachment 
experiences translate into mental representations of self and others, which have 
been related to many essential intra- and interpersonal processes (see 
Pietromonaco & Barret, 2000). These ‘working models’ can be regarded as 
cognitive schemas that provide an orienting framework for directing cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioural responses throughout the lifespan. Recent 
developments in attachment research have pointed to the crucial role of 
attachment in affect regulation and cognitive functioning through the selective 
processing of attachment-relevant information (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). In 
relation to this, it has been argued that selective attention represents a key 
strategy for the activation and regulation of the attachment system and that 
individuals differ in their ability to regulate attention to emotional stimuli as a 
function of existing goals, beliefs, and expectations (Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 
1985). Furthermore, the attachment literature suggests that insecure attachment 
orientations are characterized and maintained in part by attentional biases. Few 
empirical studies to date have, however, examined attention in the context of 
attachment, despite the theoretical importance of this regulatory process. The 
present study was therefore designed to investigate the impact of mental 
representations of attachment on selective attention to threatening information. 
We start by presenting the main assumptions on the role of attention in 
attachment system functioning. 
Attachment Theory 
In his seminal work on attachment, Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980, 1982) 
proposed that both children and adults have an innate attachment behavioural 
system that is manifested in seeking proximity to the attachment figure in times 
of need. He postulated that threatening stimuli are highly potent cues for 
activating the attachment system and that internal working models of attachment 
filter incoming, potentially threatening information by directing attention 
towards schema-congruent material (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). In addition to 
the selection of incoming information, attentional factors have also been linked 
to the regulation of the attachment system (Main, 1990). That is, by actively 
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orienting to or avoiding attachment-relevant information, one can magnify or 
reduce emotional experiences. 
Beyond describing the normative aspects of the attachment system, Bowlby 
(1973) also delineated individual differences in the functioning of the system, 
which can be traced back to early attachment experiences. When faced with 
threat, people seek for protection and support from the attachment figure. If 
these bids for care and protection are successfully met, a sense of security and 
safety will be attained, encouraging an open mind-set to explore the 
environment. This is part of the primary attachment strategy and is characteristic 
of securely attached individuals. However, when the attachment figure is 
perceived as being unavailable or unresponsive to one’s needs, no distress 
alleviation will be experienced and people will adopt alternative strategies for 
dealing with distress. This may result in so-called hyperactivation or deactivation 
of the attachment system (Main, 1990) which corresponds with attachment 
anxiety and avoidance respectively (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998). 
Hyperactivating strategies are characterized by an excessive desire for closeness, 
preoccupation with cues of attachment figure unavailability, amplification of 
threat appraisals, vigilance to distress cues, and mental rumination on negative 
emotions. These strategies may lead to a chronic activation of the attachment 
system and are a distinctive feature of attachment anxiety. Deactivating 
strategies, on the other hand, are characteristic of attachment avoidance and aim 
at down-regulating the attachment system by inhibiting attachment needs, 
diverting attention away from distress cues, and emphasizing a sense of self-
reliance in coping with distress. Basically, these strategies involve suppression 
and repression of any emotion or thought that may cause unwanted activation of 
the attachment system (i.e., especially threat- and attachment cues) (Fraley & 
Shaver, 2000; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).   
From this perspective, attachment working models can be viewed as 
providing organizational rules that guide responses to distress. Accordingly, 
important attachment-style differences can be expected in the way in which 
threatening information is processed.  
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Attachment and Attention 
Evidence on the relation between attachment representations and attention 
allocation primarily stems from research into child attachment. Although 
attachment theory clearly predicts vigilance to threat in anxious individuals and 
avoidance of threat in avoidant individuals, research has demonstrated that, in a 
distressing separation context, anxiously as well as avoidantly attached children 
look away from attachment-related pictures (Main, et al., 1985). In another 
study, selective attentional processing was examined using two simultaneously 
presented drawings depicting attachment-relevant positive information and 
attachment-irrelevant neutral information. The results of this study indicated that 
both anxiously and avoidantly attached children direct attention away from 
attachment-related information (Kirsh & Cassidy, 1997). Interestingly, when 
varying the valence of the pictures (i.e., attachment-related positive, neutral, and 
threatening pictures), it was shown that only avoidant children direct attention 
away from both positive and negative pictures (Kirsh & Cassidy, 1997). No 
significant attentional bias effects were found in the other attachment groups. In 
general, the aforementioned studies revealed that insecurely attached children 
process threatening information differently from secure children. However, no 
evidence was found for differential attentional processing as a function of the 
specific type of attachment insecurity (i.e., anxious versus avoidant).  
In the context of adult attachment, one prior study directly investigated 
attachment-style differences in selective attention for threatening, positive, and 
neutral stimuli (Zeijlmans Van Emmichoven, Van Ijzendoorn, deRuiter, & 
Brosschot, 2003). Attentional bias was measured by an emotional Stroop task 
that was administered in a sample of anxiety disordered patients and a non-
clinical sample. In broad strokes, it was found that securely attached anxiety 
disordered patients showed a larger Stroop interference effect on threat words 
than insecure (anxious as well as avoidant) patients. This led the authors to 
conclude that secure individuals are more open to process threatening 
information than insecure patients, who seem to ignore or avoid the threatening 
nature of the word stimuli. In the non-clinical group, insecure participants 
showed slower response latencies than secure ones, but none of the two 
attachment groups showed specific interference effects. As in child research, the 
findings on attention in adults could not confirm theoretical predictions, but 
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rather indicated a general effect of attachment security versus insecurity on 
attentional processing.   
One important reason for the absence of specific Stroop effects in the non-
clinical group may be that the stimuli used in the research of Zeijlmans Van 
Emmichoven (2003) were general threat words that did not refer to specific 
attachment-related concerns. According to Beck’s view on cognitive processing 
(Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985), attention allocation is related to 
the specific content of the stimuli, indicating that people preferentially process 
information that is personally relevant and schema-congruent. A second remark 
on the aforementioned study concerns the use of the emotional Stroop task as a 
measure of attention allocation. Researchers have noted several interpretive 
difficulties with the Stroop task (summarized by Mogg et al., 2000). Most 
importantly, it has been argued that the Stroop-effect does not reflect attention, 
but arises from other factors such as interruption effects or task-irrelevant 
processes (e.g., de Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994). Moreover, it has been suggested 
that interference occurs at the level of response generation rather than attention 
allocation (Rosenfeld & Skogsberg, 2006). As such, interference in the Stroop 
task may indicate either vigilance towards threat or avoidance of threat, a 
distinction that could be crucial in investigating attentional biases as a function 
of attachment style. Therefore, it is useful to look for other paradigms that 
provide a less ambiguous measure of attentional processing, such as for example 
the dot-probe task (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & 
Van Ijzendoorn, 2007, for a review of differences between the Stroop and dot 
probe task). A final remark on the study of Zeijlmans Van Emmichoven and 
colleagues concerns the fact that they adopted a categorical approach to measure 
individual differences in attachment. By classifying participants into attachment 
categories, this study can provide only partial information on attentional 
processing in the context of attachment, because the use of categories does not 
allow one to examine possible interaction effects between anxiety and 
avoidance. Furthermore, because data were collapsed across insecure 
individuals, the independent contribution of attachment anxiety and avoidance 
could not be determined. In addition, Zeijlmans Van Emmichoven and 
colleagues adopted a developmental approach to attachment research by using 
the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985) to assess 
individual differences in attachment style. The AAI focuses on attachment 
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representations, defensive strategies, and discourse properties and has been 
designed to measure working models of early child-parent relationships, not 
adult close relationships. Accordingly, the narrative approach on attachment-
style differences clearly differs from self-report measures of attachment, both in 
the conceptual and empirical sense (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). To our 
knowledge, no study to date has investigated the relation between attentional 
processing of threat stimuli and attachment style as measured by a self-report 
questionnaire. 
The Present Study  
Taking into account the above remarks, we investigated selective attention 
for general as well as attachment-related threat words as a function of attachment 
style. We also included positive words in order to examine whether selective 
attention for threat would be specific to negative stimuli or would operate for 
emotional stimuli (i.e., positive and negative) in general. Attention for these 
words was examined using the dot-probe paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, & 
Tata, 1986). On each trial, two words (one relevant, one neutral) were presented 
simultaneously at two different spatial locations on the screen. Immediately after 
these stimuli have been removed from the screen, a small dot probe appeared at 
the position of one of the two stimuli and participants were asked to respond as 
quickly as possible to the location of the dot. Responding on trials where a probe 
was presented at the same location as a relevant (i.e., non-neutral) word 
(“congruent” trial) was compared with responding on trials where a probe was 
presented at the opposite location of a relevant word (“incongruent” trial). If 
individuals selectively attend to words of a particular category, responses will be 
faster when the probe follows at the location previously occupied by words from 
this category.  
 The Experiences in Close Relationships Scale-revised (ECR-revised; Fraley, 
Waller & Brennan, 2000) was used to measure the two dimensions assumed to 
underlie individual differences in attachment, namely attachment anxiety and 
avoidance. This questionnaire has been developed in light of the dimensional 
view on attachment and provides for each participant a score on both attachment 
dimensions, which allows for testing the joint effect of attachment anxiety and 
avoidance on attention allocation. Importantly, no study to date has found the 
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predicted vigilance-effect in anxiously attached individuals. Instead, research has 
shown that anxious individuals display the same attentional pattern as avoidant 
individuals. In relation to this, it is possible that the previously observed 
attentional avoidance-effect in insecure individuals is qualified by an interaction 
effect between attachment anxiety and avoidance. In previous studies on 
attachment and attention (e.g. Kirsch & Cassidy, 1997; Zeijlmans van 
Emmichoven, 2003), this hypothesis could not be examined because participants 
were classified into one of three or four mutually exclusive attachment 
categories. We argue that in order to better understand the dynamic functioning 
of the attachment system, it is necessary to investigate how the two attachment 
dimensions of anxiety and avoidance operate in interaction with each other.  
Hypotheses 
Hypotheses from attachment theory are relatively straightforward: 
Attachment anxiety is assumed to be associated with an attentional bias towards 
(general as well as attachment-related) threatening information, whereas 
attachment avoidance would be associated with an attentional bias away from 
threat. On the other hand, because previous research has demonstrated that both 
attachment anxiety and avoidance are related to attentional avoidance of threat, it 
can also be expected that anxiety and avoidance will show a similar pattern of 
attentional responding.  In the present study, we examined this differential 
prediction. In addition, we explored whether selective attention to threat is an 
interactive function of both attachment anxiety and avoidance.  
METHOD 
Participants 
Thirty-nine first year psychology students (32 women, 7 men) participated in 
the experiment as a part of their course requirements. 
Materials and Procedure 
The stimulus material for the dot probe task consisted of 5 categories of 
words: 8 general threat words (e.g., death, dangerous, painful), 8 attachment-
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related threat words (e.g., separation, rejected, ignored), 8 general positive words 
(e.g., health, happy, satisfied), 8 attachment-related positive words (e.g., 
proximity, security, supporting) and 32 neutral words (e.g., furniture, universe, 
balanced). These words were drawn from attachment literature and previous 
research on anxiety-related attentional biases (e.g., Fox, 1993; Mogg, Bradley, 
Mathews, & Williams, 1993, 1995). Each word was paired with a neutral word, 
matched for both length and frequency (Hermans & De Houwer, 1994), to create 
32 critical word pairs. Another set of 64 neutral words were paired to create 32 
filler trials. The stimuli were presented in black uppercase letters in an Arial font 
with a font size of 38. The probe detection task was programmed and presented 
using the INQUISIT Milliseconds software package (INQUISIT 2.01, 2005) on 
a Pentium II computer with a 15-inch colour monitor. 
 Attachment style was measured using a Dutch translation of the ECR-revised 
(Fraley, et al., 2000; ECR-R-NL, Buysse & Dewitte, 2004). This questionnaire 
contains 36 statements that refer to anxiety and avoidance in attachment 
relationships. Two attachment scores were computed by averaging the items on 
the two subscales of anxiety and avoidance. This questionnaire has proven to be 
internally consistent and adequate in terms of construct validity (Brennan et al., 
1998). In the current sample, Cronbach’s alphas were high for the Anxiety 
subscale (α = .92) as well as for the Avoidance subscale (α = .89). As 
recommended, we asked our participants to fill in the questionnaire while 
holding their primary attachment figure in mind. 
 
Procedure. After signing an informed consent form, participants were seated 
behind the computer at a distance of approximately 60 cm from the screen. 
Instructions on the computer screen informed them that they would perform a 
dot detection task. The task began with 10 practice trials, followed by 192 test 
trials. Each trial started with a fixation cross that was presented for 500 ms in the 
middle of the screen. Then, a word pair appeared that remained visible for 500 
ms. Words in each pair were presented one above the other at a distance of 5 cm 
above and below the centre of the screen. As the word pairs disappeared, a small 
dot-probe (5 mm diameter) replaced one of the two words and remained on the 
screen until participants responded. Participants had to indicate the probe 
location by pressing one of two buttons as quickly and accurately as possible on 
a standard AZERTY-keyboard: the Q key with the left index finger when the 
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probe was presented at the upper location and the M key with the right index 
finger when the probe was presented at the lower location. Word pairs were 
presented in fully randomized order across trials and participants. The words as 
well as the dot probe were presented equally often at the top or bottom position 
of the screen, and the dot-probe was equally likely to replace either a relevant or 
a neutral word. Each trial type was presented four times and the inter-trial 
interval was set to 500 ms. The self-report questionnaires were administered 
after the dot-probe task.  
RESULTS 
Latencies from trials with errors were removed (less than 3 % in each 
condition) as well as reaction times (RTs) shorter than 200 ms or longer than 
2000 ms, which were considered as outliers. In addition, probe detection 
latencies that were three standard deviations above or below the individual mean 
were also excluded from statistical analyses (also see Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004).  
 
Table 1 
Mean reaction times (in ms) and standard deviations of target responses in the dot probe 
task as a function of trial type and congruency
Trial type Congruency M SD 
General threat Congruent 365 49 
 Incongruent 363 42 
Attachment-related threat Congruent 368 47 
 Incongruent 363 44 
General positive Congruent 364 44 
 Incongruent 367 46 
Attachment positive Congruent 363 48 
 Incongruent 365 45 
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Mean response latencies for each trial type are presented in Table 1. The 
reaction times on the dot-probe task were analysed using a 4 (Valence: general 
threat, attachment threat, general positive and attachment positive) x 2 
(Congruency: congruent, incongruent) repeated measures ANOVA. This 
analysis revealed no significant effects (all Fs < 1), suggesting that, overall, 
participants did not preferentially allocate attention towards certain stimulus 
categories.  
Next, we investigated the correlations between anxious and avoidant 
attachment and the four attentional bias scores (general threat, attachment threat, 
general positive and attachment positive). The attentional bias scores were 
calculated by subtracting the average detection time on congruent trials from the 
average detection time on incongruent trials (see Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 
2000). Table 2 shows that attachment anxiety as well as attachment avoidance 
correlated significantly and negatively with the attentional bias score for 
attachment threat. Furthermore, the correlation between attachment anxiety and 
the attentional bias for general threat words almost reached significance. None of 
the other correlations were significant (all ps >.10). 
 
Table 2 
Correlations between attentional bias and attachment dimensions as a function of trial 
type  
 Attachment 
anxiety 
Attachment 
avoidance 
General threat -.31* -.16 
Attachment threat -.41** -.40** 
General positive .24 .10 
Attachment positive .25 .19 
* p < .10, ** p ≤ .01 
 
The relation between attachment styles and selective attention was further 
analysed using a regression approach. Hierarchical regressions were performed, 
entering the four attentional bias scores as dependent variables and the two 
attachment dimensions (anxiety and avoidance) and their interaction term as 
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predictor variables. In a first step, attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance 
were entered as predictors and their unique main effects on attention were 
examined. In a second step, the multiplicative product of attachment anxiety and 
avoidance was entered to asses the effect of their interaction while controlling 
for their main effects. Because the anxiety and avoidance subscales of the ECR-
R were significantly correlated (r = .42, p < .01), the predictor variables were 
centred around their respective means to reduce possible problems of 
multicollinearity (see Aiken & West, 1991).  
Only the regressions on the attentional bias index for attachment threat words 
revealed significant effects, F(3, 38) = 5.63; p < .01. Specifically, the interaction 
term between attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance significantly 
predicted attentional avoidance of attachment-related threat words, β = -.32, 
t(38) = -2.22, p < .05.2 Although the model with the two attachment dimensions 
as unique predictors revealed an overall significant effect, F (2, 38) = 5.39, p < 
.01, the unique main effects of attachment anxiety (β = - .29;   p = .08) and 
avoidance (β = -.28; p = .09) were only marginally significant predictors of 
selective avoidance of attachment threat words. In a post hoc probing procedure, 
the statistically significant interaction was interpreted by plotting regression lines 
for high and low values on both attachment dimensions (Aiken & West, 1991; 
Holmbeck, 2002). That is, we tested whether the association between attachment 
anxiety and attentional avoidance of attachment threat words would be 
conditional on the values of attachment avoidance and vice versa, which 
corresponds to conducting a moderation analysis (see Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
First, we plotted regression lines for high (+1 SD above the mean) and low (-1 
SD above the mean) values of attachment avoidance (see Figure 1). Significance 
tests for slopes indicated that only the simple slope for the High avoidance 
regression line (β = -.65, p <.01) was significant. The simple slope for the Low 
avoidance regression line (β = .08, p >.10) was not significant. This suggests that 
attachment anxiety is significantly associated with attentional avoidance of 
                                                     
2 We also tested for the specificity of these effects by repeating the regression analyses on the 
attentional bias scores and adding trait anxiety – as measured by the STAI (Spielberger et al., 
1983) – as an extra predictor variable beyond attachment anxiety, avoidance, and their interaction 
term. This analysis revealed no significant main effect of trait anxiety in predicting attention to 
attachment threat, β = .08; p > .10, suggesting that trait anxiety cannot account for the observed 
effects.
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attachment threat, only in interaction with high scores on attachment avoidance. 
As we already reported above, the interaction term between the predictor (i.e., 
attachment anxiety) and the moderator variable (i.e., attachment avoidance) was 
statistically significant, indicating that the two simple slopes for low and high 
values of attachment avoidance were significantly different from one another.  
 
Fig. 1. Attentional bias for attachment threat as a function of attachment anxiety and 
avoidance, with attachment avoidance as moderator variable 
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We repeated these analyses, but this time with attachment anxiety as the 
moderator variable (see Figure 2). Significance tests for slopes indicated that 
only the simple slope for the High anxiety regression line (β = -.57, p <.01) was 
significant. The simple slope for the Low anxiety regression line (β = .16,  
p >.10) was not significant. This suggests that attachment avoidance is 
significantly associated with attentional avoidance of attachment threat, only in 
interaction with high scores on attachment anxiety. Again, because the 
interaction term between the predictor (i.e., attachment avoidance) and the 
moderator variable (i.e., attachment anxiety) was statistically significant, one can 
conclude that the two simple slopes for low and high values of attachment 
anxiety were significantly different from one another. 
The regressions on the attentional bias index for general threat stimuli as a 
dependent variable revealed no significant unique or interactive effects of 
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attachment anxiety and avoidance, F(2, 38) = 1.90,  p > .10 and F(3, 38) = 1.80,  
p > .10 respectively. Similarly, no significant unique or interactive effects of 
attachment anxiety and avoidance were found for the attentional bias indices for 
general positive and attachment positive words (all Fs < 1.5). 
 
Fig. 2. Attentional bias for attachment threat as a function of attachment anxiety and 
avoidance, with attachment anxiety as moderator variable 
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DISCUSSION 
In the present study, we examined selective attention to threat stimuli as a 
function of adult attachment style. More specifically, we examined the main and 
interactive effects of attachment anxiety and avoidance on attention for positive 
and negative attachment-related and attachment-unrelated words. We found that 
(1) attachment anxiety and avoidance were associated with an attentional bias 
away from negative attachment-related words, (2) the best predictor of this 
attentional avoidance effect was the interaction between attachment anxiety and 
avoidance, and (3) the attentional avoidance effect was specific to attachment-
related threat words. We will discuss each of these effects below.  
Attachment theory predicts clear differentiated patterns of attention in 
anxious and avoidant individuals: High anxious individuals are assumed to be 
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hypervigilant to threat cues, whereas avoidant individuals are assumed to avert 
their attention away from threat (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). However, studies 
on attachment and attention in children and adults have largely failed to support 
these predictions (Kirsch & Cassidy, 1997; Main et al., 1985; Zeijlmans Van 
Emmichoven et al., 2003). In line with these previous studies, our data showed 
that attachment anxiety and avoidance yield similar response patterns in 
attentional processing, namely attentional avoidance of attachment threat. Our 
results were thus not compatible with theoretical predictions on attentional 
processing of attachment-related threat.  
Instead, multiple regressions showed that attentional avoidance of 
attachment-related threat was best predicted by the interaction between anxiety 
and avoidance. Whereas previous studies looked only at the main effects of 
anxiety and avoidance (or the effect of secure versus insecure) and found that 
both anxious and avoidant individuals display attentional avoidance, the present 
study provided important new information on this issue. We adopted a 
dimensional approach, which enabled us to test the joint effect of the two 
attachment dimensions on selective attention. The results of our slope analyses 
revealed that specifically the combination of high attachment anxiety and high 
attachment avoidance is associated with an avoidant attentional style.  
An explanation for this finding could be found in the work of Bartholomew 
(1990). She noticed that the avoidant pattern of attachment conflates two distinct 
forms of avoidance, namely fearful-avoidance and dismissive-avoidance. Fearful 
attached individuals display an avoidant pattern of attachment in combination 
with high levels of anxiety. Such individuals are assumed to avoid attachment-
related information out of fear for the negative consequences of attachment (e.g., 
rejection, hurt). Hence, averting attention away from attachment threat stimuli 
might be a strategic attempt to alleviate the anxious mood state elicited by the 
aversive stimuli and thereby protecting themselves from painful memories of 
past attachment experiences (Main & Hesse, 1990). The latter idea bears many 
similarities with the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis that has been proposed in 
studies on trait anxiety. This theory holds that early vigilance to threat is 
followed by strategic avoidance of threat as a means to reduce subjective distress 
(Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
It is noteworthy that no study to date has found evidence that anxiously 
attached individuals turn their attention towards (general or attachment-related) 
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threat. Given that vigilance to threat is an important prediction of attachment 
theory, this null finding should be explored further. Drawing on the idea that 
attentional vigilance occurs in early, automatic stages of processing (see Mogg 
& Bradley, 1998), it is possible that the expected attentional bias effect in 
anxiously attached individuals will be apparent only when stimuli are presented 
at shorter stimulus durations. This hypothesis could be tested by examining the 
time-course of attention to threat (see Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & Van 
Damme, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004). 
A closer look at the regression slopes also revealed that the low anxiety and 
low avoidance regression lines were both non-significant with regard to selective 
attention for attachment threat. This seems to suggest that low anxious-low 
avoidant (i.e., secure) individuals do not preferentially allocate attention towards 
attachment threat, in contrast with high anxious and high avoidant individuals 
who show an avoidant pattern of attention. Subsequent analyses further 
supported the idea that insecure individuals limit attention to threatening words. 
That is, when dividing our sample in a secure-insecure group (based on a median 
split), an independent sample t-test on the attentional bias index for attachment 
threat yielded a significant difference between secure and insecure participants, 
with insecure ones being avoidant of attachment threat. This is consistent with 
previous research demonstrating differential attentional processing as a function 
of secure versus insecure attachment (Kirsh & Cassidy, 1997; Zeijlmans Van 
Emmichoven et al., 2003).  
In the present study, attentional bias effects emerged only for attachment-
related threat words. No attentional effects were found for general threat words 
or positive information. These results are compatible with Beck’s content-
specificity hypothesis (1976) stating that attentional biases are most likely to 
occur for stimuli that are consistent with the cognitive schemas that occupy the 
individual’s mind. Hence, the inclusion of stimuli that explicitly refer to an 
attachment-related content appears essential for investigating selective 
information processing as a function of attachment. Another explanation for the 
absence of selective attention to general threat words could be that the word 
stimuli used in the present study did not elicit sufficient distress and anxiety. In 
relation to this, it has been argued that words are less powerful in attracting 
attention than threatening pictures (Kindt & Brosschot, 1997). However, our 
primary interest in attachment-specific threat urged us to use word stimuli 
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because such stimuli provide precise semantic control and because it is difficult 
to find pictures that explicitly represent negative attachment experiences.  
Another two remarks can be made on the present study. First, it is worth 
noting that the two attachment dimensions of anxiety and avoidance, as 
measured by the ECR, were significantly related, which opposes the theoretical 
prediction that anxiety and avoidance are orthogonal constructs (Bartholomew & 
Horowitz, 1991; see also Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). A second remark 
concerns the fact that our sample is skewed in terms of gender, which prevented 
us from investigating possible gender differences in the relation between 
attachment and attention. However, because we did not find any differences in 
attachment styles and attentional biases between the men and women included in 
our sample, and because attachment research has revealed no or only weak 
gender differences in attachment styles (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Schmitt et al, 
2003), we do not regard the unequal distribution of gender as truly problematic 
in the present study. Nevertheless, the issue of gender differences in attentional 
biases should receive more careful attention in future research. 
To our knowledge, the current study is among the first to examine selective 
attention in relation to adult attachment. Attentional bias effects have been 
studied extensively in the context of anxiety disorders. As such, this literature 
can provide a broader framework for interpreting our results. In fact, it has 
already been argued that attachment theory and cognitive formulations of 
anxiety bear many similarities (e.g. Besser & Priel, 2003; Carnelley, et al., 1994; 
Roberts, Gotlib & Kassel, 1996). The present study supports this theoretical link 
because our results show parallels with research on attention and anxiety. More 
specifically, the finding that the interaction between anxiety and avoidance 
determines attention to threat is largely compatible with Eysenck’s (1997) notion 
that cognitive processing of threat is a function of both anxiety and 
defensiveness. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the effects of anxiety 
and defensiveness are most evident for socially-relevant threat words (Fox, 
1993), which is in line with our finding that the attentional avoidance effect was 
specific to attachment-related threat words. Such words are by definition 
interpersonally oriented. Given these parallels between attachment theory and 
theories on anxiety, and given the important role of early (interpersonal) adverse 
experiences in the development of clinical anxiety, the study of selective 
attention in adult attachment could be useful to advance our knowledge on the 
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link between attachment and psychopathology (e.g., Carnelley, Pietromonaco, & 
Jaffe, 1994; Roberts, Gotlib, & Kassel, 1996). More systematic research is 
needed to investigate the interaction between emotional disorders and attachment 
representations by including clinical samples in the study of attachment 
phenomena. Furthermore, research on the link between attachment and 
attentional processing has promising implications for clinical work. By 
understanding these links (and the social and emotional outcomes associated 
with these links), clinicians could begin to develop interventions that target 
defensive, inflexible, and/or negative types of information-processing. This is 
particularly important when considering that attentional processes mediated by 
affect regulation have the secondary effect of biasing interpretations and 
memories of interpersonal experiences. Through their influence on higher-order 
cognitive processes, attentional biases are likely to have consequences for biases 
in beliefs and expectations which, in turn, influence the allocation of attention. 
Accordingly, attentional biases can function as positive feedback loops, 
becoming increasingly resistant to change and associated with increasingly 
dysfunctional emotional states and behaviours. 
In conclusion, our study represents an important preliminary investigation of 
selective attention in the research field of adult attachment. Our results suggest 
that high levels of attachment anxiety and avoidance incline people to direct 
attention away from attachment-related threatening information. Drawing on the 
general literature on attentional biases, it can be suggested that this avoidant 
attentional style assists in mood regulation in insecure individuals by reducing 
anxious mood states in a self-regulatory way. Such cognitive processes may 
develop from adverse attachment experiences and contribute to interpersonal as 
well as intrapersonal functioning. Hence, investigating attentional processing in 
the context of attachment could be extremely important for clarifying potential 
pathways through which internal psychological models of attachment 
relationships are linked to emotional experiences over the life course. 
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ABSTRACT  
In the present study, we investigated the relation between adult attachment 
styles and attention for happy, angry, and neutral emotional face expressions. 
Using a modified version of the exogenous cueing paradigm, we found that the 
combination of high attachment anxiety and high attachment avoidance was 
associated with reduced attention for angry faces. We also observed that anxious 
individuals tended to orient attention away from happy faces, especially in 
combination with high scores on attachment avoidance. These findings replicate 
and extend the results of a previous study and provide additional information on 
the role of attention in adult attachment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Dewitte, M., & De Houwer, J. (in press). Adult attachment and attention to positive and 
negative emotional face expressions. Journal of Research in Personality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Attachment theory provides a useful framework for understanding individual 
differences in emotion regulation (Bolwby, 1962, 1982). According to this 
theory, the attachment system is critical in the regulation of distress because it 
motivates people to seek or maintain proximity to the attachment figure when 
encountering threat. Yet, whether or not people will attain the desired state of 
felt security through proximity seeking is largely determined by one’s appraisal 
of attachment figure availability and one’s expectations about the likelihood of 
attaining proximity goals. As such, interindividual differences exist in how the 
attachment system is likely to function and this variability in attachment 
orientation is commonly described in terms of two dimensions of attachment 
insecurity, namely anxiety and avoidance. Recently, the role of attachment-
related negative biases in several aspects of information processing has been 
emphasized (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). In this context, it has been argued 
that attentional processes play a key role in the triggering and regulation of the 
attachment system and clear predictions can be made on the relation between 
attachment style and attention (Bowlby, 1969, 1982; Main & Hesse, 1990). 
Specifically, it can be assumed that anxious individuals adopt a hypervigilant 
attentional style that is oriented towards threat and signs of attachment figure 
unavailability, whereas attachment avoidance is characterized by dismissal of 
threatening information in an attempt to prevent activation of the attachment 
system. Although attention is widely implicated in attachment system 
functioning, little research has been directed at investigating whether the 
different attachment strategies guide attention towards or away from threat in the 
predicted ways.  
So far, most of the research on the attachment-attention link could not 
confirm the predicted differences in attentional processing as a function of the 
specific type of attachment insecurity. Instead, it was found that both anxious 
and avoidant individuals orient attention away from threat and negative 
emotional information (Kirsh, & Cassidy, 1997; Main, Kaplan & Cassidy, 1985; 
Van Emmichoven, Van Ijzendoorn, De Ruiter, & Brosschot, 2003). However, 
these preliminary studies on attention generally adopted a categorical, rather than 
a dimensional, approach to measure attachment-style differences and did not use 
appropriate experimental tasks that allow one to draw unambiguous conclusions 
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about the spatial orientation of attention. Dewitte, Koster, De Houwer, and 
Buysse (2007) therefore conducted a new study in which they did adopt a 
dimensional approach towards individual differences in attachment and used a 
dot-probe task to examine the spatial allocation of attention. As stimulus 
material, they used attachment-related threat, general threat, attachment-related 
positive, and general positive words. This study revealed that attachment 
insecurity was associated with an attentional bias away from attachment threat 
words and this attentional avoidance effect was best predicted by the interaction 
between high attachment anxiety and high attachment avoidance. Note that these 
results contradict the theoretical prediction that attachment anxiety is associated 
with enhanced attention for (relational) threat.  
Because the study of Dewitte et al. (2007) is thus far the only one that 
directly examined the relation between attachment dimensions and attention 
allocation to threat, we conducted a new study aimed at replicating and 
extending the previous results using a different type of stimuli and a different 
attentional task. In the present study, pictures of emotional face expressions were 
presented in an exogenous cueing task (Posner, 1980). We selected pictures of 
happy, angry, and neutral faces because pictures represent more potent and 
ecological valid threat cues than words (Bradley et al., 1997) and because happy 
and angry faces might be interpreted as signalling attachment figure availability 
and unavailability, which are central attachment concerns.2  In relation to the 
latter, previous research has shown that memory and attention impairments are 
specific to attachment-related themes (e.g., Dewitte et al, 2007; Edelstein, 2006). 
The exogenous cueing task is, together with the dot probe task, one of the most 
widely used tasks in attentional bias research and provides information on the 
underlying mechanisms of attention allocation. In a modified cueing paradigm, a 
target stimulus appears at one of two spatial locations, cued by an emotional 
stimulus that precedes the same (‘valid trial’) or the opposite spatial location of 
the target (‘invalid trial’). Faster responding on valid trials compared with 
                                                     
2 Previous research has already used emotional faces in the context of attachment (Fraley, 
Niedenthal, Marks, Brumbaugh, & Vicary, 2006; Maier, Bernier, Pekrun, Zimmerman, Strasser, & 
Grossmann, 2005; Niedenthal, Brauer, Robin, & Innes-Ker, 2002). In these studies, a morph movie 
paradigm has been adopted in which a happy, angry, or sad face changed gradually into a neutral 
one and vice versa. Yet, this morph task is more likely to measure one’s interpretation of the 
emotional face rather than registering the direction of spatial attention to the facial cue. 
88  CHAPTER 2 
invalid trials is called the ‘cue validity effect’, which is an index of attention 
allocation to the cue. Contrary to the dot-probe task, neutral and emotional 
stimuli are not presented simultaneously, which allows determining whether 
attention is drawn by emotional cues (i.e., attentional engagement) or whether 
people have difficulties in disengaging attention from emotional cues (Fox, 
Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). 
Based on the results of the Dewitte et al. (2007), we predict that the 
interaction between attachment anxiety and avoidance will be related to reduced 
attention for angry faces. In the case of happy faces, however, it is difficult to 
make specific predictions. Because the attachment system is primarily oriented 
towards coping with negative information, attachment theory incorporates few 
assumptions about the processing of positive information as a function of 
attachment style. Furthermore, previous research revealed no relationship 
between attention for positive words and individual differences in attachment 
style (Dewitte et al., 2007; Van Emmichoven et al., 2003). 
METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-two first year psychology students (28 women, 14 men) participated in 
the experiment as a part of their course requirements. 
Materials 
 The stimuli for the exogenous cueing task were pictures of angry, happy, and 
neutral faces, taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) data 
base (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). All were adjusted to the same size 
(326 pixels x 326 pixels). 12 pictures (4 angry, 4 happy, 4 neutral pictures) were 
selected for the practice trials and 48 pictures (16 pictures of each emotion 
category) for the test trials. The exogenous cueing task was programmed using 
the INQUISIT Millisecond software Package (Inquisit 2.01, 2005) and presented 
on a Pentium II computer with a 17 inch colour monitor. Participants responded 
by pressing the Q or M key of an AZERTY keyboard. 
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Attachment style was measured using a Dutch translation of the Experiences 
in Close Relationships Scale-revised (ECR-R; Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000; 
ECR-R-NL, Buysse & Dewitte, 2004) which has proven to be internally 
consistent and adequate in terms of construct validity. In the current sample, 
Cronbach’s alphas were high for the Anxiety subscale (α = .92) as well as for the 
Avoidance subscale (α = .84). As recommended, we asked our participants to fill 
in the questionnaire while holding their primary attachment figure in mind. 
Procedure 
After signing an informed consent form, participants were seated behind the 
computer at a distance of approximately 60 cm from the screen. Instructions on 
the computer screen informed them to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible to the location of a target, which could appear on the left or right side of 
the computer screen. Participants were also informed that, before the target 
appeared, a picture would be presented at the same or the opposite location of 
the target. The location of the picture cued the spatial position of the target on 50 
% of the trials (valid trials) and the opposite position on the other 50 % of the 
trials (invalid trials).  
The task began with 12 practice trials, followed by 192 test trials. Each trial 
started with the presentation of two white frames (8.5 cm high by 7 cm wide) on 
a black background and located on both sides of a fixation cross. The frames 
remained on the screen throughout the entire trial. After 500 ms, a face picture 
was presented for 500 ms, replacing one of the two frames. Next, the face was 
masked for 50 ms by a white frame in order to prevent impaired target detection 
by after-effects of the picture. Then, the target (a black square of 1.1 x 1.1 cm, 1° 
x 1°) appeared and remained on the screen until the participant responded. The 
order of the trials was determined randomly. Each emotional picture was 
presented four times and the inter-trial interval was 500 ms. The ECR-R was 
administered after the dot-probe task.  
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RESULTS 
Latencies from trials with errors were removed as well as reaction times 
(RTs) shorter than 200 ms or longer than 750 ms (see Koster, Crombez, Van 
Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004). Additionally, probe detection 
latencies that were three standard deviations above or below the individual mean 
were excluded from statistical analyses. In total, 3.3 % of the data were removed 
for these reasons.  
A Valence (angry, happy, neutral) x Cue validity (valid, invalid) repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant cue validity effect, F(1, 41) = 39.10, p 
< .01, indicating faster responding on valid trials (M = 318 ms) than on invalid 
trials (M = 332 ms). No other effects were significant, Fs < 1.2. 
To investigate the relation between attention and individual differences in 
attachment style, three attentional indices were calculated: (1) cue validity effect 
= RTs on invalid trials - RTs on valid trials; (2) engagement effect = RTs on 
neutral valid trials - RTs on happy or angry valid trials; (3) disengagement effect 
= RTs on invalid happy or angry trials - RTs on invalid neutral trials (Fox et al., 
2001). On all three indices, a positive score indicates that attention is directed 
more towards the cue. One-sample t-test revealed that the cue validity effects 
were significant for all three emotional expressions, t(1, 41) = 6.02, p < .01 for 
angry faces, t(1, 41) = 3.57, p < .01 for happy faces, and t(1, 41) = 5.71, p < .01 
for neutral faces, whereas the engagement and disengagement effects did not 
reach significance (all p’s > .10).  
Next, a multivariate regression analysis was conducted, entering the cue 
validity effects for angry, happy, and neutral faces as dependent variables and 
attachment anxiety, avoidance, and their interaction term as predictors. To 
reduce the effects of multicollinearity, the predictor variables were centred 
(Aiken & West, 1991). This analysis revealed a multivariate main effect of 
attachment anxiety, F(1,36) = 4.60, p < .01, and a marginally significant 
multivariate effect of the interaction between anxiety and avoidance, F(1,36) = 
2.54, p = .07. To interpret these effects, post hoc univariate analyses were 
conducted on each of the attentional bias indices.  
The univariate analyses on the cue validity effect for angry faces yielded a 
marginally significant main effect of attachment anxiety, β = -.31, t(3, 38) =          
-1.88, p = .07, and a significant interaction of attachment anxiety and avoidance, 
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β = -.36, t(3, 38) = -2.20, p < .05. To interpret this statistically significant 
interaction term, we plotted regression lines for high (+1 SD above the mean) 
and low (-1 SD below the mean) values of both attachment dimensions 
(Holmbeck, 2002). When attachment avoidance was considered as the moderator 
variable, significance tests for both slopes indicated that only the High avoidance 
regression line was significant, β = -.78, t(3, 38) = -2.46, p < .05. The slope for 
the Low avoidance regression line did not reach significance, β = .15, p > .10. 
This indicates that a higher score on attachment anxiety is related to a decrease 
in the attentional bias for angry faces, but only when attachment avoidance is 
high (see Figure 1). When attachment anxiety was treated as the moderator 
variable, a similar pattern emerged. That is, the High anxiety regression line was 
marginally significant, β = -.52, t(3, 38) = -1.91, p = .06, whereas the Low 
anxiety slope did not reach significance, β = .41, p > .10. This suggests that 
higher levels of attachment avoidance were associated with reduced attention for 
angry faces, but only when attachment anxiety was high (see Figure 2). 
 
Fig. 1. Attentional bias for angry faces as a function of attachment anxiety and 
avoidance, with attachment avoidance as moderator variable  
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Fig. 2. Attentional bias for angry faces as a function of attachment anxiety and 
avoidance, with attachment anxiety as moderator variable 
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The analyses on the cue validity effect for happy faces revealed a significant 
main effect of attachment anxiety, β = -.46, t(3, 38) = -2.83, p < .01. This 
indicates that higher scores on attachment anxiety were related to reduced 
attention for happy faces. A marginally significant interaction effect of 
attachment anxiety and avoidance was found as well, β = -.29, t(3, 38) = -1.8, p 
= .07. By plotting the regression lines for high and low values on both 
attachment dimensions, it was found that only the High avoidance slope was 
significant, β = .-.82, t(3, 38) = -2.70, p < .01, but not the Low avoidance slope, 
β = -.05, p >.10. This suggests that attachment anxiety was associated with 
reduced attention for happy faces only in combination with high scores on 
attachment avoidance (see Figure 3). The analyses with anxiety as the moderator 
variable did not reveal significant effects, ts < 1.5.  
Finally, no significant relations were found between attachment style and the 
cue validity for neutral faces. The latter indicates that the effects of attachment 
anxiety and the interaction between anxiety and avoidance were specific to the 
cue validity effects for emotional (i.e., angry and happy) faces. The multivariate 
analyses on the engagement and disengagement scores revealed no significant 
effects, Fs < 1.05. 
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Fig. 3. Attentional bias for happy faces as a function of attachment anxiety and 
avoidance, with attachment avoidance as moderator variable 
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 DISCUSSION 
The present study aimed at further examining attachment-style differences in 
selective attention for emotional cues. The results on attentional processing of 
angry faces were in line with those of Dewitte et al. (2007). In both studies, the 
combination of high scores on attachment anxiety and avoidance was associated 
with a decrease in attention for relationally threatening stimuli. Hence, the 
results of the present study attest to the reliability and generality of the results of 
Dewitte et al. The attentional pattern observed in this and previous studies could 
be explained by referring to the defensive processing mechanisms that are 
characteristic of high anxious-high avoidant (i.e., fearfully attached) individuals. 
Their continuous fear of being rejected and hurt by significant others may incline 
the latter to use emotion-minimizing strategies that involve pre-emptively 
redirecting attention away from threatening information in order to prevent that 
negative affect will be encoded and experienced. As such, their avoidant 
attentional style may serve as a protective bias, that is, protecting them from 
being overwhelmed by negative emotions and memories (see also Main & 
Hesse, 1990).  
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No support was found for the presumed attentional styles of anxious and 
avoidant individuals (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). That is, attachment anxiety 
was associated with a tendency to direct attention away from negative emotional 
information. When considering expressions of anger as signalling both 
attachment figure unavailability and rejection, it does seem remarkable that 
anxious individuals do not show the predicted vigilance to threat. However, 
taking into account their hypersensitivity to rejection cues, it is reasonable to 
assume that limiting attention to negative information is functional in 
maintaining their attention on current goals (i.e., proximity maintenance). 
Furthermore, the observed attentional avoidance effect could also be regarded as 
a defensive response towards information that makes salient their underlying 
fear. It is also worth noting that avoidant individuals, who are thought to be 
defensive regarding negative emotions as a means to minimize their impact, do 
not avoid negative stimuli when they are not feeling relationally anxious as well. 
In fact, the present results revealed a main effect of attachment anxiety, where 
we would expect a main effect of attachment avoidance. In other words, 
attachment avoidance does not seem to be the critical dimension in averting 
attention away from threat, which would have been expected based on 
attachment theory. However, in interpreting these results, it is important to bear 
in mind that the effect of attachment anxiety on attention allocation should not 
be considered independent from the effect of attachment avoidance and vice 
versa. That is, both dimensions have a joint effect on directing attention to threat, 
an idea which is in line with the theory of Eysenck (1997) on anxiety and 
defensiveness.  
The present study also revealed that attachment anxiety was related to 
reduced attention for happy faces. Although attachment theory does not make 
specific predictions regarding the processing of positive information, this result 
seems at first sight contra-intuitive, given that happy faces signal acceptance and 
willingness to provide care and support. Such signals are highly desirable for 
anxiously attached individuals. Again, it should be noted that the effect of 
attachment anxiety on attention to happy faces tended to be qualified by a 
marginally significant interaction effect between anxiety and avoidance, 
indicating that the negative relation between anxiety and attention to positive 
cues was conditional on high scores on attachment avoidance. This result could 
be explained in light of the avoidant strategies underlying fearful attachment. 
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High anxious-high avoidant individuals are assumed to avoid intimacy and shy 
away from any emotional information out of fear that positive input will not be 
forthcoming and that negative information will be too intense (Bartholomew & 
Horowitz, 1991). Hence, looking away from cues that invite interpersonal 
interactions (such as a happy face) could be interpreted as an attempt to avoid 
the pain of disappointment and rejection. Also note that attentional avoidance 
emerged only when attachment avoidance, rather than attachment anxiety, was 
considered as the moderator variable. This result is in line with the work of 
Edelstein (2006) who also found that positive attachment-related constructs may 
activate the defensive processes that are characteristic of deactivating strategies.  
In conclusion, the present results provided additional support for the joint 
effect of attachment anxiety and avoidance on attention allocation and suggests 
that high anxious-high avoidant individuals tend to redirect attention form all 
emotional cues, and not only from negative cues. It is noteworthy that although 
happy and angry faces differ in terms of valence, they are both signalling other’s 
dominance (e.g., Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 2000) which may be considered as a 
negative incentive in terms of attachment bonding. The latter could possibly 
explain why a similar pattern was observed for both types of stimuli as a 
function of attachment style; a result that is actually in line with previous 
research on attention and perceptual processing in the context of attachment 
(Edelstein, 2006; Maier et al, 2005; Niedenthal et al, 2002).  
Still, several issues need to be addressed in future research. For instance, we 
have to be careful in interpreting the lack of vigilance-effects in anxious 
individuals because we presented the faces for 500 ms. This stimulus 
presentation time may have been sufficient to induce a vigilant-avoidant 
attentional pattern (Mogg, & Bradley, 1998). Hence, it is possible that anxious 
individuals do selectively attend to emotional stimuli when attention is assessed 
after a shorter stimulus presentation. In addition, it may be useful to choose other 
baseline stimuli than neutral faces, because it can be argued that these reflect 
ambiguous social information, which could interfere with attentional responses. 
Note that this might have been responsible for the lack of significant engagement 
and disengagement effects in the present study. Furthermore, using pictures of 
the actual attachment figure displaying different emotions might help to boost 
the attentional bias effects and is, in fact, necessary to prove the ecological 
validity of attentional paradigms in adult attachment research.  
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ABSTRACT  
In four experiments, we tested the assumption that, under conditions of threat, 
people will selectively direct attention to attachment figure-related cues and that 
this attentional effect will be related to individual differences in attachment style. 
Participants completed a dot probe task in which pairs of first names were 
presented. The name pairs consisted of the participant’s own name and a neutral 
name (Experiments 1-4), the name of their attachment figure and a neutral name 
(Experiments 1-4), or the name of an acquaintance and a neutral name 
(Experiments 2, 3, and 4). A significant attentional bias effect was found for the 
attachment name in an attachment-related context, regardless of whether the 
context was threatening or positive. The results of Experiment 2 provided 
evidence that the attentional bias effects were not driven by familiarity effects, 
whereas Experiment 4 excluded an interpretation in terms of salience. 
Attachment anxiety was associated with hypervigilance towards the attachment 
figure’s name in both a threatening and positive attachment context. Attachment 
avoidance was not related to any of the attentional bias effects. 
                                                     
1 Dewitte, M., De Houwer, J., Koster, E. H. W., & Buysse, A. (2007). What´s in a name: 
Attachment-related attentional bias. Emotion, 7, 535-545.
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INTRODUCTION 
Bowlby’s attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1982) has a strong influence on 
our present understanding of child and adult attachment. Although this theory 
already proposed an information-processing model of attachment, experimental 
research into the mechanisms by which people process attachment-related 
material is limited. Specifically early information-processing mechanisms such 
as attention, that are considered of key relevance in the regulation of the 
attachment system (Main, 1990), have not yet been studied systematically. 
Therefore, the present set of studies focuses on a neglected component of 
attachment system functioning by investigating the relation between attachment 
style and selective attention to attachment figure-related information in adults.  
Cognitive View on Attachment 
Central to Bowlby’s attachment theory is the concept of internal working 
models (IWM) that evolve out of early attachment experiences with primary 
caregivers. These basic cognitive structures are assumed to enclose specific 
beliefs, goals, and expectations as well as processes that influence the encoding 
of interpersonal information (Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000). Attachment 
working models are presumed to affect pathways from childhood to adulthood 
by shaping cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses that provide 
guidelines for coping with distress. One particularly important mechanism that 
might mediate linkages between past and present attachment representations is 
the process of selective attention. The latter has been argued to be of key 
relevance in extracting motivationally relevant information from our 
environment and hence guides our perception of the world. Furthermore, the 
deployment of attention is believed to be a crucial mechanism through which 
people regulate thoughts, feelings, goals, and behaviour (see Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Within the attachment domain, a few 
researchers have started to investigate the role of attentional biases in the 
processing of threatening information (Belsky, Spritz, & Crnic, 1996; Dewitte, 
Koster, De Houwer, & Buysse, 2007; Kirsch & Cassidy, 1997; Main, Kaplan, & 
Cassidy, 1985; Zeijlmans Van Emmichoven, Van Ijzendoorn, deRuiter, & 
Brosschot, 2003). However, attention involves more than the filtering of 
incoming information, which is just a first step in the activation of the 
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attachment system. That is, attention allocation may also serve important 
functions for the regulation of the attachment system once it has been activated. 
The Attachment Behavioural System 
A central tenet of Bowlby’s attachment theory (1969, 1982) is that children 
and adults have an innate attachment behavioural system that is organized 
around seeking proximity towards significant others in times of need. When 
there is no signal of threat or when the attachment figure is perceived as nearby 
and responsive to one’s needs, the attachment system remains quiescent and one 
feels safe and confident to engage in other behavioural activities (e.g., 
exploration and affiliation). Once a threat has been detected, however, the 
attachment system becomes automatically activated, resulting in feelings of 
insecurity. To deal with these distressing feelings, people seek proximity 
towards the attachment figure to get comfort and protection. When this 
attachment figure is perceived as available and thus willing to provide support, 
the individual regains a sense of ‘felt security’, ending the activation of the 
attachment system. Repeated interactions with an available attachment figure 
usually result in the development of positive expectations about the availability 
of others in times of need, which is characteristic of securely attached 
individuals. Conversely, when the attachment figure is appraised as being 
unavailable and unresponsive, feelings of insecurity remain active, which 
encourages the development of alternative strategies of affect regulation. The 
latter coincide with the development of negative expectations about the self 
and/or the other, which is characteristic of anxiously and avoidantly attached 
individuals (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998). Although both anxious and 
avoidant attachment are commonly referred to as insecure attachment, each style 
is associated with a distinct way for coping with distress. Anxiously attached 
individuals adopt hyperactivating strategies which are manifested in exaggerated 
threat appraisals, increased proximity-seeking behaviour, and hypervigilance 
towards the attachment figure. Avoidantly attached individuals, on the other 
hand, avoid attention and proximity to the attachment figure by deactivating the 
attachment system and relying on themselves to cope with distress (Fraley & 
Shaver, 2000; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).  
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This model clearly emphasizes that proximity seeking is a central coping 
mechanism for dealing with distress and that individual differences in 
attachment style contribute to distress-regulation by relying on, intensifying, or 
inhibiting proximity seeking towards the attachment figure. Given that the 
regulation of felt security and the maintenance of proximity are a central pursuit 
of IWM (Bretheron, 1985), it can be argued that IWM and their underlying 
processes play a key role in the regulation of the attachment system.  
The appealing nature of this model resides in the fact that it integrates a 
normative and intra-individual perspective on attachment, while putting forward 
several clear and verifiable assumptions. First of all, the attachment system gets 
activated only in threatening conditions. That is, attachment-related as well as 
attachment-unrelated threat cues trigger the operation of attachment processes in 
order to achieve the goal of proximity towards the attachment figure. This stress-
attachment link has been well-documented in the literature. Several studies 
among infants as well as adults have demonstrated that the encounter with 
stressful events such as separation (e.g. Ainsworth, 1978; Fraley & Shaver, 
1998), thoughts about loss (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1997), interpersonal conflict 
(Noller, Feeney, Bonnell, & Callan, 1994; Pietromonaco & Barrett, 1997), 
distress (Mikulincer, 1998; Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992), and 
attachment-related and -unrelated threat words (Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Woddis, 
& Nachmias, 2000; Mikulincer, Gillath, & Shaver, 2002) increases proximity 
seeking at the behavioural as well as at the cognitive level. These studies also 
showed that individual differences in attachment style influence the experience 
and expression of attachment system activation. Mikulincer and colleagues 
(2000) have provided interesting evidence on this behalf. In three experiments 
using a lexical decision task after priming of a threat or neutral word, they found 
that secure individuals react to threat-primes with heightened accessibility of 
proximity-related thoughts. Anxious individuals, in contrast, had ready access to 
both proximity-related thoughts and worries following either a threatening or 
neutral prime, which points to their chronically active attachment system. 
Avoidantly attached individuals reacted the same as secure ones, except they 
displayed defensive suppression of proximity worries. Beyond these individual 
differences, the three attachment groups reacted to threat with heightened 
accessibility of proximity themes, which supports the normative component of 
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the stress-attachment link. This indicates that, in a distressing context, everyone 
undergoes (preconscious) activation of the attachment system. 
Secondly, the attachment behavioural system is specifically oriented towards 
the attachment figure. That is, only proximity to or thoughts about the 
attachment figure can stop or prevent activation of the attachment system. Three 
features are critical in distinguishing attachment figures from non-attachment 
figures (Hazan & Shaver, 1994; Hazan & Zeifman, 1994). First, this person 
should be a target of proximity maintenance, meaning that one enjoys close 
contact with the attachment figure and gets upset when separated from him/her. 
Secondly, an attachment figure is used as a safe haven in times of distress, 
illness, or danger, meaning that this person provides support, protection, and 
advice when feeling sad or upset. Third, an attachment figure is relied on as a 
secure base from which one can explore the world, because this person promotes 
feelings of confidence and security. Given that several persons can serve these 
attachment functions, it is generally believed that people can have more than one 
attachment figure (Collins & Read, 1990; Mikulincer & Arad, 1999; Ross & 
Spinner, 2001). In the present study, we were interested only in the primary 
attachment figure with whom one maintains a long-term and strong affective 
bond.  
 The third aspect of the attachment behavioural system that we want to 
emphasize is the most important one in terms of the present investigation. That 
is, adults, contrary to children, do not necessarily need the physical proximity of 
the attachment figure to obtain a sense of felt security. A mental representation 
of this person can suffice. Hence, threat automatically activates thoughts about 
the attachment figure, and these internal representations can become symbolic 
sources of protection (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). At the cognitive level, such 
mental representations might direct attentional resources towards attachment 
figure-related information. Accordingly, it can be argued that attentional factors 
contribute to proximity maintenance and as such influence the regulation of the 
attachment system.  
In summary, the attachment system (1) gets activated only in distressing 
conditions, (2) is specifically oriented towards the attachment figure and, once 
activated, (3) elicits a mental representation of the attachment figure as a means 
to obtain a sense of psychological proximity (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). On 
the basis of these three assumptions of the attachment behavioural system, one 
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can predict that, under conditions of threat, adults will selectively direct attention 
to information related to the attachment figure and this mechanism will be 
associated with individual differences in attachment style. The present studies 
were set out to test these hypotheses. There is one set of data that has some 
bearing on this research question. In three experiments, Mikulincer, Gillath, and 
Shaver (2002) primed their participants subliminally with (attachment-related as 
well as attachment-unrelated) threat words, followed by a lexical decision task in 
the first two studies and an emotional Stroop task in the third study. The target 
stimuli in these cognitive tasks were names of the attachment figure, close 
persons, known persons, and unknown persons. Their results showed that threat 
primes led to increased accessibility of attachment figure representations, as 
indicated by faster reaction times on the lexical decision task and longer colour-
naming latencies on the emotional Stroop task. They also found that this effect 
was stronger in anxious individuals, after priming a threatening and neutral 
word, whereas the effect was smaller (and even absent in an attachment-related 
threat context) in avoidant individuals. 
Although these data clearly show that information regarding the attachment 
figure is more accessible in a threatening context, they do not allow for the 
conclusion that people direct their attention to such information. In the present 
paper, we were specifically interested in attentional processes because these are 
at the heart of attachment theory. That is, internal working models are conceived 
as providing rules for the direction and organisation of attention (Main, Kaplan, 
& Cassidy, 1985), which implies that attentional factors play a key role in the 
activation and functioning of the attachment system. Hence, whereas the 
Mikulincer study was primarily interested in demonstrating attachment-system 
activation in the context of distress by measuring cognitive accessibility, we 
focused on the effect of attentional processes on the regulation of the attachment 
system. Moreover, the tasks used in previous research, namely the Stroop and 
lexical decision task, serve as measures of cognitive activation, but have been 
criticised as measures of attention allocation. Researchers have indicated some 
interpretative difficulties with these tasks. For instance, it has been argued that 
the Stroop-effect does not reflect attention, but arises from other factors such as 
interruption effects or task-irrelevant processes (e.g., de Ruiter & Brosschot, 
1994). In the case of attachment, the latter could be positive/negative thoughts 
about the attachment figure or other attachment-related thoughts, which compete 
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for attentional resources. Similar problems have been noted regarding lexical 
decision tasks (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Even if the Stroop and 
lexical decision tasks would capture a certain component of attention, it is 
certainly not the component of selective spatial attention that is in all likelihood 
crucial in the seeking for security and proximity from the attachment figure.  
The Present Study 
To investigate selective attention towards the attachment figure, we used a 
dot probe task (MacLeod et al, 1986), in which pairs of first names were 
presented. In the dot probe task, two stimuli, consisting of a critical stimulus and 
a neutral stimulus, are presented simultaneously at two different locations on the 
computer screen. After these stimuli have been removed from the screen, a small 
dot probe appears at the position of one of the two stimuli and participants are 
asked to respond as quickly as possible to the location of the dot. When the dot 
replaces the critical stimulus, this is called a congruent trial; when the dot 
appears at the location of the neutral stimulus, this is called an incongruent trial. 
The idea behind the dot probe task is that reaction times are faster on congruent 
trials than on incongruent trials because attention is already allocated at the 
location where the probe appears. This is labelled as a congruency effect and 
indicates selective attention. Compared with other attentional bias tasks, the dot 
probe task is particularly suitable for measuring selective attention, because the 
required response follows a double-stimulus presentation and thus implies the 
selection of one stimulus over another.  
Hypotheses 
As described earlier, the search for (psychological) proximity is part of the 
primary attachment strategy and can thus be regarded as a normative process. 
This implies that everyone is assumed to display an attentional bias effect 
towards the attachment figure in the context of distress. However, based on 
attachment theory and the aforementioned research, it can also be expected that 
individual differences in attachment style will modulate this attentional bias 
effect. Given that anxiously attached individuals are characterized by a 
hyperactive attachment system (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Mikulincer, Shaver, 
& Pereg, 2003), we hypothesized that the attentional bias effect for the name of 
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the attachment figure would become more pronounced as attachment anxiety 
increases. Attachment avoidance, on the other hand, should be negatively 
associated with selective attention for the attachment name because individuals 
scoring high on the avoidance dimension tend to deactivate their attachment 
system when confronted with threat (Mikulincer et al, 2002).  
 To investigate these hypotheses, we conducted four experiments. In 
Experiment 1, we explored whether an attentional bias effect towards the 
attachment figure’s name can indeed be found. In the second experiment, we 
examined whether this bias is specific to the attachment figure or driven by 
familiarity effects. Through systematic variation of the prime context, distressing 
(Exp 1) versus positive (Exp 3), we also investigated whether this effect is 
unique to a stress-eliciting context, as is postulated by attachment theory. The 
fourth experiment was designed to exclude the interpretation that selective 
attention for the attachment name is caused by potentially confounding factors 
such as salience. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The main objective of Experiment 1 was to examine selective attention for 
the attachment figure’s name in an attachment-related stress context. Stress was 
induced by a procedure in which participants were asked to imagine their 
attachment figure going abroad for a long period of time. In relation to this, 
research has demonstrated that asking people to imagine their attachment figure 
leaving them for a while generates an amount of distressing feelings (e.g., 
Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum, & Malishkewitz, 2002). Accordingly, being 
physically separated from the attachment figure can be regarded as a particularly 
potent cue for activating the attachment system, which makes people appeal to 
psychological sources of proximity. Subsequently, we administered a dot-probe 
task presenting stimulus pairs consisting of the first name of the attachment 
figure (i.e., attachment name) and a neutral name, and pairs consisting of the first 
name of the participant (i.e., own name) and a neutral name. Faster responding 
on congruent trials (dot appears at the location of the attachment or own name) 
than on incongruent trials (dot appears at the opposite location of the attachment 
or own name) indicates an attentional bias effect (MacLeod et al., 1986). Based 
on attachment theory, we expected to find an overall attentional bias effect 
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towards the name of the attachment figure. In addition, we predicted that this 
attentional effect would be stronger in anxiously attached individuals and weaker 
in avoidant individuals. By including trials with the name of the participant, we 
could verify whether the relation between selective attention and attachment 
style is specific to the attachment name. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Our sample consisted of 59 participants. Of those, 25 were visit students from 
high school (mean age was 17 years) who volunteered to participate. The 
remaining 34 were first year psychology students at Ghent University (mean age 
was 18 years) who participated in return for course credit.   
Materials 
As stimulus material we selected single names: the first name of the 
attachment figure, the first name of the participant, and neutral first names. We 
created three types of stimulus pairs: pairs in which the name of the attachment 
figure was combined with a neutral name, pairs in which the participant’s own 
name was combined with a neutral name, and filler pairs that consisted of two 
neutral names (to avoid habituation effects). We assured that each of the critical 
stimuli was assigned to one of the four neutral stimuli. Each name was presented 
equally often during the task. The names were presented in black uppercase 
letters (Arial Black, font size 38), at a distance of 5 cm above and below the 
centre of the screen. The probe detection task was programmed and presented 
with the INQUISIT Milliseconds software package (INQUISIT 2.01, 2005) on a 
Pentium II computer with a 15-inch colour monitor.  
 We used a Dutch translation of the revised Experiences in Close 
relationships Scale (ECR-R, Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000; ECR-R-NL, 
Buysse & Dewitte, 2004) to measure the two attachment dimensions of anxiety 
and avoidance. The Anxiety scale (18 items) taps fear of abandonment and 
strong desires for interpersonal merger, whereas the Avoidance scale (18 items) 
assesses discomfort with closeness, dependence, and intimate self-disclosure. 
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This questionnaire has proven to be internally consistent and adequate in terms 
of construct validity. In the current sample, Cronbach’s alphas were high for the 
Anxiety subscale (.89) as well as for the Avoidance subscale (.92). To ensure 
that we measured one’s relationship-specific attachment style, we asked our 
participants to fill in the questionnaire holding their primary attachment figure in 
mind. Also note that narrowing the target to one particular person is assumed to 
attenuate social desirability-effects (Stein et al., 2002). 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in groups of four participants. After signing 
an informed consent form, we identified the participants’ primary attachment 
figure, using the WHOTO scale which consists of six questions referring to the 
three critical features that distinguish attachment figures from non-attachment 
figures (proximity seeking and separation distress, safe haven, and secure base; 
Hazan & Zeifman, 1994). For each question, participants had to write the name 
of the person that best served each of these functions. The person that was listed 
most frequently was labelled as the primary attachment figure. In case of an 
exaequo, we chose as the attachment figure the person that satisfied the larger 
number of attachment-related functions (see Fraley, & Davis, 1997). Next, 
participants were asked to imagine this person going abroad for 1 to 2 years. 
This separation scenario served primarily to activate the attachment system (see 
Fraley & Shaver, 1998). After the priming task, they were instructed to select 
four neutral names from a name list of 50 male and 50 female names. A neutral 
name was defined as a name that did not represent anyone they knew. The 
neutral names from the name list were relatively ‘common’ names, ranging from 
short names to longer names. To match for word length, participants were urged 
to choose names with approximately the same number of letters as the name of 
their attachment figure. Subsequently, participants performed the dot probe task, 
followed by the ECR-R.  
 Participants were seated behind the computer at a distance of approximately 
60 cm from the screen to perform the dot probe task. Our version of the task 
consisted of an instruction screen, 12 practice trials, and 160 test trials. 
Participants were instructed to respond to a small dot that would appear at the 
upper or lower location of the screen. In addition, they were instructed to 
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respond as quickly and accurately as possible. All trials were presented in a 
random order. Each trial started with a fixation cross that was presented in the 
centre of the screen for 1000 ms. Then, a name pair appeared, with one name 
presented in the upper spatial location and the other name presented in the lower 
spatial location of the computer monitor. After 500 ms, these names disappeared 
and one of them was replaced by a small dot (5 mm diameter). When the probe 
was presented at the upper location, participants pressed the Q key with the left 
hand; when the probe was presented at the lower location, they pressed the M 
key with the right hand. The names and dot probes were presented equally often 
at the upper or lower position of the screen. The 160 test trials were divided in 
two blocks (without pause in between) of 80 trials, consisting of 32 own name – 
neutral pairs, 32 attachment name – neutral pairs and, 16 neutral – neutral pairs.  
Data analysis 
Reaction times were analysed using a Name (own name, attachment name) x 
Congruency (congruent, incongruent) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with both 
variables treated as within-subjects factors. In addition, attentional bias scores 
were calculated and then correlated with attachment anxiety and avoidance. To 
retain the full range of scores on the subscales of the ECR-R and in line with the 
dimensional view on attachment (Fraley et al., 2000), we preferred correlational 
analyses to inter-group analyses. The attentional bias indices were calculated by 
subtracting the average detection time on congruent trials from the average 
detection time on incongruent trials. A positive bias score indicates vigilance 
(shorter reaction times on congruent trials than on incongruent trials), whereas a 
negative bias score indicates avoidance (shorter reaction times on incongruent 
trials than on congruent trials) (see Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). 
RESULTS 
Latencies from trials with errors were removed (less than 3 % in each 
condition) as well as reaction times (RTs) shorter than 200 ms or longer than 
2000 ms, which were treated as outliers (see Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & 
De Houwer, 2004). Probe detection latencies that were three standard deviations 
110    CHAPTER 3 
above or below the individual mean were considered as additional outliers and 
excluded from statistical analyses. 
 Table 1 presents the mean response latencies for each trial type. The repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 58) = 
13.65, p < .001, indicating that subjects responded faster on congruent trials  
(M = 371 ms, SD = 48) than on incongruent trials (M = 384 ms, SD = 54). 
Neither the main effect of name, nor the interaction effect between name and 
congruency were significant (all Fs < 1).  
 
Table 1 
Mean reaction times (in ms) and standard deviations of target responses in the dot probe 
task as a function of trial type and congruency in Experiment 1
Trial type Congruency M SD 
Own name – neutral name Congruent 371 50 
 Incongruent 382 52 
Attachment name – neutral name Congruent 371 49 
 Incongruent 387 63 
 
Both the attentional bias indices for the attachment name, t(58) = 2.36, p < 
.05, as well as for the own name, t(58) = 3.04, p < .01, differed significantly 
from zero. In addition, we investigated the correlations between attachment 
anxiety and avoidance and the attentional bias scores. These correlations are 
presented in Table 2. A significant positive correlation emerged between 
attachment anxiety and the attentional bias index for the attachment name.2 
Neither the attentional bias for the own name, nor the attentional bias for the 
attachment name was significantly related to attachment avoidance.
 
                                                     
2 Note that when conducting regression analyses on the attentional bias scores, entering 
attachment anxiety, attachment avoidance, and their interaction term as predictor variables, the 
interaction effect between anxiety and avoidance was not significant, in none of the Experiments.  
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Table 2 
Correlations between individual differences in attachment style, as measured by the 
ECR, and global self-esteem, as measured by the RSES, versus the attentional bias 
scores for the different trial types, throughout the four experiments 
Attentional Bias Index Attachment 
Anxiety 
Attachment 
Avoidance 
Global  
Self-Esteem  
Experiment 1 
Own name .01 -.08  
Attachment name .32** .15  
Experiment 2 
Own name -.03 -.01 -.11 
Attachment name .24* -.01 -.27** 
Known name .02 .10 .14 
Experiment 3 
Own name .15 -.07 -.04 
Attachment name .28** -.08 -.11 
Known name -.08 -.16 .21 
Experiment 4 
Own name -.16 .01 -.02 
Attachment name -.21 -.04 -.02 
Known name .20 .19 .01 
* p < .10; ** p ≤ .05 
DISCUSSION 
The most important finding of Experiment 1 was the significant attentional 
bias effect for the attachment name. This result is in line with the hypothesis that 
attachment system activation influences cognitive processing, causing selective 
attention for the name of the attachment figure. Note that an attentional bias 
effect for the own name was found as well. Although of secondary importance, 
this result is interesting because previous studies have suggested that selective 
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attention for the own name is not a robust and stable phenomenon (Bundesen et 
al., 1997; Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003; Harris & Pashler, 2004; Harris, 
Pashler, & Coburn, 2004).  
One could argue that the observed attentional bias effect for the attachment 
name says little about attachment processes because a similar bias was found for 
the name of the participant. In other words, the bias effects may have been 
driven by general factors such as familiarity or personal relevance. In response to 
this comment, we want to emphasize, however, that only the attentional bias for 
the attachment name was significantly related to attachment-style differences, 
which suggests that the effect was indeed driven by attachment-related 
processes. In line with theoretical predictions, we found that the attentional bias 
for the attachment name was stronger for individuals scoring higher on 
attachment anxiety. Attachment avoidance, on the other hand, did not relate to 
any of the attentional bias effects. We will return to this finding in the General 
Discussion.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
To test an alternative explanation of our findings in terms of familiarity, we 
conducted a second experiment in which trials with the name of an acquaintance 
were included. The absence of an attentional bias for the name of an 
acquaintance with whom one meets regularly, but who does not serve attachment 
functions, would then argue against an interpretation in terms of familiarity and 
would provide additional evidence for the specificity of the attentional bias 
effect. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-five psychology students from Ghent University participated in the 
study in return for course credit. Additionally, another 14 students from various 
faculties at Ghent University were paid five euros for their participation in this 
study, resulting in a total sample of 59 participants. None of them had 
participated in the first experiment.  
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Materials and Procedure 
We will describe only the differences with Experiment 1. This time, 
participants were asked to identify not only their attachment figure but also an 
acquaintance, which we called ‘a known person’. They were told that a known 
person is someone who they meet and speak to regularly, but with whom they do 
not have a special, close relationship. As such, the dot probe task in the second 
experiment consisted of three critical trial types: own name – neutral name, 
attachment name – neutral name, and known name – neutral name. Again, 
neutral – neutral trials were included as filler trials. To obtain a complete 
randomized combination of critical names with neutral names, we urged the 
participants to choose five instead of four neutral names from the name list. In 
this study, the 160 test trials were divided in two blocks of 80 trials consisting of 
20 own name-neutral pairs, 20 attachment name-neutral pairs, 20 known name-
neutral pairs, and 20 neutral-neutral pairs. 
 Two self-report questionnaires followed the dot probe task, the ECR-R 
(Fraley et al., 2000; Buysse & Dewitte, 2004) and the 10 items of the Rosenberg 
Self-esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). The latter was added to explore the 
relationship between selective attention for the own name, which was found in 
the first study, and self-esteem. In the current sample, Cronbach’s alphas were 
high for both questionnaires (α = .89 for the ECR-Anxiety scale, α = .85 for the 
ECR-Avoidance scale, and α = .87 for the RSES). 
RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the mean reaction times for each trial type. We conducted a 
3 x 2 ANOVA with Name (own name, attachment name, known name) and 
Congruency (congruent, incongruent) as within-subject factors. The main effect 
of congruency was marginally significant, F(1, 58) = 3.76, p = .06, indicating 
that participants tended to react faster on congruent trials (M = 381 ms, SD = 37) 
than on incongruent trials (M = 386 ms, SD = 39). In addition, we found a 
significant interaction effect between name and congruency, F(1, 57) = 3.39, p < 
.05. Similar to Experiment 1, the main effect of name was not significant, F(1, 
57) = 1.35, p >.10.  
114    CHAPTER 3 
With a priori t-tests, we showed that only the attentional bias score for the 
attachment name differed significantly from zero, t(58) = 3.16, p < .01. The bias 
scores for the own name and the known name were not significant, ts < 1.  
 
Table 3 
Mean reaction times and standard deviations (in ms) of target responses in the dot probe 
task as a function of trial type and congruency in Experiment 2 
Trial type Congruency M SD 
Own name – neutral name Congruent 378 40 
 Incongruent 384 37 
Attachment name – neutral name Congruent 379 41 
 Incongruent 390 47 
Known name – neutral name Congruent 387 40 
 Incongruent 383 40 
 
Unlike to what was found in Experiment 1, the correlation between anxious 
attachment and the attentional bias index for the attachment name was not 
statistically significant; yet, it approached statistical significance, p = .07 (Table 
2). Furthermore, a significant negative correlation was found between self-
esteem, as measured by the RSES, and the attentional bias for the attachment 
name. Again, no significant correlations were found between the attentional bias 
indices and attachment avoidance.  
DISCUSSION 
Most importantly, participants were faster in responding to congruent trials 
than to incongruent trials and this selective attention effect was more pronounced 
in trials with the attachment name than in the other trials. Contrary to the 
previous study, the attentional bias effect was specific to the attachment name; 
neither the attentional bias for the own name, nor the attenional bias for the 
known name was significant. This indicates that, in a threatening context, only 
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the name of someone serving attachment functions grabs attention, which is in 
line with attachment theory. Note that these results also suggest that the findings 
of Experiment 1 could not be accounted for by familiarity effects.  
 Again, we found meaningful relations between the attentional bias index for 
the attachment name and individual differences. More specifically, the 
attentional bias index for the attachment name was marginally significantly and 
positively related to attachment anxiety and negatively related to self-esteem. 
The latter indicates that people with low self-esteem display enhanced attention 
for the attachment name. Given that anxiously attached individuals are 
characterized by negative self-esteem (e.g., Bylsma, Cozarelli, & Summer, 1997; 
in our study, anxious attachment was also significantly correlated with global 
self-esteem, r = -.36, p <.01), this result could be regarded as indirect and 
additional evidence for our hypothesis concerning attachment anxiety. Again, 
attachment avoidance was not significantly related to any of the attentional bias 
indices.  
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a threatening situation such as separation 
from the attachment figure triggers the operation of the attachment system, 
which inclines people to direct attention towards attachment figure-related cues. 
In the third experiment, we added a control condition to further examine the 
stress-attachment hypothesis (Bowlby, 1969, 1982). Because previous research 
has primarily included a neutral context as a control condition, we decided to 
explore the effect of a positive prime context on selective attention. According to 
the stress-attachment hypothesis, selective attention for the name of the 
attachment figure should be evident only when people imagine a threatening 
event involving the attachment figure, but not when imagining a benign event. 
To test this hypothesis, we conducted a third experiment that was identical to the 
second one, except that we now asked our participants to imagine spending an 
enjoyable evening or day out with their attachment figure. Given that no stress-
eliciting context is presented, the coping mechanism of seeking proximity should 
not be relevant. Accordingly, no attentional bias effects should be found, except 
perhaps for anxiously attached individuals who may experience attachment-
system activation in the absence of actual signs of threat. That is, it can be 
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expected that anxious individuals’ chronically active attachment system and their 
excessive preoccupation with attachment themes will facilitate selective 
attention for the attachment name, even in a positive context. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Fifty-four psychology students from Ghent University participated in the 
study in return for course credit. None of them had participated in the previous 
experiments. 
Materials and Procedure 
The only difference between the present study and Experiment 2 concerned 
the nature of the priming task. Instead of imagining their attachment figure going 
abroad, participants were asked to think and write about spending an enjoying 
day out with their attachment figure. Again, both the ECR (α = .91 for the ECR-
Anxiety scale and α = .90 for the ECR-Avoidance subscale) and the RSES (α = 
.81) were highly internally consistent. 
RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the mean reaction times for each trial type. A 3 x 2 ANOVA 
with Name (own name, attachment name, known name) and Congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) as within-subject factors revealed a significant main 
effect of congruency, F(1, 53) = 7.74, p <. 01, indicating that participants were 
faster in responding to congruent trials (M = 384 ms, SD = 48) than to 
incongruent trials (M = 392 ms, SD = 46). Both the main effect of name, F(1, 52) 
= 2.64, p = .08, and the interaction effect between name and congruency, F(1, 
52) = 2.66, p = .08, approached significance. With a priori t-tests, we showed 
that the attentional bias indices for the attachment name, t(53) = 2.49, p < .05, 
and for the known name, t(53) = 2.69, p < .01, differed significantly from zero. 
The attentional bias index for the own name was not significant (t < 1). 
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Table 4 
Mean reaction times and standard deviations (in ms) of target responses in the dot probe 
task as a function of trial type and congruency in Experiment 3  
Trial type Congruency M SD 
Own name – neutral name Congruent 388 52 
 Incongruent 388 47 
Attachment name – neutral name Congruent 379 51 
 Incongruent 389 49 
Known name – neutral name Congruent 384 50 
 Incongruent 396 51 
 
Next, we investigated the relation between anxious and avoidant attachment 
and the three attentional bias indices. Table 2 shows that attachment anxiety 
correlated positively and significantly with the attentional bias index for the 
attachment name. None of the other attentional bias indices were significantly 
associated with individual differences in attachment style. Similar to 
Experiments 1 and 2, no significant correlations were found between the 
attentional bias indices and attachment avoidance. Global self-esteem was not 
significantly associated with neither of the attentional bias indices.  
DISCUSSION 
Unexpectedly, we observed a significant attentional bias effect for the 
attachment name, indicating that even in a positive relational context people 
generally direct attention towards their attachment figure. Contrary to what was 
observed in the previous experiments, an attentional bias effect was found for the 
known name as well. At first glance, these findings oppose the stress-attachment 
link, according to which the attachment system would get activated only in the 
context of distress. Note, however, that the observed relation between the 
attentional bias index for the attachment name and attachment anxiety still 
allows for an explanation in terms of attachment processes. That is, it has been 
argued that anxious individuals’ preoccupation with cues of attachment figure 
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unavailability and amplification of threat appraisals lead to a chronic activation 
of the attachment system (Mikulincer et al, 2003), causing vigilance to 
attachment figure-related cues in every environmental transaction, whether it is a 
negative or a positive one. Although our results are generally not in line with the 
normative component of the stress-attachment hypothesis, this explanation in 
terms of individual differences suggests that the observed attentional bias effects 
are indeed driven by attachment processes. Nevertheless, an alternative 
interpretation for the obtained findings is still plausible. It has to be considered 
that our results simply reflect the fact that just before completing the dot probe 
task, participants were asked to think about their attachment figure. This mental 
focus on the attachment figure may have been sufficient to temporarily increase 
the salience of information related to the attachment figure, and as such may 
have induced the attentional bias effects for the attachment name.  
EXPERIMENT 4 
To test this alternative explanation, we conducted a fourth experiment that 
was identical to Experiments 2 and 3, except that we now primed an attachment-
irrelevant context by asking our participants to imagine the known person, and 
not the attachment figure, going abroad for a certain period of time. This allowed 
us to investigate whether merely thinking about the attachment figure has 
induced the attentional bias effects observed in the previous experiments. 
According to the alternative explanation in terms of salience-effects, this priming 
task should lead to an attentional bias effect for the known name rather than for 
the attachment name. Finding no attentional bias effect in this experiment would 
thus strengthen the idea that the attentional bias effects in the previous 
experiments were specifically related to attachment processes. Accordingly, we 
hoped to find no attentional bias effects, not even for the attachment name. 
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METHOD 
Participants  
Sixty-two first year psychology students participated in the experiment as a 
part of their course requirements. None of them had participated in the previous 
experiments. 
Materials and Procedure  
These were the same as in the previous two experiments, except for the 
nature of the priming task. This time, participants were asked to think and write 
about the known person going abroad for a certain period of time. Similar to the 
previous three experiments, both the ECR and the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale 
displayed high Cronbach’s alphas (α = .87 for the ECR-Anxiety, α = .90 for the 
ECR-Avoidance, and α = .91 for the RSES). 
RESULTS 
Table 5 
Mean reaction times (in ms) and standard deviations of target responses in the dot probe 
task as a function of trial type and congruency in Experiment 4 
Trial type Congruency M SD 
Own name – neutral name Congruent 376 57 
 Incongruent 379 49 
Attachment name – neutral name Congruent 377 58 
 Incongruent 380 56 
Known name – neutral name Congruent 381 52 
 Incongruent 382 51 
 
Table 5 presents the mean response latencies for each trial type. We analysed 
these reaction times using a 3 (own name, attachment name, known name) x 2 
(congruent, incongruent) repeated measures ANOVA. As expected, neither the 
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main effect of congruence nor the interaction between name and congruence 
were significant, Fs < 1. Also the main effect of name did not reach significance, 
F(1, 61) = 1.72, p > .10.  
 None of the attentional bias indices differed significantly from zero (all ts < 
1) and none of them correlated significantly either with individual differences in 
attachment style or with global self-esteem (Table 2).  
DISCUSSION 
In line with our predictions, no significant attentional bias effect was found 
for the known name after an imagination procedure involving the known person. 
This finding indicates that the attentional bias effects for the attachment name 
observed in the previous experiments were not simply due to the stress-induction 
procedure functioning as a prime and increasing attention for the attachment 
stimulus. Furthermore, the absence of a bias effect for the attachment name is in 
line with attachment theory, because separation from a known person can be 
regarded as a non-threatening and attachment-irrelevant situation that is not 
supposed to activate the attachment system (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). 
The fact that anxiously attached individuals did not react with vigilance towards 
the attachment name also seems plausible, considering that the content of the 
priming was not relevant in terms of attachment needs. To ascertain that the 
absence of a bias effect was genuine, we calculated the statistical power of the 
crucial test. Starting from the mean effect size of the attentional bias scores for 
the attachment name, estimated from Experiments 1 and 2 (mean d = .35), this 
study, with 62 participants, had a power of .77 to detect an effect of that 
magnitude at the .05 alpha level (two-tailed). Hence, our study had enough 
power to detect an effect if any should appear, but we still failed to find one. 
This indicates that the lack of an attentional bias for the attachment name was 
not the result of a lack of power.   
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Although Bowlby has emphasized the centrality of internal working models 
as an organizing force in guiding attention, to date little is known about the 
relationship between attentional processing and the regulation of the attachment 
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system. Therefore, we argued that research into the information-processing 
mechanisms associated with attachment system functioning is pivotal. In 
attachment theory, it has been postulated that the confrontation with or the 
imagination of a distressing situation activates the attachment system and the 
primary goal of proximity maintenance towards the attachment figure 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). The studies reported in this paper linked this key 
assumption to the process of selective attention, considering it as a necessary 
regulatory process underlying attachment system activation. The most important 
finding throughout the four experiments was that we consistently found an 
attentional bias effect for the attachment name in an attachment-related context, 
regardless of whether the context was positive or negative. We also 
demonstrated that attention allocation was modulated by individual differences 
in attachment style. More specifically, we found that attachment anxiety was 
related to enhanced attention for the attachment figure’s name in both a 
threatening and a positive attachment context. We will briefly summarize the 
experimental findings that led to these conclusions and relate these main findings 
to a cognitive-motivational view on adult attachment.  
The first two experiments supported the central claim that, after exposure to 
an attachment-related threat prime, attention was selectively directed towards 
attachment figure-related information. Several sources of evidence point to the 
reliability and strength of these findings: First, selective attention for the name of 
the attachment figure was found in Experiment 1 and replicated in Experiment 2. 
Second, the attachment name was the only stimulus name that yielded a robust 
attentional bias effect. In Experiments 1 and 3, attentional bias effects for the 
own name and known name were found as well, but these effects could not be 
replicated in the following experiments, which is consistent with other studies 
investigating attention towards personally relevant stimuli (Bundesen et al., 
1997; Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003; Harris & Pashler, 2004; Harris, 
Pashler, & Coburn, 2004). Most of this research has shown that selective 
attention towards emotional words and names is actually not a robust and stable 
phenomenon. Therefore, we want to emphasize the importance of the fact that 
we did find a consistent attentional bias effect towards the name of a significant 
other. Third, this effect was found in a sample of non-selected individuals, even 
though it has been argued that attentional bias effects in a non-selected, non-
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clinical sample are usually not very robust and actually not easily found at all 
(Mogg & Bradley, 2005).  
The present findings also revealed that attention was selectively and 
specifically directed towards the name of the attachment figure. Throughout the 
experiments, some direct and indirect evidence was obtained in support of this 
idea: First, as described earlier, selective attention effects were most consistently 
found for the attachment name, which is fully in line with attachment theory. 
Second, in Experiments 2 and 4, alternative explanations (familiarity, salience) 
for the attentional bias effects could be excluded. Third, in Experiments 1, 2, and 
3, only selective attention for the attachment name was meaningfully related to 
individual differences that have been proposed to modulate the effect of threat 
on attachment processes. 
One particular finding, however, was not consistent with theoretical 
predictions. According to the stress-attachment link, only events that are 
perceived as threatening should activate the attachment system (Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2003). Yet, in Experiment 3, we found that thoughts about spending an 
enjoying day out with the attachment figure also led to selective attention for the 
attachment name. This suggests that the process of selective attention was not 
uniquely activated by stress-eliciting stimuli. Although this finding seems at 
odds with the normative component of attachment system activation, an 
explanation in terms of attachment-style differences is still plausible. That is, 
selective attention towards the attachment name was specifically and exclusively 
related to attachment anxiety, indicating that the more anxious a person is, the 
more he or she will attend to attachment figure-related cues, even in a positive 
prime context. This fits with anxious individuals’ chronic hyperactivation of the 
attachment system, an assumption already demonstrated in previous research. 
For instance, Mikulincer and colleagues (2000, 2002) found that anxious 
individuals show heightened accessibility to attachment themes in both a stress 
and non-stress context, suggesting that their attachment system is chronically 
activated even when there is no signal of threat and no demand for coping 
actions. This conclusion has been substantiated using a neutral priming context 
as a control condition, leaving unexplored how the attachment system 
cognitively reacts to an attachment-related positive context. In this respect, the 
present data suggest that, even in an attachment-related positive context, 
anxiously attached individuals rely on their hyperactivating strategies. We will 
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return to this finding in the following paragraph, in which we elaborate on the 
relation between individual differences in attachment style and attentional 
processing.  
Our results showed that anxious individuals react with enhanced attention for 
the attachment figure’s name in either a threatening or a positive attachment 
context, providing additional evidence for their hyperactive attachment system. 
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the expected hypervigilance in a stress 
context, whereas Experiment 3 revealed the same attentional pattern in a positive 
attachment context. With regard to the first two experiments, only the first one 
revealed a clearly significant correlation between attachment anxiety and 
selective attention for the attachment name. In Experiment 2, this correlation was 
marginally significant, but we did find additional evidence for our hypothesis on 
individual differences by means of the negative correlation between self-esteem 
and selective attention for the attachment name. The latter could, however, not 
be replicated in the other experiments. One possible explanation for the fact that 
the pattern of findings on individual differences was somewhat dissimilar in 
Experiments 1 and 2 may be variation in the mean and range of attachment 
anxiety, avoidance, and self-esteem scores across experiments. However, post-
hoc analyses revealed no indication of such differences. Another possibility is 
that the observed correlations with attachment anxiety are weakened by the 
limited range of attachment anxiety scores in our samples, which may result 
from the fact that our participants were not pre-selected based on their 
attachment style. Given that anxious attachment styles represent rather small 
portions of the population (Hazan & Shaver, 1987), our sample did probably not 
enclose extremely high anxious individuals. In fact, securely attached individuals 
(i.e., low anxiety and avoidance scores) formed the vast majority of our 
participants. Another plausible reason for the inconsistencies in the correlational 
results may be the low reliability of interindividual differences in dot-probe 
effects (see Schmukle, 2005). In the present set of data, the mean split-half 
reliabilities of the attentional bias effects for the attachment name were .41 in the 
first experiment, .23 in the second experiment, .26 in the third experiment, and 
.38 in the fourth experiment. Considering that sufficient reliability of measures is 
a prerequisite for research on interindividual differences, the low reliabilities of 
these dot probe tasks seriously limit the strength of the correlations one can 
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expect to observe. In fact, given these low reliabilities, it is striking that we did 
find meaningful correlations in three consecutive experiments.  
Regarding the results of the third experiment, demonstrating anxious 
individuals’ hypervigilance in a positive attachment context, it is important to 
note that an interpretation in terms of distress arousal is still plausible. We refer 
to a study by Mikulincer and Sheffi (2000) showing that anxious individuals 
reacted with impaired cognitive processing after a positive affect induction. 
According to them, anxious individuals endorse a negative interpretation of 
positive affect in an attempt to deny the cognitive relaxation that follows from 
the recognition of a safe environment, because this cognitive loosening may be 
perceived as a danger cue. Moreover, it is likely that, through semantic priming 
mechanisms, positive thoughts about the attachment figure will automatically 
spread into memories of negative attachment experiences that are 
overrepresented in the associative network of the anxious individual’s mind 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).  
In general, the results with regard to attachment anxiety are in line with 
attachment theory. However, in the case of attachment avoidance, results did not 
conform to theoretical expectations. Given that avoidantly attached individuals 
tend to deactivate their attachment system and inhibit proximity seeking as a 
means to cope with insecurity (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003), we expected that, in 
a distressing context (and even in a positive attachment context), attachment 
avoidance would be negatively related to the attentional bias index for the 
attachment name. None of our experiments confirmed this finding. A possible 
explanation for the absence of results regarding attachment avoidance could be 
the nature of the threat prime. That is, separation from the attachment figure may 
be a particularly salient threat cue for anxious individuals, but not for avoidant 
individuals who are found to suppress separation-related thoughts (Fraley & 
Shaver, 1997; Fraley, Garner, & Shaver, 2000; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). 
Hence, it could be that our separation threat prime did not evoke sufficient 
distress in avoidant individuals, which would imply that no coping actions are 
required and thus no distance goals are being activated. In that case, the 
attentional bias mechanism would not be relevant. Unfortunately, no 
manipulation check was performed to examine the effectiveness of our threat 
induction in avoidant individuals. Future research should incorporate 
manipulation checks of threat induction or could rely on subliminal priming 
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procedures (see Mikulincer et al., 2002) that may reduce strategic avoidance 
strategies. In addition, future work is needed to investigate whether selective 
attention for the attachment name depends on specific threat contexts. 
Considering previous research showing that avoidant individuals react 
differently to attachment-related versus attachment-unrelated threatening 
contexts (Mikulincer et al., 2002), it may be interesting to precede our dot-probe 
task with attachment-irrelevant stress stimuli, such as failure, so that we can 
further explore the effect of threat on the process of selective attention.  
Throughout the general discussion, we have already mentioned several 
limitations of the present studies and made suggestions for future research. There 
is, however, still an issue that needs to be discussed. That is, the dot-probe tasks 
in the present studies yielded relatively small differences in reaction times, 
which could possibly indicate that the attentional bias effects varied over the 
course of the experiment. Therefore, we calculated attentional bias scores on the 
first and second halves of the dot-probe tasks, in order to determine whether the 
obtained attentional biases reflect a stable effect or a momentary response that 
habituates quickly (see Harris & Pashler, 2004). Throughout the four 
experiments, these analyses revealed no significant differences between the 
attentional bias effects calculated on the first and second halves of the task, 
which suggests that selective attention towards the attachment name is a real and 
consistent phenomenon that is not just an artefact of averaging reaction times 
over numerous trials.   
In closing, the present studies were among the first to assess the attentional 
correlates of the attachment system. Our results were generally in line with the 
theoretical prediction that activation of the attachment system causes selective 
attention towards the attachment figure and that this attentional effect is 
modulated by individual differences in attachment style. We are convinced that 
this series of studies opens a wide range of possibilities with regard to the study 
of attentional processes in the adult attachment domain. Our studies also have 
broader theoretical implications. We think that they point to the importance of 
incorporating information-processing mechanisms, and attention in particular, 
into the conceptualization of the attachment system. That is, selective attention 
has been related to perceptual, appraisal, and memory processes (see Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998), which are all relevant in the regulation of the attachment system. 
Furthermore, it is known that attentive processing of motivationally relevant 
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information is modulated by personality factors (e.g., Eysenck, 1992) and 
learning experiences (e.g., Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De 
Houwer, 2004). Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that, once attention 
is guided by established working models, this may influence and magnify the 
effects of previous experiences on ongoing attachment-related cognition, affect, 
and behaviour and could therefore play an important role in transferring early 
attachment experiences into working models (Bowlby, 1969, 1982). Exploring 
the proposed dynamic relationships between early experiences, the attachment 
system, information processing, and attachment behaviour is pivotal in 
deepening our understanding on adult attachment and social behaviour. 
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PROXIMITY SEEKING IN ADULT 
ATTACHMENT: EXAMINING THE 
ROLE OF AUTOMATIC APPROACH-
AVOIDANCE TENDENCIES1
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In two experiments, participants made symbolic approach and avoidance 
movements towards or away from attachment figure- and acquaintance-related 
cues after being primed with a distressing or a non-distressing context. Results 
showed that automatic approach responses towards the attachment figure were 
stronger in a distressing than in a non-distressing context, regardless of whether 
the source of distress was attachment-relevant or -irrelevant and regardless of 
one’s attachment style. Individual differences in attachment anxiety and 
avoidance were associated with the predicted patterns of approach-avoidance 
tendencies: Attachment anxiety heightened the tendency to approach the 
attachment figure (Experiments 1 and 2), whereas attachment avoidance reduced 
this tendency (Experiment 2). The findings are discussed as providing first 
evidence on the role of automatic action tendencies in adult attachment.  
 
                                                     
1 Dewitte, M., De Houwer, J., Buysse, A., & Koster, E.H.W. (in press). Proximity Seeking in 
Adult Attachment: Examining the Role of Automatic Approach-Avoidance Tendencies. British 
Journal of Social Psychology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decades, Bowlby’s attachment theory (1969, 1982) has been 
highly influential for understanding the regulation of closeness in attachment 
relationships. Central to attachment theory is the idea that individuals differ in 
their motivation to seek or avoid proximity towards the attachment figure in 
times of need. Given that motivational elements and behavioural strategies are 
clearly represented in attachment theory (see Collins, Guichard, Ford, & Feeney, 
2004), we believe it is useful to study attachment in relation to broader 
motivational systems such as approach-avoidance. Consistent with this idea, it 
has indeed been argued that attachment behaviour is driven by an attachment 
motivational system that is automatically activated by threatening stimuli, 
evoking a set of approach or avoidance behavioural tendencies towards or away 
from the attachment figure. Furthermore, conceptualising proximity seeking in 
terms of automatic approach-avoidance tendencies allows for a more valid test 
of this mechanism as a central regulatory process in attachment system 
functioning and provides a broader framework for understanding individual 
differences in attachment behaviour.  
Proximity Seeking and Adult Attachment: Theory and Past Evidence 
The idea that emotions have the ability to motivate, that is, to direct 
behaviour towards certain (emotion-related) goals (e.g., Carver, Sutton, & 
Scheier, 2000; Frijda, 1986), is inherently present in attachment theory. The 
attachment behavioural system is commonly described as a goal-directed system 
that is oriented towards distress alleviation when confronted with threat by 
seeking proximity towards someone who can provide comfort and protection 
(i.e., the attachment figure) (Bowlby, 1969, 1982; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). 
It is also a goal-correcting system, meaning that the utility of one’s behaviour 
will be appraised in light of its progress towards security attainment so that, in 
the case of a goal-discrepancy, the individual can adjust his/her behaviour and/or 
goals. When the attachment figure is believed to answer one’s bids for 
proximity, a sense of protection and security is attained, ending the activation of 
the attachment system. Repeated episodes of attachment figure availability lead 
to the development of positive beliefs (i.e., working models) about the self and 
others, which in turn reinforce active approach behaviour. However, when the 
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attachment figure is perceived as being inattentive and unresponsive to one’s 
needs, the primary attachment strategy of proximity seeking fails to achieve the 
main goal of ‘felt security’ and is therefore likely to be replaced by alternative 
strategies of distress regulation, which are driven by specific sub-goals organised 
around seeking (extreme) closeness or keeping independence. Hyperactivating 
strategies are characterized by an intense desire for closeness, which is 
manifested in worries about separation and abandonment, strong efforts to 
maintain proximity, and persistent attempts to minimize emotional, cognitive, 
and physical distance from the attachment figure. The main goal of this strategy 
is to get the unavailable attachment figure as yet to be responsive, attentive, and 
supporting by intensifying proximity seeking behaviour. Deactivating strategies, 
on the other hand, aim at inhibiting the activation of the attachment system by 
attenuating proximity seeking behaviour through emotional and physical 
distancing and self-reliance. Thoughts about closeness, separation, or 
abandonment are being suppressed in an attempt to avoid intimacy and 
interdependence while defensively convincing others of one’s own efficacy and 
autonomy. Hyperactivating and deactivating strategies can operate 
independently or in parallel and are closely tied to the dimensions of, 
respectively, attachment anxiety and avoidance, which are assumed to underlie 
individual differences in attachment style (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998).  
Empirical support for the normative and individual differences component of 
proximity seeking stems primarily from behavioural observation and self-report 
studies. In relation to the theory, it has been shown that couples who were 
separating at the airport sought and maintained more proximity than couples who 
were not separating (Fraley & Shaver, 1998). In addition, the results of a diary 
study revealed that couples reported seeking more support from their partner on 
days when they experienced distress (Collins & Feeney, 2005). With regard to 
individual differences, several studies have demonstrated that secure individuals 
exhibit more proximity seeking behaviour (Fraley & Shaver, 1998) and seek or 
provide more support than insecure individuals, especially in a distressing 
situation (e.g., Collins & Feeney, 2000; Simpson, Rholes, Orña, & Grich, 2002, 
Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992). Furthermore, they were found to be more 
comfortable with interpersonal closeness when discussing personal issues (Kaitz, 
Bar-Haim, Lehrer, & Grossman, 2004) and display a more open expression of 
thoughts and emotions in social settings (e.g., Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991). 
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The opposite is shown for avoidant individuals, namely seeking and providing 
less support when feeling distressed, and pulling away from the attachment 
figure when separation is imminent. Note, however, that avoidant individuals do 
seek contact with their attachment figure when experiencing lower levels of 
distress and anxiety (see Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Simpson et al, 1992). In 
addition, they were found to report being less supportive (e.g., Carnelley, 
Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1996), to prefer more interpersonal distance, and to 
display less open communication in a relationship-relevant or social situation 
(Gillath, Mikulincer, Fitzsimons, Shaver, Schachner, & Barg, 2006; Kaitz et al., 
2004). For anxious individuals, no clear relations were found with observable 
attachment-related behaviour; yet, they clearly reported more intense distress 
reactions in response to separation threat (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1998). They 
were also found to report higher needs for closeness and interdependence (e.g., 
Collins & Allard, 2001; Griffin, & Bartholomew, 1994; Mikulincer & Nachson, 
1991). 
Also within the social-cognitive domain, studies relying on reaction time 
measures have provided interesting information on the relation between 
attachment style, stress, and proximity seeking. For instance, Mikulincer, 
Birnbaum, Woddis, and Nachmias (2000) examined the accessibility of 
proximity themes and worries after priming a threatening and neutral word. 
Using a lexical decision task with proximity, distance, neutral, positive, and 
negative words, they found that, regardless of attachment style, the induction of 
threat led to faster reaction times on proximity words. In addition, individual 
differences in attachment style were found to modulate cognitive reactions to 
threat. That is, anxious individuals showed faster reaction times to distance 
words - compared to secure and avoidant individuals - following either a 
threatening or neutral prime, but reacted faster to proximity words only when a 
neutral word was primed. Avoidant individuals, on the other hand, generally 
displayed fast reaction times to proximity words, but reacted faster to proximity 
worries only when a cognitive load was added, which may suggest that they 
defensively suppress proximity worries. Note that their pattern of reaction times 
on proximity words contradicts their consciously reported need for cognitive and 
emotional distance. In a follow-up study, Mikulincer, Gillath, and Shaver (2002) 
elaborated on the stress-proximity link by focusing on the accessibility of 
attachment figure representations in situations of distress. Using a lexical 
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decision and an emotional Stroop task, participants were exposed to the names of 
their attachment figure, a close person, a known person, and an unknown person 
after the induction of a threat (failure or separation) and a neutral word. They 
found that threat primes led to higher accessibility of mental representations of 
the attachment figure, as was indicated by faster reaction times on trials with the 
attachment name. Attachment anxiety increased this effect in both neutral and 
threat contexts, whereas attachment avoidance was related to slower reaction 
times to the attachment name following a separation (but not a failure) word 
prime.  
Proximity Seeking as an Automatic Action Tendency 
An important merit of the two studies described above is their reliance on 
unobtrusive reaction time measures that are less susceptible to conscious 
deliberation and self-presentation issues than self-report and observation 
methods. This characteristic is especially relevant for investigating the cognitive 
structures and processes underlying attachment avoidance because their 
deactivating strategies sometimes fail in dismissing distress arousal (e.g., Dozier 
& Kobak, 1992) and in suppressing the need for closeness (Mikulincer et al, 
2000) when measured at the automatic level. Focussing on automatic processes 
is thus essential for gaining deeper insight into the working mechanisms of 
attachment strategies of which many components are assumed to operate 
automatically and without conscious awareness (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). 
This certainly applies to the study of proximity seeking because the latter may be 
considered as an automatic action tendency associated with achieving 
attachment-related goals that people pursue without conscious awareness, 
intention, effort, and control (see Collins et al., 2004). In this respect, the 
Mikulincer studies can provide only partial support on the theoretical 
assumptions regarding proximity seeking. The tasks and stimulus material that 
they used can serve only as a measure of cognitive activation of semantic 
knowledge regarding proximity seeking, and do not allow for drawing 
conclusions on the effects of stress on behavioural tendencies. Moreover, 
Mikulincer and colleagues were primarily interested in demonstrating 
preconscious activation of the attachment system upon distress arousal, whereas 
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we wanted to focus on the effects of stress on the proximity seeking mechanism 
itself.  
As reported in the beginning of the introduction, a key difference between 
individuals with different attachment styles is their level of motivation to seek 
closeness towards their attachment figure versus keeping independence and self-
control. These behavioural differences stem from different goal-structures that 
can be roughly divided into approach (i.e., proximity maintenance) and 
avoidance (i.e., avoiding rejection) goals that are associated with approach and 
avoidance action tendencies (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Accordingly, it 
may be theoretically relevant to conceptualize proximity seeking as a 
motivational action tendency aimed at reducing the discrepancy between one’s 
actual (i.e., distress) and desired goal-state (i.e., security) and to organise 
individual differences in proximity seeking along an approach-avoidance 
continuum. Note that such approach-avoidance action tendencies are likely to 
operate automatically and may or may not be translated into overt behavioural 
responses (see Carver & Scheier, 1998; Custers & Aerts, 2007).  
The conceptualisation of proximity seeking in terms of approach-avoidance 
tendencies fits more closely with the theoretical definition of proximity seeking 
as a goal-directed response. Furthermore, this conceptualisation allows for 
empirical testing of several core assumptions of attachment theory. First, we 
tested the idea that, in the general population, a distressing context will 
automatically evoke a stronger proximity-seeking tendency towards the 
attachment figure relative to a non-distressing context. Second, we examined 
whether individual differences in attachment anxiety and avoidance modulate 
this general tendency and are associated with the predicted patterns of approach 
and avoidance, namely an increase in approach responses in the case of 
attachment anxiety and a decrease in the case of attachment avoidance. So far, 
there has been little empirical work that directly addresses these hypotheses by 
focusing on both the automatic and behavioural component of proximity 
seeking.  
The Present Study 
To investigate approach-avoidance tendencies that are automatically evoked 
by attachment figure-related stimuli, we used a stimulus response compatibility 
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(SRC) task that was first used by Mogg, Bradley, Field, and De Houwer (2003). 
In this task, participants are instructed to make a symbolic approach or 
avoidance response depending on a certain feature of the presented stimuli. In 
our version of the SRC task, on each trial a word was presented on a computer 
screen together with the drawing of a manikin above and below the word. The 
presented word could refer either to the attachment figure of the participant or to 
an acquaintance. Participants were instructed to make the manikin move towards 
(approach) or away (avoid) from the word based on the identity of the person to 
which the word referred (attachment figure or acquaintance). In the compatible 
block, an approach movement had to be made towards attachment-related words 
and an avoidance movement away from acquaintance-related words, whereas in 
the incompatible block the instructions were reversed. Subtracting the reaction 
times in the compatible block from the reaction times in the incompatible block 
gives us information on the strength of automatic approach versus avoidance 
tendencies towards the attachment figure. In this context, it should be noted that 
the SRC task is a relative measure. It allows one to draw conclusions on the 
extent to which one category of stimuli evokes an approach or avoidance 
tendency, but only relative to the extent to which another category of stimuli 
evokes this tendency. This is suggested by the fact that in similar tasks with two 
relevant categories, reactions to one category can depend on the nature of the 
other category (Brendl, Markmann, & Messner, 2001). Because we were 
interested in the impact of attachment on approach-avoidance responses, we 
selected as a secondary category acquaintance-related stimuli that are also 
familiar to the participant, but differ from attachment-related stimuli in terms of 
their relevance for serving attachment goals (i.e., providing comfort and security 
in times of need).  
Hypotheses 
Considering proximity seeking as the central regulatory force of the 
attachment system, we expect that secure as well as insecure individuals will 
show stronger approach tendencies towards the attachment figure in a distressing 
context compared to a non-distressing context. We also predict that this 
normative process will be modulated by individual differences in attachment 
anxiety and avoidance: The tendency to approach the attachment figure is 
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expected to increase with higher scores on attachment anxiety and decrease with 
higher scores on attachment avoidance. Attachment theory also postulates that 
attachment strategies are mainly activated upon distress arousal, because only 
then coping actions are required. Accordingly, it can be predicted that 
individuals scoring higher on attachment avoidance will display a decreased 
tendency to approach the attachment figure only when feeling distressed. 
Drawing on both attachment theory and previous research (Mikulincer et al., 
2002; Rholes, Simpson, Tran, Martin, & Friedman, 2007), we did not anticipate 
an interaction effect between prime condition and attachment anxiety. That is, 
anxious individuals’ chronically active attachment system is assumed to 
strengthen approach responses towards the attachment figure in both distressing 
and non-distressing contexts. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty first year psychology students (48 females, 12 males) from Ghent 
University participated in return for extra course credit. The average age of 
participants was 19.80 years, ranging from 18 to 27. They were randomly 
divided into two priming conditions, each consisting of 30 participants.  
Materials  
The stimulus material for the approach-avoidance task consisted of two 
categories of words. Four word stimuli referred to the attachment figure, that is, 
first name, surname, hometown and the word “partner”, “friend”, “mother”, or 
“father” (according to the nature of the relationship). Another four words 
referred to an acquaintance, that is, first name, surname, hometown, and the 
word “acquaintance”. All words were presented at the centre of the screen in 
white uppercase letters (Arial Black, font size 42) on a black background. The 
manikin consisted of a white circle for the head, an ellipse for the body and lines 
that represented arms and legs. It was about 2.8 cm high and 1.5 cm wide (arms 
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inclusive). Participants could make the manikin move upwards by pressing the 
“8” key of the numeric part of the keyboard and could make it move downwards 
by pressing the “2” key. When one of these keys was pressed, the manikin 
“walked” towards the word presented at the centre of the screen or away from 
the word (towards the upper or lower edge of the screen). The approach-
avoidance task was programmed and presented using the INQUISIT 
Milliseconds software package (INQUISIT 2.01, 2005) on a Pentium II 
computer with a 15-inch colour monitor. 
As a measure of individual differences in attachment style, we used a Dutch 
translation of the Experiences in Close Relationships scale-revised (ECR-R; 
Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000; ECR-R-NL, Buysse & Dewitte, 2004). 
Eighteen items tap attachment anxiety (i.e., fear of abandonment and strong 
desires of interpersonal merger) and 18 items tap attachment avoidance (i.e., 
discomfort with closeness, dependence, and intimate self-disclosure). The 
reliability and validity of these scales are well documented (e.g., Fraley et al., 
2000; Sibley, & Liu, 2004). Also in the current sample, Cronbach’s alphas were 
high for the Anxiety subscale (α = .90) as well as for the Avoidance subscale    
(α = .95). 
Procedure  
First, our participant’s primary attachment figure was identified using the 
WHOTO scale which consists of six questions referring to the three critical 
features that distinguish attachment figures from non-attachment figures 
(proximity seeking and separation distress, safe haven, and secure base; Hazan & 
Zeifman, 1994). For each question, participants had to write the name of the 
person that best served each of these functions. The person that was listed most 
frequently was labelled as the primary attachment figure. In case of an exaequo, 
we chose as the attachment figure the person that satisfied the larger number of 
attachment-related functions (see Fraley, & Davis, 1997). Next, participants 
were asked to write down the first name, surname, and hometown of their 
attachment figure and to label that person’s relational role (partner, friend, 
mother, father …). Similarly, they were asked to give the first name, surname, 
and hometown of someone they know and meet frequently, but with whom they 
do not have a special, close relationship. To ensure that the stimuli listed for the 
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attachment figure did not overlap with those of the acquaintance, participants 
were urged to choose an acquaintance that had different names and a different 
hometown than their attachment figure. While the experiment leader set up the 
computer task, participants received priming instructions. Half of the participants 
were asked to imagine that their attachment figure would go abroad for 1 or 2 
years and to write about thoughts and feelings related to such an event 
(separation threat condition), whereas the other half of the participants were 
asked to describe a typical Tuesday (control condition). Research has shown that 
disruptions of proximity maintenance to the attachment figure (e.g., separation), 
whether these are real or imagined, generate intense distress reactions (Feeney & 
Kirkpatrick, 1996; Fraley & Shaver, 1997, 1998). Participants were randomly 
assigned to the separation threat and control condition in order to avoid 
systematic differences between conditions.  
After the priming task, participants completed the approach-avoidance task. 
For this task, participants were seated behind the computer at a distance of 
approximately 60 cm from the screen. The task consisted of 8 practice and 64 
test trials of a first response assignment, and 8 practice and 64 test trials of a 
second response assignment. Instructions informed the participants that on each 
trial they would see a word that either referred to their attachment figure or to an 
acquaintance. A manikin would also appear either below or above the word. 
Their task was to move the manikin towards or away from the word depending 
on the identity of the person to which the word referred. In the compatible block, 
participants were instructed to make the manikin run towards attachment-related 
stimuli and away from stimuli related to the acquaintance. In the incompatible 
block, instructions were reversed, that is, they had to move the manikin away 
from attachment stimuli and towards acquaintance-related stimuli. The order of 
the blocks was counterbalanced across participants.  
Each trial started with the presentation of the manikin that appeared in the 
centre of the upper or lower half of the screen. The starting position of the 
manikin (above or below) was determined randomly and throughout the task the 
manikin appeared equally often above and below the words. After 750 ms, a 
word stimulus was presented at the centre of the screen. All words disappeared 
as soon as the manikin reached the centre of the screen (the location of the word) 
or the edge of the screen. The inter-trial interval was 1000 ms. The latency 
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between the onset of the word and the first key press was registered as the 
reaction time.  
RESULTS 
Latencies from trials with errors were removed (4.2 % of all trials). Reaction 
times that were shorter than 200 ms or more than 3 SD above the individual 
mean were treated as outliers and excluded from analyses (see Mogg et al., 
2003). 
 
Table 1 
Mean reaction times (in ms) and standard deviations of the responses on the SCR 
approach-avoidance task as a function of congruency and prime condition in 
Experiments 1 and 2
Prime condition Congruency M SD 
Experiment 1 
Congruent 867 225 Non-threat prime 
Incongruent 889 189 
Congruent 902 208 Threat prime 
Incongruent 1094 318 
Experiment 2 
Non-threat prime Congruent 802 191 
 Incongruent 927 166 
Threat prime Congruent 853 163 
 incongruent 1084 209 
 
 To examine our hypothesis on the normative component of the proximity 
seeking mechanism, we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with 
compatibility as a within-subjects variable and prime condition as a between-
subjects variable. The relevant mean reaction times are presented in Table 1. 
This analysis yielded a significant main effect of compatibility, F(1, 58) = 11.76, 
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p < .01, and of prime condition, F(1, 58) = 5.00, p < .05, as well as a significant 
interaction effect of compatibility and prime condition, F(1, 58) = 7.47, p < .01. 
Overall, participants reacted faster in the compatible task (M = 885 ms, SD = 
215) than in the incompatible task (M = 991 ms, SD = 279), and reaction times 
were significantly faster in the non-threat condition (M = 878 ms, SD = 224) 
compared to the separation threat condition (M = 998 ms, SD = 262). The 
significant interaction effect indicated that participants displayed stronger 
approach tendencies after priming a separation threat context (M = 191 ms, SD = 
258) compared to a non-threat context (M = 22 ms, SD = 221).  
To investigate the relation between attachment style, as measured by the 
ECR, and the approach-avoidance index, we conducted hierarchical regression 
analyses with the approach-avoidance index as a dependent variable and prime 
condition, attachment anxiety, and attachment avoidance as predictors. In a first 
step, prime condition, attachment anxiety, attachment avoidance, and the two-
way interaction of anxiety and avoidance were entered as predictors. To reduce 
possible problems of multicollinearity when analysing the interaction term, the 
anxiety and avoidance scores were centred (Aiken & West, 1991). In a second 
step, the two-way interactions between prime condition and attachment anxiety, 
and prime condition and attachment avoidance were added. The first model 
explained a significant part of the variance in approach-avoidance responses,    
R² = .42, p < .05. More specifically, the regression analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of prime condition, β = .31, p <.05, d = .66, and a marginally 
significant main effect of attachment anxiety, β = .27, p = .06, d = .52. The main 
effect of attachment avoidance was not significant, t < 1, d = .15, neither was the 
interaction effect between attachment anxiety and avoidance, t < 1, d = .15. In 
the second step, the interactions between prime condition and attachment 
anxiety, and prime condition and attachment avoidance did not add significantly 
to the prediction of approach-avoidance responses, ΔR² = .01, p > .10, ts < 1,    
ds < .10 . Note, however, that this test had a power of only .12 to detect a small 
effect (d = .20) and a power of .61 to detect a medium effect (d = .50). 
We also explored whether task order would moderate the relationship 
between the predictors and the approach-avoidance index by entering task order 
and the interaction terms (i.e., task order x predictors) into the regression 
analyses. Neither the main term of order nor the interaction terms were 
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significant, ts < 1, indicating that the pattern of results was not affected by task 
order effects.  
DISCUSSION 
Most importantly, we found that the general tendency to approach (versus 
avoid) the attachment figure (relative to the acquaintance) was stronger when a 
distressing context was induced compared to a non-distressing context. These 
data confirm our prediction that the priming of a distressing context 
automatically increases behavioural strategies oriented towards the attachment 
figure. We also found evidence for individual differences in proximity-seeking 
tendencies. Overall, the analyses revealed that attachment anxiety was related to 
faster approach (versus avoidance) responses towards the attachment figure 
(relative to an acquaintance) and this relation was not influenced by the type of 
prime condition. This result reflects the assumed hyperactive attachment system 
of anxiously attached individuals, which is characterized by constant and 
excessive efforts to gain the proximity of the attachment figure in any kind of 
situation, whether it is a threatening one or not (e.g. Mikulincer & Florian, 1998; 
Mikulincer et al, 2000). Note, however, that we have to be careful in interpreting 
the lack of interaction effects because this might be attributed to the small 
sample sizes (n = 30 in the separate samples) and the resulting lack of power.  
Attachment avoidance, on the other hand, was not related to the approach-
avoidance index. This result came rather unexpected, especially because the 
avoidance dimension is considered to be crucial in determining the motivational 
orientation of behavioural strategies (Fraley & Shaver, 1998, 2000). In addition, 
we did not find the expected interaction effect between prime condition and 
attachment avoidance. As such, we could not confirm the hypothesis that only a 
distressing context will evoke an avoidance response in avoidantly attached 
individuals, whereas a non-distressing context is assumed to evoke a normative 
reaction (i.e., approaching the attachment figure) (e.g., Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2003). A possible explanation for this lack of results regarding attachment 
avoidance could be the nature of the threat prime. That is, separation from the 
attachment figure is an explicitly attachment-related threat context that may be 
defensively suppressed in avoidant individuals. Research has shown that, in the 
case of attachment threat, deactivating strategies can act pre-emptively, that is, 
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precluding attachment-related distressing material from further cognitive 
processing in an attempt to prevent attachment system activation (Fraley & 
Shaver, 1997, Fraley, Garner, & Shaver, 2000, Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). 
Because of this pre-emptive strategy, it could be that participants scoring higher 
on attachment avoidance do not experience distress in response to a separation 
threat, which would imply that no coping actions are required and thus no 
distance goals are being activated. We therefore designed a second study in 
which we used a different prime, one that induces an attachment-irrelevant and 
non-interpersonal threat context, namely academic failure. This specific prime is 
useful for circumventing the defensive reactions of avoidantly attached 
individuals. Given that avoidant individuals’ defensive system is organized 
around their strong need for self-reliance and self-promotion, it has been argued 
that any kind of situation that threatens their self-esteem is likely to cause 
distress in avoidant individuals (Mikulincer et al., 2002; Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2003). An attachment-unrelated prime such as failure is also useful for excluding 
an alternative interpretation of our findings. This alternative interpretation is 
related to the fact that the threat prime in Experiment 1 focused on thoughts 
about the attachment figure, which might have been sufficient to activate 
attachment-related goals of proximity, regardless of the experience of threat (see 
Gillath et al, 2006). Hence, to explicitly investigate the effects of threat versus 
no threat on the automatic tendency to approach the attachment figure while 
controlling for influences of attachment figure-related thoughts, we asked our 
participants in the second experiment to think about not passing their final exams 
at university.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty students (44 women, 16 men) from various faculties at Ghent 
University participated in the experiment. Each participant received 5 euros for 
their participation. The average age of participants was 20.53 years old, ranging 
from 18 to 35. None of them had participated in the previous experiment. As in 
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the first experiment, participants were randomly divided into two conditions. 
The scores of one subject were removed from the analyses because of extreme 
values (i.e., more than 3 SD above the general mean) on the ECR-Anxiety scale. 
The remaining sample consisted of 30 participants in the non-threat prime 
condition and 29 participants in the threat prime condition. 
Procedure 
The second experiment followed the exact same procedure as the first one, 
except for the nature of the priming task. Instead of the separation prime, we 
presented our participants with an attachment-unrelated threat prime. More 
specifically, participants were asked to imagine failing their final exams and 
consequently failing to obtain their degree, and then had to write about related 
thoughts and feelings. Participants in the non-threat prime condition received the 
same prime as in the first experiment, namely describing a typical Tuesday. 
Again, the two subscales of the ECR-R were found to be highly reliable (α = .94 
for the Anxiety subscale and α = .84 for the Avoidance subscale). 
RESULTS 
A repeated measures ANOVA with compatibility as a within-subjects 
variable and prime condition as a between-subjects variable revealed a 
significant main effect of compatibility, F(1, 57) = 94.81, p < .01 (Table 1). The 
main effect of prime condition, F(1,57) = 5.31, p < .05, and the interaction effect 
between compatibility and prime condition, F(1, 57) = 8.31, p < .01, also 
reached significance. Similar to the first experiment, participants reacted faster 
in the compatible task (M = 827ms, SD = 178) than in the incompatible task  
(M = 1004 ms, SD = 209) and reaction times were significantly faster in the non-
threat condition (M = 864 ms, SD = 179) compared to the failure threat condition 
(M = 968 ms, SD = 192). The significant interaction effect indicated that 
participants displayed stronger approach tendencies after priming a failure threat 
context (M = 231 ms, SD = 162) compared to a non-threat context (M = 125 ms, 
SD = 115).  
To explore the contribution of attachment styles on approach-avoidance 
tendencies, we performed hierarchical regression analyses on the approach-
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avoidance index with prime condition, attachment anxiety, attachment avoidance 
and their interaction terms as predictors. The model with prime condition and 
attachment scores together accounted for a significant portion of the variance in 
approach-avoidance responses, R² = .50, p < .01.  Concretely, a significant main 
effect emerged of prime condition, β = .37, p < .01, d = .81, a marginally 
significant main effect of attachment anxiety, β = .25, p = .06, d = .51, and a 
significant main effect of attachment avoidance, β = -.27, p = .05, d = .54. The 
interaction effect between attachment anxiety and avoidance did not reach 
significance, t < 1, d = .33. In the second step, the interactions between prime 
condition and attachment anxiety, and prime condition and attachment avoidance 
did not add significantly to the prediction of approach-avoidance responses, ΔR² 
= .02, p >.10, ts < 1, ds < .28. As in Experiment 1, the above reported 
associations were not influenced by task order effects, ts < 1.  
DISCUSSION 
The findings of Experiment 2 replicated and extended those of Experiment 1. 
In general, we found that approach (versus avoidance) responses towards the 
attachment figure (relative to an acquaintance) were stronger in a distressing 
context compared to a non-distressing context. Hence, the priming of an 
attachment-unrelated threat context yielded the same effect on the normative 
functioning of the attachment system as the priming of an attachment-related 
threat, providing further support for the hypothesis that threat automatically 
activates stronger approach tendencies towards the attachment figure. 
With regard to individual differences in approach-avoidance tendencies, we 
found that higher scores on attachment avoidance were associated with a weaker 
tendency to approach the attachment figure, which is consistent with theoretical 
ideas and empirical findings (Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2003). Contrary to our expectations, however, this relation was not influenced by 
the type of prime condition, which suggests that higher scores on attachment 
avoidance are associated with a weaker tendency to approach the attachment 
figure irrespective of the presence of threat. This seems at odds with the 
theoretical assumption that the deactivating strategies of avoidantly attached 
individuals counteract the tendency to approach the attachment figure only when 
feeling distressed. The findings on attachment anxiety replicated those of 
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Experiment 1. That is, attachment anxiety was related to a stronger tendency to 
approach the attachment figure and this relation was not influenced by the type 
of prime condition. These findings provide additional evidence for anxious 
individuals’ chronic activation of (excessive) proximity-seeking tendencies in 
both stress and non-stress contexts (Mikulincer & Florian, 1998). Note, however, 
that the lack of interaction effects between prime condition and both attachment 
anxiety and avoidance should be interpreted with caution because the power to 
detect statistically significant interactions was rather low. Recall that our test had 
a power of only .12 to detect a small effect (d = .20) and a power of .61 to detect 
a medium effect (d = .50). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The primary objective of the present studies was to investigate a core 
assumption of attachment theory by conceptualising proximity seeking as a 
motivational action tendency that operates in an automatic mode. In general, our 
results showed that a distressing context automatically evokes stronger approach 
responses towards the attachment figure, regardless of whether the source of 
distress was attachment-relevant or attachment-irrelevant and regardless of one’s 
attachment style. Secondly, our findings indicated that individual differences in 
attachment anxiety and avoidance are associated with the predicted patterns of 
approach-avoidance tendencies: Attachment anxiety was related to a stronger 
tendency to approach the attachment figure (Experiments 1 and 2), whereas 
attachment avoidance was related to a weaker tendency to approach the 
attachment figure (Experiment 2).  
Across both studies, we found that the tendency to approach (versus avoid) 
the attachment figure (relative to an acquaintance) was significantly stronger in a 
distressing context compared to a non-distressing context. This finding supports 
the core idea in attachment theory that threat automatically activates a stronger 
proximity-seeking tendency towards the attachment figure (Bowlby, 1973; 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). Furthermore, this 
pattern of results was found regardless of individual differences in attachment 
orientation, which is in line with other studies demonstrating the normative 
functioning of the attachment system under conditions of threat (Mikulincer et 
al., 2000; Mikulincer et al., 2002). Another important finding of the present 
148    CHAPTER 4 
study is that the approach response towards the attachment figure could be 
replicated using two different threat primes: an attachment-relevant (i.e., 
separation) and an attachment-irrelevant (i.e., failure) threat context, which is 
consistent with theoretical predictions (Bowlby, 1969; Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2003) and empirical research on attachment system activation (e.g., Mikulincer 
et al., 2002). That is, every event that is perceived as threatening is assumed to 
activate the attachment system and these triggers include both attachment-related 
and -unrelated sources of threat. On a side-note, we want to remark that our 
results do not imply that distress-alleviating functions necessarily need to be 
salient for proximity-seeking tendencies to occur. That is, we primarily 
demonstrated that these approach responses were stronger in a distressing 
compared to a non-distressing context. One can imagine, of course, that people 
can seek proximity for affiliative or sexual reasons as well.  
Both studies could also provide evidence on attachment-style differences in 
behavioural responses towards the attachment figure. In both Experiments 1 and 
2, we found that attachment anxiety was related to heightened approach (versus 
avoidance) responses towards the attachment figure (relative to an 
acquaintance). This finding confirms the theoretical assumption that anxious 
individuals make insistent attempts to seek and maintain proximity towards their 
attachment figure. Furthermore, the results of both experiments suggested that 
the relation between attachment anxiety and approach-avoidance tendencies did 
not depend on the presence of threat. This finding is in line with the general idea 
that anxious individuals are chronically preoccupied with attachment concerns 
and tend to appraise ‘objectively’ safe situations as being threatening 
(Mikulincer & Florian, 1998; Mikulincer et al., 2000; Shaver & Hazan, 1993). It 
also fits with other empirical research showing a main effect of attachment 
anxiety on the accessibility of attachment figure representations following the 
priming of a separation threat, failure threat, and neutral context (Mikulincer et 
al., 2002). On the other hand, the lack of interaction contradicts the findings of 
another study by Mikulincer and colleagues (2000) that examined the effects of 
stress on the accessibility of proximity-related thoughts. In these studies, an 
interaction effect was found between prime condition and attachment anxiety, 
indicating heightened accessibility of proximity words (compared to secure and 
avoidant attachment) only in the neutral prime condition, but not in the stress 
prime condition. The divergence in results between our study and that of 
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Mikulincer et al. (2000) could possibly be explained by the different tasks used 
and the differences in focus, namely proximity seeking as a behavioural action 
tendency in the present study (symbolic movements in the SRC task) versus 
proximity-related thoughts in the Mikulincer et al. study (reacting to words in the 
lexical decision task). This difference in operationalisation impairs a straight 
comparison between the results of both studies, because what people think and 
what they tend to do is not always likely to converge. We will return to this in 
the following paragraph. 
 With regard to attachment avoidance, only the second experiment yielded the 
expected pattern of results, namely a weaker tendency to approach the 
attachment figure. This illustrates avoidant individuals’ tendency to downplay 
attachment needs by deactivating the attachment system. On the one hand, this 
finding is in line with attachment theory and the findings of self-report and 
behavioural observation studies (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1998). On the other 
hand, it does not fit well with previous social-cognitive research demonstrating 
preconscious activation of proximity-related themes in avoidant individuals after 
being primed with distress (Mikulincer et al., 2000). The results on attachment 
avoidance are also inconsistent with another study by Mikulincer et al (2002) 
that showed lower accessibility of attachment figure representations in a 
separation threat context, whereas the present study found decreased approach 
responses in the failure and neutral context of Experiment 2, but not in the 
separation context of Experiment 1. Again, the focus on semantic knowledge 
versus action tendencies could provide a plausible explanation for the divergence 
in results between our study and that of Mikulincer. It is possible that avoidant 
individuals do experience preconscious activation of proximity needs, but these 
may not necessarily translate into behavioural action tendencies because of past 
failures to attain security through proximity seeking. In other words, they may 
want, yet simultaneously, fear closeness with the attachment figure because the 
latter has been associated with rejection and abandonment, and over the course 
of years this may have resulted in the development of distance instead of 
proximity goals. The latter conclusion has been substantiated by research on 
automatic goal-pursuit in which attachment avoidance was found to be 
associated with a stronger implicit motivation for distance goals (Dewitte & De 
Houwer, submitted, Gillath et al., 2006). Drawing on this line of reasoning, we 
thus argue that the present results do not contradict, but rather complement the 
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results of Mikulincer et al. (2000, 2002). To explain the finding that a failure 
threat did elicit the expected avoidance response in avoidant individuals whereas 
a separation threat did not, we refer to the nature of the threat prime. Separation 
involves a disruption of proximity maintenance, so there is no need for avoidant 
individuals to defend themselves by keeping distance and independence. Failure, 
on the other hand, is more likely to create distress in avoidant individuals 
because it undermines their sense of self-worth and self-efficacy, which may 
encourage them to restore their sense of control through the inhibition of 
proximity seeking (see Mikulincer, 1998). 
 The latter assumption does, however, imply that the inhibition of proximity 
seeking in the case of attachment avoidance should be evident only in the 
context of distress; yet, this could not be confirmed by the present results. 
Instead, a main effect of attachment avoidance was found, suggesting that these 
individuals tend to inhibit approach responses towards the attachment figure in 
both distressing and non-distressing contexts. This could raise the question why 
we did not find an avoidance response in the first experiment, especially because 
the same neutral prime was used in Experiments 1 and 2. In addressing these 
issues, we need to consider some limitations of the present study that may 
complicate the interpretation of our findings. First, we have to be careful in 
interpreting the lack of interaction effects between prime condition and 
attachment style, because this might be due to the small sample sizes in the 
separate prime conditions, which has limited the power to detect statistically 
significant interaction effects. Also note that the small sample size did not allow 
us to test the hypothesis that attachment security (i.e., low on attachment anxiety 
and avoidance) is related to heightened approach responses particularly in a 
threat context, because this would have required testing a three-way interaction 
between attachment anxiety, avoidance, and prime condition.2 The statistical 
power of the present experiments was, however, not sufficient to test higher-
order effects. On the other hand, it is worth noting that we did find fairly 
                                                     
2 Regarding the lack of relationship between attachment security and the approach-avoidance 
index, it is also important to note that some researchers (e.g., Fraley et al., 2000) have argued that 
the ECR is better able to capture the high ends of the anxiety and avoidance dimensions than it 
does the low (or secure) ends of each dimension, which would imply that the ECR may not be as 
sensitive for assessing attachment security (we will return to this in the General Discussion of this 
dissertation). 
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consistent results in two consecutive experiments, despite these small sample 
sizes, which seems to suggest that our results are reliable and theoretically 
meaningful.  
Another remark concerns the relative nature of the SRC task used in the 
present study. The compatible and incompatible blocks are always defined in 
terms of symbolic movements towards or away from the attachment figure 
relative to the non-attachment figure. Hence, it is difficult to disentangle whether 
our results reflect stronger approach responses towards the attachment figure or 
faster avoidance responses away from the acquaintance. However, we believe 
that it is most plausible to interpret our results in terms of approach responses 
towards the attachment figure, because it is rather difficult to justify theoretically 
that an acquaintance would evoke proximity or distance motives. In relation to 
the previous remark, it can also be argued that an attachment figure and an 
acquaintance differ not only on the crucial attachment dimension, but also in 
terms of familiarity, cognitive accessibility, relationship closeness, etc. This may 
introduce some ambiguities for interpreting our results. However, the observed 
relationships between the approach-avoidance index and individual differences 
in attachment style do seem to indicate that it is indeed the relevance for 
attachment goals that is the crucial difference between both categories of stimuli. 
Furthermore, the fact that our studies yielded results compatible with attachment 
theory and other studies on automatic attachment-system activation validates the 
present method as providing evidence on the impact of attachment on approach-
avoidance tendencies.  
In general, our results provided several new insights on attachment-style 
differences in the tendency to approach or avoid the attachment figure, 
especially with regard to attachment anxiety. That is, previous observational 
research revealed that only variation in attachment avoidance was related to 
actual behavioural strategies, whereas attachment anxiety was unrelated to 
proximity seeking (e.g., Collins & Feeney, 2000; Fraley & Shaver, 1998; 
Rholes, et al, 2002; Simpson, et al., 1992). As a result, attachment anxiety has 
often been referred to as an appraisal dimension that is primarily related to 
distress-reactions (Fraley & Shaver, 1998). The present studies, in contrast, did 
demonstrate an association between attachment anxiety and behavioural 
responses because we operationalized proximity seeking as an automatic action 
tendency. This seems to suggest that anxious individuals’ motivation for 
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closeness and intimacy is primarily operating at the automatic level and this fits 
with research on automatic goal-pursuit in which attachment anxiety was found 
to be associated with proximity goals (e.g., Gillath et al., 2006; Rom, & 
Mikulincer, 2003). An explanation in terms of automatic processes may thus 
clarify why our SRC task could tap the expected approach responses in anxious 
individuals, whereas observational methods could not. Within the SRC task, the 
tendency to seek or avoid proximity towards the attachment figure is inferred 
from the speed of symbolic approach and avoidance responses, which is less 
susceptible to demand effects. Such biases cannot be ruled out in observation 
studies because proximity seeking behaviour may be influenced by self-
presentation issues or conscious deliberation about the expected outcome of this 
behaviour. In the case of attachment anxiety, the latter could possibly interfere 
with the actual manifestation of proximity motives, because thoughts about not 
receiving as much proximity from the attachment figure as one desire may cause 
ambivalence and inner conflict in anxious individuals, which may eventually 
detract them from actual seeking proximity. This fits with the idea that anxious 
individuals are not only highly sensitive to proximity goals, but also to anti-goals 
such as rejection, separation, and attachment figure unavailability (Mikulincer et 
al., 2000; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007).  
It is remarkable that anxious individuals continue their approach behaviour, 
even though they appraise their attachment figure as being unavailable and 
unsupportive (Collins, 1996; Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips, 1996). A possible 
explanation for this discrepancy could be that anxious individuals stay 
committed to proximity goals, despite their negative expectations regarding 
goal-attainment, because they have no alternative for achieving security due to 
their sense of self as weak, vulnerable, and incompetent. It is also possible that 
anxious individuals do not form a univalent, negative view of their attachment 
figure, because this would imply that proximity seeking is hopeless (which is the 
avoidant view). Accordingly, the appraisal of the attachment figure in anxious 
individuals may vary depending on their current goal-state (see also 
Pietromonaco & Barrett, 1997, 2006). When confronted with distress, it may be 
that anxious individuals’ underlying proximity motive makes more accessible 
the positive aspects of the goal-helpful object (i.e., the attachment figure) while 
inhibiting its negative aspects (see Moors & De Houwer (2001, 2004; also see 
Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). In other words, the pursuit of intimacy goals in 
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anxious individuals may automatically render the attachment figure approach-
friendly and facilitate goal-consistent behaviour (i.e., proximity seeking).3 
Future work is needed to elaborate on these ideas and to explore them further in 
systematic research. In addition, more direct tests are needed to investigate the 
influence of attachment schemas on motivation, goals, and action tendencies 
measured at the automatic level, because this may advance our understanding on 
the underlying dynamics of attachment behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 It is worth noting that the approach-avoidance SRC task has originally been applied as an 
implicit measure of valence evaluation. Accordingly, the observed relationship between 
attachment anxiety and approach responses may indicate that anxious individuals hold a positive 
implicit evaluation of their attachment figure. This is, however, not in line with empirical findings 
showing that both anxious and avoidant individuals evaluate their attachment figure as being 
unavailable, inattentive, unsupportive, and insensitive to one’s needs (for a review, see Mikulincer 
& Shaver, 2007).  A possible explanation for this affect-behaviour incompatibility could be found 
in the distinction between ‘affective’ and ‘motivational’ valence. According to Robinson and 
Berridge (1993, 2001), both types of valence represent independent aspects of incentive 
motivation, which may explain why some stimuli produce goal-directed approach behaviour in the 
absence of subjective liking. In the case of attachment anxiety, it is not unlikely that one has 
learned to depend and rely on the attachment figure for protection and security because of the 
belief that one cannot handle threats on his/her own. Consequently, the attachment figure becomes 
a particularly salient stimulus and close contact with this person becomes very attractive, wanted, 
and essential for survival, eliciting a strong tendency to approach the attachment figure. Drawing 
on the distinction between ‘affective’ and ‘motivational’ valence, it can thus be speculated that the 
SRC task is primarily measuring a ‘wanting’ component rather that subjective ‘liking’. This 
hypothesis is worth exploring in future research. 
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ABSTRACT 
In three experiments, we used a variant of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
and explicit reports to examine the assumption that attachment anxiety and 
avoidance are related to proximity and distance goals. Results confirmed that 
higher scores on attachment avoidance are associated with a stronger implicit 
motivation for and positive evaluation of distance goals in attachment 
relationships. This was found both at the implicit and explicit level and both in a 
stress and non-stress context. Attachment anxiety was associated with proximity 
goals only when measured explicitly, but not when goal-activation was measured 
implicitly. Our findings highlight the importance of considering both implicit 
and explicit goal-representations when studying motivational processes in the 
context of attachment, and suggest that the IAT can provide a useful tool for 
investigating implicit motivational constructs. 
 
 
                                                     
1 Dewitte, M., & De Houwer, J. Proximity and distance goals in adult attachment. Manuscript 
submitted for publication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As human beings, we all have an innate need to be close to someone. Yet, 
sometimes this desire for proximity can become deregulated by past failures to 
obtain closeness, support, and intimacy. As a result, some of us strive for the 
very opposite, and prefer to spend time and space alone. Others, in contrast, 
crave intimacy and desperately try to minimize distance from the one they love 
with a risk of ultimately ‘suffocating’ them. The present study aims at studying 
such discrepancies in the regulation of closeness and distance by measuring the 
attitudes towards and implicit motivation for interpersonal closeness and 
distance as a function of individual differences in attachment style.  
Attachment-Related Differences in Proximity and Distance  
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1982) offers a coherent theoretical 
framework for explaining individual differences in closeness-distance regulation. 
According to the theory, perceived threats and dangers make salient the 
interpersonal goal of gaining proximity and support from the attachment figure, 
which encourages the implementation of behavioural plans aimed at attaining 
safety and support. Although the attachment behavioural system serves the broad 
goal of felt security, ‘a person’s history of achieving or failing to achieve this 
goal is expected to result in a characteristic hierarchy of attachment needs’ 
(Collins, Guichard, Ford, & Feeney, 2004, p. 204). In relation to this, it has been 
theorized that, depending on one’s expectations about how the attachment figure 
is likely to respond, people will adopt different goals, plans, and behavioural 
strategies aimed at minimizing or maximizing proximity towards the attachment 
figure. The expectations, beliefs, goals, and plans that evolve out of repeated 
experiences with the attachment figure are stored in mental working models that 
shape cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses in attachment 
relationships. According to attachment theory, proximity and distance goals 
constitute one of the most important components of attachment working models, 
because these goals are assumed to be most influential in directing the appraisal 
of emotion-eliciting events, the processing of attachment-related information, 
and the planning of one’s behaviour in social situations (e.g., Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2007). As such, proximity and distance goals are highly relevant for both 
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intra- and interpersonal regulation, which points to the importance of studying 
these goals in the context of adult attachment.  
Individual differences in attachment working models serve as the basis for 
individual differences in attachment style. Accordingly, important attachment-
style differences can be expected in the pursuit of interpersonal closeness and 
distance. Attachment styles are commonly described and measured in terms of 
two dimensions of attachment insecurity, namely anxiety and avoidance 
(Brennan, Clark, Shaver, 1998; Fraley & Waller, 1998). Individuals who are 
neither anxious or avoidant (i.e., secure) have a history of interactions with 
available and responsive attachment figures, which leads to the development of 
optimistic expectations about stress manageability, a strong sense of self-
efficacy (Mikulincer & Florian, 1995), and confidence in others good intentions 
(Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). As such, secure individuals have no 
difficulties in depending on and seeking support from others and can flexibly 
move along the proximity-distance continuum depending on the situational and 
relational context. Insecure individuals, in contrast, are less able to balance 
closeness and distance within their relationships. Because of their history of 
attachment figure unavailability, in which they have repeatedly experienced that 
proximity goals and associated action tendencies failed in achieving security, 
they needed to reorganize their goal-system. Anxious individuals stay committed 
to proximity goals and are compulsively driven to fulfil their unmet attachment 
needs of closeness and interdependence. Given their deep-rooted sense of 
helplessness and disbelief in their own lovability, these individuals tend to 
overemphasize their need for closeness and co-regulation, and overly rely on 
proximity-seeking tendencies. Avoidant attachment, on the other hand, is 
characterized by a tenacious belief that others are unreliable and unavailable 
when needed. As a defence, these individuals have disengaged from proximity 
goals and primarily aim at deactivating the attachment system by dismissing 
distress-cues and inhibiting proximity seeking behaviour through the pursuit of 
autonomy and control. Being reluctant to count on others for support, they aim at 
maximizing physical and psychological distance from the attachment figure, 
tend to minimize the importance of closeness, and promote a strong sense of 
self-reliance and independence (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). 
From the above description on attachment-related differences, it is clear that 
attachment theory places great emphasis on the representation of motivational 
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elements related to proximity and distance. These goals are most likely to differ 
between anxious and avoidant individuals and may lead them to construe and 
respond to similar situations in very different ways. Although several theorists 
have discussed their significance in attachment working models (e.g., Collins & 
Read, 1994; Collins, et al., 2004; Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000), there is little 
empirical work that directly assesses the goal-structures associated with different 
attachment styles.  
Existing Research on Proximity and Distance Goals in Adult Attachment 
Traditionally, research has relied on self-report measures to examine the 
assumption that attachment anxiety and avoidance differ in the content and 
expression of proximity and distance goals. Consistent with theoretical 
predictions, it has been shown that anxious individuals report higher levels of 
interdependence, intimacy, and willingness to self-disclose, whereas avoidant 
individuals show the opposite pattern (e.g., Collins & Allard, 2001; Griffin, & 
Bartholomew, 1994; Mikulincer & Nachson, 1991; Shaver & Hazan, 1993). 
These self-report studies have, however, important drawbacks. A first concern 
involves the issue of common method variance and procedural item-overlap. 
That is, the questionnaires that have been used to measure proximity and 
distance in close relationships show a high similarity with the questionnaires 
measuring attachment anxiety and avoidance, which also include items on self-
disclosure, dependence, and (dis)comfort with closeness (e.g., Bartholomew & 
Horowitz, 1991; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998; Collins & Read, 1990). 
Because of this item-overlap, it is thus not surprising that most self-report studies 
have confirmed the predicted relationships between attachment styles and 
proximity seeking, especially when both types of questionnaires are 
administered in the same session. Secondly, self-report measures are susceptible 
to self-presentation strategies and are limited to the study of conscious and 
reportable experiences (e.g., Greenwald, & Banaji). Although people may be 
aware of the goals they typically pursue to regulate attachment behaviour, it has 
been argued that the pursuit of attachment goals becomes solidified through 
repeated experiences and increasingly automatized over time (e.g., Collins et al, 
2004). Accordingly, self-report measures can reveal only partial information on 
proximity and distance goals, because the latter can also be triggered and 
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pursued without conscious planning. This is congruent with Bargh’s (1990) 
auto-motive model, in which goals are described as mental representations that 
can be preconsciously activated and can guide behaviour without conscious 
awareness, intention, effort, and control (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001).  
Because of these limitations of self-report measures, researchers have 
recently started to rely on reaction time paradigms that allow investigating the 
implicit features of attachment working models. Also with regard to the study of 
goals and needs, such implicit measures have proven to be useful for examining 
the automatic goal-related cognitions associated with attachment anxiety and 
avoidance. Summarizing the main results of these studies, it has been found that 
anxious individuals pursue extreme closeness and security, whereas attachment 
avoidance is associated with the goal of maintaining control and interpersonal 
distance as a means to avoid intimacy and dependence (e.g., Gillath, Mikulincer, 
Fitzsimons, Shaver, Schachner, & Bargh, 2006; Rom, & Mikulincer, 2003). 
Although research using implicit measures has revealed important information 
on the relation between adult attachment and automatic goals, there are still 
some issues that call for further research. First of all, only a small number of 
studies have examined automatic goal-activation in the context of attachment. 
This is surprising when considering that goals are essential in the regulation of 
attachment behaviour. Secondly, most of this research has relied on the lexical 
decision task, which is just one possible tool for identifying the goals associated 
with attachment strategies. Moreover, in the lexical decision task, the activation 
of goals is inferred from the extent to which goal-related concepts are cognitive 
accessible, which can provide only a static and remote index of the presence of 
goal-related representations. Therefore, we argue that research on attachment 
goals could benefit from the use of other implicit measures that tap more directly 
into automatic motivational processes and that are able to capture the dynamic 
component of goal-related cognitions. A final concern involves the observation 
that most of the research on automatic attachment goals has investigated these 
goals within a specific context or after presenting specific primes. For example, 
studies have examined (a) the pursuit of proximity-goals after priming the name 
of the attachment figure (Gillath, et al., 2006), (b) attachment goals within the 
context of new relationship development (Bartz & Lydon, 2006), (c) trust-related 
goals (Mikulincer, 1998), and (d) the manifestation of goals within group 
contexts (Rom & Mikulincer, 2003). Given that the manipulation of (prime) 
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context is likely to influence the activation or inhibition of goal-related 
cognitions, it is important to also explore attachment-style differences in 
proximity and distance goals within a neutral context. In other words, research is 
needed that specifically focuses on individual differences in automatic proximity 
and distance goals as a study object in itself. 
The Present Study 
At present, few empirical studies have directly assessed the implicit goal-
representations that are stored in attachment working models and none 
systematically compare explicit and implicit behavioural goals in relation to 
attachment style. The aim of the present studies was to address this need for 
additional research. For this purpose, we used a variant of the Implicit 
Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to measure 
attachment-related differences in the implicit motivation and attitudes towards 
proximity and distance. More specifically, we adapted the IAT in such a manner 
that it would measure, in a non-verbal way, the extent to which proximity and 
distance goals are wanted and liked. As such, the IAT can provide a more direct 
test of the automatic goal-representations that are assumed to be associated with 
attachment anxiety and avoidance. Furthermore, the IAT has proven to 
outperform other implicit measures in terms of reliability and effect size (e.g., 
De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007). Note that variants of the IAT have already 
been used successfully in the context of adult attachment (see Banse & 
Kowalick, 2007, and Zayas & Shoda, 2005 who used the IAT to assess 
automatic evaluations of self and others as a function of attachment style).  
In addition to the measurement of implicit behavioural goals, the present 
studies also aimed at examining the relation between attachment style and self-
reported proximity and distance; yet, in a way that precludes problems of shared 
method variance and item-overlap. We therefore used pictorial measures and 
rating scales tapping directly into one’s preferred and actual proximity-distance 
tendencies towards the attachment figure, and explored whether previous self-
report findings could be verified. Because this is the first study using a 
motivational IAT to assess implicit goal-representations, we were also interested 
in examining the association between the IAT and the explicit closeness-distance 
indices. Although the IAT and self-report measures are believed to tap different 
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aspects of a specific construct, one can assume that these aspects are related to a 
certain extent (e.g., Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwender, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). 
Hence, if we would observe a correlation between the IAT and explicit reports of 
proximity-distance, this would support that the IAT can be used to assess 
automatically activated goal-representations. 
 In the present paper, three experiments are reported that investigate 
attachment-style differences in implicit and explicit motivation and attitudes 
towards proximity and distance. Experiment 1 explored this relationship within a 
neutral context using a personalized motivational IAT in combination with self-
reported indices of closeness-distance. In the second experiment, we examined 
whether the association between attachment style and proximity-distance 
motives would differ after priming a distressing context. Finally, Experiment 3 
adopted a traditional IAT to measure the automatic evaluation of proximity and 
distance goals as a function of attachment style. Specific predictions will be 
made when discussing each of the experiments separately. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The main objective of Experiment 1 was to examine the relation between 
attachment anxiety and avoidance and their underlying proximity and distance 
goals within a neutral context. These goals were measured at the implicit level 
using a motivational variant of the IAT. Because motivational processes 
necessarily invoke personal associations, we adopted a personalized version of 
the IAT, which we created by changing the positive and negative labels of the 
traditional IAT into I want and I don’t want in combination with omitting the 
error feedback (see Olson & Fazio, 2004). These labels have the added value that 
they can capture the dynamic component of goal-pursuit and goal-
representations, namely wanting to attain proximity or distance. In addition to 
the IAT, participants also completed a series of explicit measures tapping into 
their consciously reportable judgments of closeness and distance.  
We were specifically interested in exploring whether the results of previous 
research on automatic goal-activation can be replicated within a neutral context 
and using another method than the lexical decision task. On the basis of both 
attachment theory and research on self-reported and automatic goals, we expect 
that higher scores on attachment avoidance will be related to a stronger 
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motivation for interpersonal distance, whereas attachment anxiety should be 
associated with a stronger motivation for proximity towards the attachment 
figure. On the one hand, we predict that the assumed relationships will emerge 
both at the implicit and explicit level. On the other hand, it can also be expected 
that, especially in the case of attachment avoidance, explicit responses will differ 
from automatic responses. In relation to this, several studies have demonstrated 
that avoidant individuals sometimes fail to achieve their deactivating goals (i.e., 
interpersonal distance) and reveal their underlying attachment needs (i.e., 
proximity) when these are measured at the automatic level (Mikulincer, 1998; 
Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Woddis, Nachmias, 2000).  
METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-nine first year psychology students from Ghent University participated 
in return for extra course credit.  
Materials  
Attachment style was measured using a Dutch translation of the ECR-revised 
(Experiences in Close Relationships scale revised; Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 
2000; ECR-R-NL, Buysse & Dewitte, 2004). This 36-items questionnaire is 
designed to assess the two attachment dimensions of anxiety and avoidance. 
Participants rated the extent to which each item is descriptive of their 
experiences with their primary attachment figure, using a 7-points scale ranging 
from not at all to very much. Eighteen items tap fear of abandonment and strong 
desires for interpersonal merger (Anxiety) and another 18 items assess 
discomfort with closeness, dependence, and intimate self-disclosure 
(Avoidance). Both scales have proven to be internally consistent and adequate in 
terms of construct validity. In the current sample, Cronbach’s alphas were high 
for the Anxiety (.93) as well as for the Avoidance subscale (.93).  
 
Self-report measures of proximity and distance. As a self-report index of 
proximity and distance tendencies, participants were asked to rate the extent to 
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which they prefer proximity and distance in their attachment relationship, using 
two separate 7 points-scales ranging from not at all to very much. Higher scores 
reflect a higher preference for, respectively, interpersonal distance and proximity 
towards the attachment figure. Additionally, a relative proximity-distance 
measure was created by asking the participants to rate their preference for 
keeping distance or seeking proximity towards the attachment figure on a scale 
ranging from 1 (distance keeping) to 7 (proximity seeking). Because the IAT can 
provide only a relative proximity-distance score, this measure allows for a direct 
comparison between one’s implicit and explicit motivation to seek proximity or 
keep distance from the attachment figure. 
Next, the Inclusion of the Other in the Self Scale (IOS; Aron, Aron, & 
Smollan, 1992) was administered. The IOS is a widely used pictorial measure of 
closeness that has proven to asses both feeling and behaving close, has shown 
good psychometric qualities, and is less susceptible to social desirability 
responses than other closeness-questionnaires. The latter makes the IOS-scale 
particularly useful in terms of the present research. Participants were instructed 
to select the picture that best described their attachment relationship from a set of 
Venn-like diagrams showing different degrees of overlap between two circles (I 
and other). These circles progresses linearly, creating a seven-step scale. Higher 
scores reflect higher levels of interconnectedness and perceived oneness.  
As a final index of interpersonal closeness, participants were presented with a 
diagram consisting of 10 concentric circles with in the middle the word ‘I’ (also 
see Rowe & Carnelley, 2005). Participants were asked to name the three most 
important persons in their lives (beginning with the attachment figure) and were 
instructed to place them in the diagram according to how much closeness they 
experience between themselves and the named person. The attachment figure 
was the primary variable of interest. Lower scores reflect a higher level of 
closeness between the self and the attachment figure.  
 
The IAT. The items for the IAT were four positive (i.e., humour, health, gift, 
peace) and four negative (i.e., hate, war, illness, pain) words, taken from a 
normative evaluation study of Dutch words (Hermans & De Houwer, 1994), and 
four proximity (i.e., nearby, intimacy, hug, close) and four distance (i.e., 
separation, independent, autonomous, distant) words that were drawn from the 
attachment literature. Word stimuli were presented in the centre of a black screen 
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using white uppercase letters in an Arial font with a font size of 32. As IAT 
labels, we used the Dutch words for proximity, distance, I want, and I don’t 
want. The IAT was programmed and presented using the INQUISIT 
Milliseconds software package (INQUISIT 2.01, 2005) on a Pentium II 
computer with a 15-inch colour monitor.  
Procedure 
After signing the informed consent, the primary attachment figure of each 
participant was identified using the WHOTO scale, which consist of 6 questions 
referring to the proximity-seeking, safe haven and secure base functions of an 
attachment figure (Hazan & Zeifman, 1994). For each question, participants had 
to write the name of the person that best served each of these functions. The 
person that satisfied the larger number of attachment-related functions was 
labelled as the primary attachment figure (see Fraley & Davis, 1997).  
Next, the IAT was administered. In accordance with Greenwald et al. (1998), 
the IAT consisted of five blocks in which participants were instructed to 
categorise words as quickly as possible into different categories by pressing a 
left (Q) or right (M) key on the AZERTY keyboard. The items were presented 
equally often in a random order. To minimize error variance, the order of the 
blocks within each IAT was kept constant for all participants (see Hofmann et 
al., 2005). In the first block, participants discriminated attribute-items by 
pressing a right key for proximity-words and a left key for distance-words. Next, 
they sorted target-items into the I want (right) and I don’t want (left) categories. 
The third stage combined these attributes and targets so that proximity and I want 
(right) had to be discriminated from distance and I don’t want (left). 
Subsequently, the interpersonal words of Block 1 were presented again, but this 
time the key assignment for proximity and distance was reversed. The final stage 
combined targets and attributes in this reversed order so that distance and I want 
required a right response and proximity and I don’t want a left response. The 
single-task blocks (Block 1, 2, and 4) comprised of 24 trials, whereas the dual-
task blocks (Block 3 and 5) consisted of two sub-blocks of 48 trials. The IAT-
effect was computed by subtracting the mean latencies of the initial combined 
tasks from the mean latencies of the reversed combined tasks, so that a positive 
IAT score indicates a stronger association between proximity and I want (or 
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distance and I don’t want) than proximity and I don’t want (or distance and I 
want).  
An instruction screen at the beginning of the task informed the participants 
that proximity and distance referred to, respectively, intimacy and independence 
with regard to their primary attachment figure. The labels I want and I don’t 
want were described as involving things one might want or don’t want. In 
addition, each block was preceded by a short instruction of the following task, 
reminding of the exact key-assignment on the one hand, and the attachment 
context of the labels on the other hand. A stimulus remained on the screen until a 
response was registered. In each block, the labels of categories assigned to the 
left key were printed in the top left corner of the screen, whereas the labels of the 
categories assigned to the right key were presented in the top right corner of the 
screen. Labels were presented continuously throughout each block. Once a 
response was given, the next stimulus appeared after an interval of 400 ms. In 
accordance with Olson and Fazio (2004), we ‘personalized’ the IAT by omitting 
the error feedback. Finally, participants completed a set of self-report 
questionnaires.  
RESULTS  
IAT-effect 
Data reduction and analyses were consistent with the D600-scoring algorithm 
recommended by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). Table 1 shows the 
means and standard deviations of the response latencies on the IAT in 
milliseconds.2  To evaluate the internal consistency of the IAT, we divided each 
combined block into two sub-blocks of equal length (first half and second half) 
and then calculated difference scores for these two halves. The Spearman-Brown 
coefficients revealed a good split-half reliability (.78). 
 
                                                     
2 Given that the present studies primarily aimed at identifying individual differences in implicit 
motivational processes, we did not counterbalance the order of response assignment in the IAT 
(see Gawronski, 2002; Hoffmann, et al., 2007). Therefore, the IAT-effects cannot be interpreted in 
absolute terms. Yet, for the interested reader, we do report that participants generally wanted more 
proximity than distance in their attachment relationships and also evaluated proximity as more 
positive than distance (Cohen’s d ranging from 1.67 to 2.34).
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Table 1 
Means (in ms) and Standard Deviations of the reaction times on the IAT in Experiments 
1, 2, and 3 
 M SD 
 Experiment 1 
I want - Proximity 684 182 
I  want - Distance 1078 218 
 Experiment 2 
I want - Proximity 738 177 
I  want  - Distance 1155 305 
 Experiment 3 
Positive - Together 692 98 
Positive - Apart 1069 205 
Relation between Individual Differences in Attachment and IAT 
Regression analyses were performed on the D600 IAT score, entering the two 
attachment scores as predictor variables. In a first step, attachment anxiety and 
avoidance were centred around their respective means and then entered as 
predictors in the regression analysis in order to examine their unique main 
effects on the IAT score. In a second step, we included the two-way interaction 
between anxiety and avoidance (i.e., product term) as an additional predictor. As 
can be seen in Table 2, only a significant main effect of attachment avoidance 
emerged, indicating that higher scores on attachment avoidance are associated 
with a stronger implicit motivation for interpersonal distance (relative to 
proximity). There was no significant unique effect of attachment anxiety and no 
significant interaction effect of anxiety and avoidance. 
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Table 2 
Regression analyses on the implicit and explicit closeness-indices of Experiment 1 with 
attachment anxiety, attachment avoidance and their interaction term as predictors 
Closeness indices βanxiety βavoidance βanxiety x 
avoidance 
IAT proximity-distance .13 -.31* .01 
Self-reported proximity .25** -.75*** .12 
Self-reported distance -.29** .77*** -.19 
Relative proximity-distance -.02 -.78*** .04 
IOS .08 -.77*** .05 
Closeness towards the self -.19 .65*** -.09 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
β = standardized regression coefficient 
Relation between Individual Differences in Attachment and Self-Report 
Indices of Closeness-Distance 
Table 2 shows that both attachment anxiety and avoidance were significant 
predictors of the level of self-reported proximity and distance regarding the 
attachment figure. In line with theoretical predictions, attachment anxiety was 
positively related to proximity seeking and negatively related to distance 
keeping. Attachment avoidance, on the other hand, was associated with a higher 
preference for distance keeping and a lower preference for proximity seeking. 
With regard to the relative proximity-distance measure, only a main effect of 
attachment avoidance emerged, indicating that the more avoidantly attached 
individuals preferred to keep interpersonal distance relative to seeking 
proximity. No significant relation was found with attachment anxiety. 
Attachment avoidance was also significantly related to the IOS-scale and 
closeness-towards-the self, which demonstrates that individuals scoring higher 
on attachment avoidance show less interconnectedness with their attachment 
figure and prefer to keep them at distance. Again, no relation was found with 
attachment anxiety. Furthermore, none of the closeness indices showed a 
significant relation with the anxiety x avoidance interaction term. 
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Relation between the IAT and Indices of Closeness-Distance 
As reported in Table 3, the IAT was significantly related to the level of self-
reported interpersonal distance and the relative proximity-distance measure. This 
indicates that the level of implicit motivation for proximity-distance is associated 
with the level of explicitly reported preference to keep distance from the 
attachment figure. No significant relation was found with self-reported 
proximity. In addition, the relation between the IAT and both the IOS-scale and 
closeness-towards-the-self almost approached significance. This suggests that 
the stronger one’s implicit motivation for proximity, the more 
interconnectedness and closeness one tends to report at the explicit level.3
 
Table 3 
Relation between the IAT and the self-reported closeness-indices in Experiment 1 
Self-reported closeness indices IAT score 
Self-reported proximity .19 
Self-reported distance -.30** 
Relative proximity-distance .30** 
IOS .26* 
Closeness towards the self -.27* 
* p < .10; ** p < .05 
DISCUSSION 
The most important result in terms of the present research is the observed 
relationship between attachment style and the implicit motivation to seek 
proximity or distance regarding the attachment figure. Results showed that 
                                                     
3 Because several studies (Banse & Gawronski, 2001; Dunton & Fazio, 1997) noticed an 
increase in correlations between the IAT and questionnaire measures when self-presentation 
tendencies are controlled for, we presented our participants with the 11 statements of the Marlowe-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) to control for these response 
tendencies. Yet, in none of the three Experiments, controlling for social desirability did affect the 
pattern of results.  
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individuals scoring higher on attachment avoidance, already at a relatively 
automatic level, want more distance than proximity in their attachment 
relationship. This is in line with theoretical ideas and empirical evidence on 
attachment-related goal pursuit (e.g., Gillath et al., 2006; Rom & Mikulincer, 
2003). In addition, their self-reported need for closeness and distance fitted their 
pattern of responses on the IAT. That is, a higher level of attachment avoidance 
was related to a greater preference for distance over proximity, less 
interconnectedness with the attachment figure, and a greater distance between 
the self and the attachment figure. Importantly, the finding that distance goals 
were pursued in the absence of a threat context may possibly indicate that the 
deactivating strategies of avoidant individuals are chronically organized around 
their self-protective need to avoid intimacy and keep independence, even when 
no coping actions are required. Note that this finding may cast doubts about the 
theoretical assumption that attachment strategies and working models are 
primarily activated under distressing conditions (see Collins et al., 2004; 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). Unexpectedly, attachment anxiety did not relate to 
responses on the proximity-distance IAT and was associated with only two of 
the five self-reported closeness-distance indices. These findings are at odds with 
attachment theory and research demonstrating that anxious individuals display a 
strong desire for proximity and intimacy, also at the automatic level (Mikulincer 
et al, 2000; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Gillath et al., 2006). Finally, it is 
noteworthy that the IAT was related to almost all self-report indices of 
closeness-distance, which provides partial support for the validity of the 
personalized motivational IAT to assess proximity-distance motives.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
The unexpected lack of association between attachment anxiety and implicit 
proximity goals is intriguing, because the search for interpersonal fusion and 
closeness is generally conceived as a defining characteristic of attachment 
anxiety. Therefore, we conducted a new experiment aimed at further exploring 
the relation between attachment style and implicit goals, by inducing a threat-
context before administering the IAT. Given that anxious individuals fear loss 
and abandonment by their attachment figure, it can be expected that their desire 
for proximity will particularly be triggered by events that make salient their 
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underlying fear. This is congruent with theoretical accounts of and empirical 
findings on goal-activation, indicating that the priming of a goal-relevant context 
enhances the accessibility of goal-related knowledge-structures (e.g., Förster, 
Liberman, & Friedman, 2007). Accordingly, Experiment 2 explored the 
possibility that the imagination of being temporally separated from the 
attachment figure will trigger anxious individuals’ motivation to restore this 
disruption of proximity maintenance. In the case of attachment avoidance, 
theoretical predictions are less clear. On the one hand, it could be expected that 
their tendency to pursue distance goals will not be affected by the induction of 
(attachment) threat. On the other hand, a study by Mikulincer and colleagues 
(2000), in which a lexical decision task was used with proximity and distance-
related words after priming a threat context, has revealed that threat can bypass 
the avoidant cognitive shield and reveal a need for proximity at the preconscious 
level (i.e., fast reaction times on proximity words). On the basis of this study, it 
could thus also be expected that higher scores on attachment avoidance will be 
associated with a stronger implicit motivation for proximity towards the 
attachment figure.  
METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-four students from various faculties at Ghent University participated in 
the experiment. Each participant received 5 euros for their participation. None of 
them had participated in the first experiment. The scores of one participant were 
removed because of extreme scores on the ECR (i.e., more than 3 SD above the 
mean) and another participant was excluded from analyses because he did not 
complete all the questionnaire items (more than 25 % missing values). The 
remaining sample consisted of forty-two participants.  
Materials and Procedure  
Instructions and materials were identical to those of Experiment 1, except that 
participants were primed with a threat context before completing the IAT. The 
priming task was described as a visualisation exercise in which participants were 
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asked to form a vivid image of their attachment figure going abroad for 1 to 2 
years. After the visualisation, participants were instructed to write about their 
thoughts and feelings related to this event. To measure the amount of distress 
elicited by the separation scenario, 12 visual analogue scales were administered 
before and after the prime. Participants were asked to place a mark on a 10-cm 
line, according to how much distress, despair, loneliness, anxiety, sadness, 
tension, insecurity, hurt, happiness, self-confidence, and joy they experienced at 
that moment, followed by a general evaluation of their current mood. We used 
continuous line rating scales to make it less likely that participants would 
remember their responses. 
RESULTS  
Distress Induction 
When comparing the amount of negative and positive feelings (means of the 
negative and positive VAS scales respectively) reported before and after the 
visualisation exercise, it appeared that, after the imagination of the attachment 
figure leaving, participants generally reported more negative feelings, t(1,41) = 
3.72, p < .01, and a less positive evaluation of their current mood, t(1, 41) = 
3.41, p < .01, than before the threat-prime. This indicates that our threat-prime 
was successful in eliciting distress. To examine the relation between attachment 
style and the amount of distress elicited by the separation-scenario, we 
calculated difference-scores between the amount of positive feelings reported 
before and after the threat-prime and the amount of negative feelings before and 
after the threat-prime. A significant relationship was found between attachment 
anxiety and the amount of negative feelings and current mood, indicating that the 
more anxiously attached individuals reported more negative feelings, r = .35, p < 
.05, and a less positive mood in response to an imagined separation, r = -.28, p < 
.05. Attachment avoidance, on the other hand, showed no significant relationship 
with the difference-scores of positive and negative feelings; neither did they 
report a difference in mood before and after the threat-prime, rs < .10, ns.  
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IAT 
The mean reaction times on the IAT are presented in Table 1. Again, the IAT 
was found to be highly reliable (.79). 
Relation between Individual Differences in Attachment and IAT 
Similar to Experiment 1, only a significant main effect of attachment 
avoidance emerged, indicating that the more avoidantly attached individuals 
hold a relatively stronger implicit motivation to keep interpersonal distance in 
their attachment relationship. Again, no significant relation was found with 
attachment anxiety and no significant interaction effect between anxiety and 
avoidance (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
Regression analyses on the implicit and explicit closeness-indices of Experiment 2 with 
attachment anxiety, attachment avoidance and their interaction term as predictors 
Closeness indices βanxiety βavoidance βanxiety x 
avoidance 
IAT proximity-distance .05 -.42** -.16 
Self-reported proximity .25** -.68*** .10 
Self-reported distance -.38** .58*** .21 
Relative proximity-distance .19* -.88*** -.04 
IOS .37*** -.67*** .04 
Closeness towards the self -.37*** .78*** -.02 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Relation between Individual Differences in Attachment and Self-Report 
Indices of Closeness-Distance 
As reported in Table 4, both attachment anxiety and avoidance were 
significantly related to the level of self-reported proximity and distance. Similar 
to Experiment 1, attachment anxiety was associated with a greater preference for 
proximity seeking and a lower preference for distance keeping, whereas 
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attachment avoidance showed the opposite pattern. The relative proximity-
distance measure was also related to both attachment dimensions. Attachment 
anxiety showed a marginally significant association with the level of preferred 
proximity seeking (relative to distance keeping). Attachment avoidance, on the 
other hand, was significantly associated with a greater preference for distance 
keeping (relative to proximity seeking). Both attachment dimensions were also 
significantly related to the IOS-scale and closeness-towards-the-self. The 
observed relationships indicated a higher level of interconnectedness and 
closeness in the case of attachment anxiety, and a lower level of closeness in the 
case of attachment avoidance. Again, none of the closeness-measures showed a 
significant relation with the anxiety x avoidance interaction term. 
 
Table 5 
Relation between the IAT and the self-reported closeness-indices in Experiment 2 
Self-reported closeness indices IAT score 
Self-reported proximity .11 
Self-reported distance -.29* 
Relative proximity-distance .35** 
IOS .08 
Closeness towards the self -.27* 
* p < .10; ** p < .05 
Relation between IAT and Self-Report Indices of Closeness-Distance 
Similar to Experiment 1, the IAT was significantly related to self-reported 
distance keeping and the relative proximity-distance measure (see Table 5). 
Results indicated that a higher level of implicit motivation for interpersonal 
distance was associated with a higher level of explicitly reported distance 
regarding the attachment figure. Again, no significant relation was found 
between the IAT and self-reported proximity-seeking. With regard to the other 
closeness indices, the IAT was associated only with closeness-towards-the-self, 
indicating that a higher score on the IAT was related to a higher level of reported 
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closeness between the self and the attachment figure. Unlike to what was the 
case in Experiment 1, no significant relation was found with the IOS-scale.  
DISCUSSION 
The results were generally in line with those of Experiment 1. Attachment 
avoidance was significantly related to the pursuit of interpersonal distance rather 
than proximity, and this was reflected both in their implicit and explicit 
responses. On the one hand, these findings contradict those of Mikulincer and 
colleagues (2000) who demonstrated high accessibility of proximity words in 
avoidant individuals after priming distress. On the other hand, the search for 
interpersonal distance instead of proximity does seem to be in line with the 
theoretical prediction that avoidant individuals automatically activate self-
protective distance motives in response to threat (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). In 
relation to the latter, we need to note, however, that our mood-manipulation 
check did not reveal a significant relationship with attachment avoidance. This 
lack of relationship could possibly result from the fact that avoidant individuals 
tend to suppress separation-related thoughts as a means to prevent that 
attachment needs become salient (Mikulincer, Dolev, & Shaver, 2004; Fraley, 
Garner, & Shaver, 2000; Fraley & Shaver, 1997). Because avoidant individuals 
were found to be unaffected by the separation threat prime and because we 
obtained similar results in a neutral context (see Experiment 1), the automatic 
activation of distance goals, found in the present study, should probably not be 
interpreted as an active defensive response against separation distress, but may 
rather be interpreted in terms of the chronic activation of distance goals in 
avoidant individuals.  
For the second time, the expected relationship between attachment anxiety 
and the implicit motivation to seek proximity towards the attachment figure 
could not be demonstrated. When measured at the explicit level, on the other 
hand, the pattern of proximity-distance responses did conform to theoretical 
predictions. That is, individuals scoring higher on attachment anxiety reported to 
prefer more proximity and interconnectedness in their attachment relationship. 
Contrary to the previous experiment, an association was found with almost all 
the self-reported closeness indices. As such, a clear dissociation could be 
observed between the implicit and explicit responses of anxious individuals. The 
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lack of association between attachment anxiety and the automatic proximity-
response came rather unexpected, especially because we induced a separation 
context which was expected to increase their motivation to alleviate distress and 
make salient proximity goals. In relation to this, it is worth noting that our results 
did confirm that anxious individuals were strongly affected by the induction of 
separation threat, which may reflect their tendency to ruminate on negative 
thoughts and focus on their emotional state when confronted with (attachment) 
threat (e.g., Mikulincer & Florian, 1995).4 Finally, similar to Experiment 1, the 
personalized motivational IAT was related to almost all self-report indices of 
closeness-distance, which provides additional support for its potential to capture 
implicit motivational constructs. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Whereas the previous two experiments focused on a rather dynamic 
component of goal-pursuit, namely wanting to attain the goal of proximity or 
distance, the third Experiment aimed at examining the valence of the end-states 
of the goals, namely proximity and distance. Provided that goals reflect cognitive 
representations of the desired outcomes that people want to attain (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999; Custers, & Aerts, 2005), it can be expected that goals will be 
associated with a positive evaluation. Hence, to the extent that anxious 
individuals are indeed motivated to maintain excessive closeness towards the 
attachment figure, they should display a positive attitude towards proximity 
relative to distance. Avoidant individuals, on the other hand, are expected to 
value proximity as less positive and distance as more positive. To test these 
predictions, a traditional IAT was administered, measuring positive and negative 
associations with regard to proximity and distance within a neutral context. 
Given that the IAT may be contaminated by extra-personal associations 
reflecting cultural instead of personal attitudes (see Olson & Fazio, 2004), we 
used the labels together and apart because these words are less likely to be 
construed normatively (compared to the words proximity and distance).  
                                                     
4 Note that it is not clear whether this result reflects a greater willingness to report distress in 
response to separation thoughts or whether anxious individuals actually experience greater distress. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-six students from various faculties at Ghent University were paid 5 
euros for their participation in this study. None of them had participated in the 
previous experiments.  
Materials and Procedure 
The same procedure and materials were used as in Experiment 1. The only 
difference was the use of a traditional IAT instead of a personalized one. To 
measure implicit evaluations of proximity and distance goals, the labels I want 
and I don’t want were replaced by positive and negative, and the labels 
proximity and distance were replaced by less clearly positively and negatively 
valued words, namely together and apart. The word stimuli were the same as in 
the previous experiments. Another difference with the personalized version of 
the IAT was that errors were followed by a red X presented in the middle of the 
screen for 400 ms. Otherwise, the procedure of the IAT was identical to that of 
Experiments 1 and 2. A larger score on the IAT indicates a more positive 
implicit evaluation of proximity (or negative evaluation of distance), whereas a 
lower score on the IAT indicates a more negative evaluation of proximity (or 
positive evaluation of distance). 
RESULTS  
IAT 
Table 1 presents the mean response latencies of the IAT. Similar to 
Experiments 1 and 2, the IAT was found to be highly internally consistent (.86).  
Relation between Individual Differences in Attachment and IAT  
In line with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, attachment avoidance 
emerged as the only significant predictor of the IAT score, indicating that higher 
scores on attachment avoidance were related to a more positive implicit 
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evaluation of interpersonal distance relative to proximity. No significant relation 
was found with attachment anxiety and no significant interaction effect of 
anxiety and avoidance.  
 
Table 6 
Regression analyses on the implicit and explicit closeness-indices of Experiment 3 with 
attachment anxiety, attachment avoidance and their interaction term as predictors 
Closeness indices βanxiety βavoidance βanxiety x 
avoidance 
IAT proximity-distance -.01 .33** -.11 
Self-reported proximity .33*** -.63*** .21 
Self-reported distance -.26* .47*** -.05 
Relative proximity-distance .22 -.63*** .09 
IOS .24** -.74*** .20 
Closeness towards the self -.25** .63*** -.26** 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Relation between Individual Differences in Attachment and Self-Report 
Indices of Closeness-Distance 
As shown in Table 6, both attachment anxiety and avoidance significantly 
predicted self-reported proximity seeking. As expected, individuals scoring 
higher on attachment anxiety reported more proximity seeking towards the 
attachment figure, whereas a negative relation was found with attachment 
avoidance. With regard to self-reported distance keeping, a significant main 
effect emerged of attachment avoidance and a marginally significant main effect 
of attachment anxiety. Again, individuals scoring higher on attachment 
avoidance reported a greater preference for interpersonal distance in their 
attachment relationship, whereas the more anxiously attached individuals tended 
to report less distance keeping. Similar to Experiment 1, the regression analysis 
on the relative proximity-distance measure revealed a significant main effect 
only of attachment avoidance, demonstrating avoidant individuals’ preference 
for distance over proximity. Finally, the IOS-scale and the closeness-towards-
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the-self measure were significantly related with both attachment anxiety and 
avoidance. As predicted, individuals with higher scores on attachment anxiety 
report more closeness towards their attachment figure, whereas individuals 
higher on attachment avoidance report less closeness and interconnectedness. 
Unlike to the previous experiments, the analyses on the closeness-towards-the-
self measure also revealed a significant interaction effect of attachment anxiety 
and avoidance. In order to interpret this significant interaction, we plotted the 
regression lines for high (+1 SD above the mean) and low (-1 SD above the 
mean) values of attachment avoidance and anxiety. Significance tests for slopes 
indicated that only the regression lines for low anxiety (β = .82, p < .01) and low 
avoidance (β = -.55, p < .01) were significant (all other p’s > .10). This indicates 
that high attachment avoidance, only in combination with lower scores on 
attachment anxiety, is associated with more reported distance between the self 
and the attachment figure. Attachment anxiety, on the other hand, is related to 
more reported closeness towards the attachment figure, but only in combination 
with lower scores on attachment avoidance. These findings conform to 
theoretical descriptions of attachment anxiety and avoidance (see Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2003).  
 
Table 7 
Relation between the IAT and the self-reported closeness-indices in Experiment 3 
Self-reported closeness indices IAT score 
Self-reported proximity .19 
Self-reported distance .13 
Relative proximity-distance .21 
IOS .27* 
Closeness towards the self -.18 
* p < .10; ** p < .05 
Relation between IAT and Self-Report Indices of Closeness-Distance  
Contrary to the previous experiments, no significant relation was found 
between the IAT and the self-reported closeness-distance indices, except for a 
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marginally significant correlation with the IOS-scale (see Table 7). In relation to 
the latter, we found that the more positive one’s implicit attitude towards 
proximity seeking, the stronger the interconnectedness one reports with the 
attachment figure. 
DISCUSSION  
In line with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, individuals scoring higher on 
attachment avoidance evaluated distance goals as more positive than proximity 
goals, and reported more (actual and preferred) distance in their attachment 
relationship. In the case of attachment anxiety, however, the present results did 
not reveal the expected positive implicit evaluation of proximity goals, although 
they did report preferring and experiencing higher levels of proximity towards 
the attachment figure. This replicates the pattern of results observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Unlike to what was the case in the previous two 
experiments, the IAT score was virtually unrelated to the self-report indices of 
closeness-distance. We will return to this finding in the General Discussion.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The primary objective of the present research was to examine the assumption 
that attachment anxiety and avoidance are related to proximity and distance 
goals respectively. For this purpose, we used a variant of the IAT to measure 
one’s implicit motivation for proximity and distance regarding the attachment 
figure, in combination with explicit measures of these goal-representations. With 
regard to attachment avoidance, all three experiments revealed a clear and 
consistent pattern of results. Specifically, it could be demonstrated that 
attachment avoidance was related to a stronger implicit motivation for and 
positive evaluation of distance goals (relative to proximity goals), which 
illustrates their tendency to downplay attachment motives and overemphasize the 
need for interpersonal distance (e.g., Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). In general, 
these results are in line with theoretical ideas and empirical findings suggesting 
that avoidant individuals lack the motivation to seek proximity towards the 
attachment figure in an attempt to avoid intimacy, which may be further linked 
to their compulsive need for control, self-reliance, and self-protection (for a 
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review, see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 2007; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). 
Importantly, the relation between attachment avoidance and distance goals was 
found both at the implicit and explicit level, and both in a stress and non-stress 
context. Although avoidant strategies are regularly believed to create 
dissociations between implicit and explicit responses, our results indicate that 
distance goals are both implicitly and explicitly represented in avoidant working 
models. This fits with the notion that implicit and explicit processes can operate 
in the same direction to achieve a goal and that implicit motives are often 
manifested in conscious appraisals and vice versa (Chartrand & Bargh, 2002).  
The finding that distance goals were pursued irrespective of the presence of 
threat does, however, not fit well with theoretical predictions and empirical 
research showing that avoidant individuals’ tendency to act in a distant manner 
is confined to stressful situations, because coping actions are required only in 
those situations (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 
1992). The chronic activation of distance goals in avoidant individuals might be 
explained by referring to their social learning history. Given that attachment 
avoidance would result from repeated experiences of rejection in attachment 
relationship(s), it is likely that avoidant individuals have learned to suppress 
proximity needs and proximity-seeking efforts towards the attachment figure 
(e.g., Fraley, Davis, & Shaver, 1998). As a result, they are less sensitive to 
positive outcomes and place less value at attachment needs, because they are 
chronically concerned with maintaining their well-practiced defences, especially 
in an attachment-related context. Although our results strongly suggest that 
distance goals are chronically activated in avoidant individuals, more direct tests 
are needed to further examine this conclusion. Such tests may require randomly 
assigning avoidant subjects to different levels and sources of distress and 
measuring its effect on implicit proximity-distance goals.  
It is also important to note that the findings of Experiment 2, in which 
motivational responses were measured in the context of distress, are at odds with 
other social-cognitive research demonstrating that a distressing context causes a 
breakdown in the avoidant defensive system, resulting in the automatic 
activation of proximity-related themes (Mikulincer et al., 2000). This divergence 
in results may, however, partially be explained by the methodological 
differences between our study and that of Mikulincer and colleagues. That is, the 
latter relied on another task (i.e., lexical decision task) for measuring proximity 
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and distance responses, and focused on the accessibility of cognitive constructs 
rather than measuring the dynamic and motivational component of goal-
representations. Also, Mikulincer et al. used attachment-unrelated word-primes 
(e.g., death and illness) which are less self-relevant than our visualisation task 
and do not refer to a specific attachment-context. Furthermore, in the Mikulincer 
study, attachment style and proximity-distance were measured without any 
reference to a specific attachment relationship. This last point is crucial because 
it can be speculated that both proximity and distance needs are cognitively 
represented in avoidant working models, and that the activation of each of these 
representations will depend on specific contextual or relational features. In the 
present study, we measured proximity-distance goals within a specific 
attachment relationship and this context may have served as a retrieval cue for 
the activation of distance goals in avoidant individuals. This fits with research on 
automatic goal-activation showing that when a goal-representation is 
consistently and repeatedly activated in a given situation (i.e., attachment 
relationship), this goal will become chronically and automatically activated in 
this specific (relational) context (see Custers & Aerts, 2007; Higgins, 1996). 
Further research is needed to better understand the associative links between the 
different motivational components of attachment schemas, to identify which 
mechanisms underlie their activation or inhibition, and to examine whether these 
representations and processes differ across relationships.  
Individuals scoring higher on attachment anxiety also showed an interesting 
and fairly consistent pattern of results. Across three experiments, attachment 
anxiety was related to proximity goals only when dependent variables were 
measured explicitly, but not when goal-activation was measured at the automatic 
level. That is, no relationship was found between attachment anxiety and the 
level of responding on the proximity-distance IAT, neither when measuring the 
implicit motivation for or implicit evaluation of proximity goals. As such, the 
present results were in line only with previous self-report findings and could thus 
provide only partial support for the theoretical assumption that anxious 
individuals organise their goals around their unfulfilled need for love and 
support and their compulsive desire to maintain close contact with the 
attachment figure (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). Note, however, that even at 
the explicit level, attachment anxiety did not consistently relate to all closeness-
distance indices. Furthermore, the correlations between attachment anxiety and 
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self-reported closeness-distance were much lower than in the case of attachment 
avoidance. Regarding the latter, some of the correlations approached .80, even 
though we used proximity-distance measures that showed less procedural 
overlap with the attachment questionnaire than other self-report measures do.  
On the one hand, our findings on the IAT oppose other research on automatic 
goal-activation in which attachment anxiety was found to be associated with 
proximity goals (e.g., Gillath et al., 2006; Rom, & Mikulincer, 2003). On the 
other hand, the pattern of results on the IAT does converge with behavioural 
observation studies revealing that only variation in attachment avoidance is 
related to proximity seeking, whereas so far no clear support has been found for 
the assumption that anxious individuals display higher levels of proximity 
seeking (e.g., Collins & Feeney, 2000; Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Rholes, et al, 
2002; Simpson, et al., 1992). Given that the chronic and compulsive pursuit of 
proximity needs would constitute one of the most salient characteristics of 
anxious individuals, it is intriguing that this goal was manifested only in their 
self-reports and not in their implicit responses. Taking into account other 
evidence showing inconsistent (i.e., negative or insignificant) relationships 
between attachment anxiety and proximity seeking (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1998; 
Vogel & Wei, 2005), the observed discrepancy between self-reports and reaction 
times on the IAT may point to the fragile nature of anxious individuals’ desire 
for interpersonal closeness. Nevertheless, we should be careful in interpreting 
these results because other evidence did demonstrate an association between 
attachment anxiety and proximity seeking at the automatic level (e.g., Dewitte, 
De Houwer, Buysse, & Koster, in press; Gillath et al., 2006). Therefore, we also 
need to consider other possible explanations for the lack of association between 
the proximity-distance IAT and attachment anxiety. 
One possible explanation could be the limited range of attachment anxiety 
scores in our samples. This might result from the fact that our participants were 
not pre-selected based on their attachment style. Consequently, our sample did 
probably not enclose extremely high anxious (and avoidant) persons. Note, 
however, that we did find the expected results with regard to attachment 
avoidance and post-hoc analyses revealed no differences in the range of anxiety 
and avoidance scores across experiments. Other explanations could be related to 
the relative nature of the IAT. It has been argued that past failures to obtain 
comfort and support from the attachment figure may interfere with anxious 
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individuals’ motivation to seek proximity to this person. Intense wishes for 
security and proximity, coupled with doubts about support availability and 
worries about rejection and abandonment may lead to ambivalence towards 
proximity seeking and approach-avoidance conflicts (Simpson et al., 1992). 
Hence, it could be that both proximity and distance goals are activated 
simultaneously in anxious individuals and this conflictive information may 
explain the lack of relationship between the IAT and attachment anxiety. That is, 
the procedure of the IAT indirectly inclines people to make comparative 
judgments on proximity relative to distance. To the extent that the interpretation 
in terms of conflicting motives is accurate, the relative nature of the IAT may 
thus impose a constraint on its potential to capture the underlying proximity 
goals of anxious individuals. This is less likely for avoidant individuals who 
clearly view intimacy and closeness as anti-goal states. This explanation does, 
however, not alter the fact that we still consider the IAT as a suitable instrument 
for testing the original theoretical predictions on attachment-related goal pursuit, 
because anxious and avoidant individuals are assumed to take extreme positions 
on the proximity-distance continuum. Furthermore, the IAT did have the 
potential to reveal the expected relationship between attachment avoidance and 
distance responses and yielded consistent results in three consecutive 
experiments. This further supports the value and usefulness of the IAT for 
investigating implicit behavioural goals in the context of attachment.  
A final remark on the pattern of results regarding attachment anxiety is 
related to the previous one and concerns the observation that in all three 
experiments the self-reported relative proximity-distance index was not or only 
marginally related to attachment anxiety, whereas it was strongly related to 
attachment avoidance. Interestingly, this fits the pattern of results on the IAT 
which is also a relative measure and related only to attachment avoidance. 
Again, this seems to suggest that it may be the relative nature of the IAT that is 
responsible for the lack of relationship with attachment anxiety. In relation to 
this, it is reasonable to assume that relative measures tapping the closeness-
distance continuum are more likely to reflect distance rather than proximity. 
Support for this assumption could be found in the results of Experiments 1 and 2 
in which IAT effects were related only to the self-reported distance measure, but 
not to the proximity measure. Based on this argument, it can thus be expected 
that attachment anxiety will relate to IAT effects that assess only the proximity 
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dimension. This possibility could be explored in future research by using, for 
example, a single-target IAT (ST-IAT; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006) to measure 
implicit motivation and attitudes towards proximity independent from distance. 
Note that the ST-IAT may also be useful to test the idea that anxious individuals 
hold ambivalent attitudes towards proximity (cfr. supra). By administering 
separate ST-IATs and comparing the strength of positive and negative 
associations with regard to proximity and distance (and with regard to non-
ambivalent attitude objects as a control comparison), we could test whether 
proximity and distance evoke equally strong positive and negative associations 
in anxious individuals (see de Liver, vander Pligt, & Wigboldus, 2007). In any 
case, delineating the conditions under which attachment anxiety relates to 
proximity goals as well identifying the mechanisms underlying attachment-
related goal-pursuit will be important to further clarify whether the lack of 
relationship between attachment anxiety and implicit proximity motives reflects 
something about attachment anxiety, or something about our IAT measure. 
 Despite the aforementioned concerns regarding the link between attachment 
anxiety and implicit motives, the present studies did provide valuable new 
information on attachment-style differences in proximity and distance goals 
because (1) we explored these goals both in a neutral and stress context and 
measured them both at the implicit and explicit level, (2) we used self-report 
measures of proximity and distance that showed less item-overlap with the 
attachment questionnaire, and (3) we were the first to use a motivational IAT for 
assessing automatic goal-activation as a function of attachment. In relation to the 
latter, our studies have at least three observations that promote subsequent use of 
the IAT in attachment research. First, the use of an IAT for assessing proximity 
and distance goals allowed us to overcome the problem of shared method 
factors. As such, we could provide independent evidence on the theoretical 
assumptions above and beyond the specific method used. Secondly, because the 
IAT is able to directly assess goal-related cognitions at a pre-attentive, automatic 
level, the present studies could reveal unique information on the implicit aspects 
of working models that might not be accessible through self-report. In this 
context, it is noteworthy that, in two experiments, the IAT and the explicit 
closeness-distance indices were significantly related, though the amount of 
common variance was limited to 20 %. This leaves enough room for both 
measures to explain each a unique part of the attachment construct, which points 
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to the importance of using both self-report and indirect measures when testing 
assumptions derived from attachment theory (see Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). A 
final observation that is worth mentioning concerns the pattern of results on the 
IAT which shows great similarities with the findings of behavioural observation 
studies, namely a significant relation with attachment avoidance and no relation 
with attachment anxiety. Both seem to contradict the findings on self-reported 
proximity in anxious individuals. This may possibly indicate that the proximity-
distance IAT is tapping the same underlying processes that determine actual 
behaviour. This is an interesting observation, especially because proximity-
distance goals can be regarded as the proximal determinants of attachment 
behaviour. In order to test this hypothesis in future research, it would be useful 
to examine the predictive value of the IAT in a study that compiles the IAT, self-
report measures, and actual behaviour into one design.   
In addition to providing evidence on the pursuit of proximity-distance goals 
as a function of attachment style, the present studies also add to the general 
literature on the IAT. First, given that the personalized motivational IAT was 
meaningfully related to individual differences in attachment style, it can be 
concluded from the present studies that the IAT can provide a valid index for 
measuring (attachment-related) motivational constructs. This should encourage 
researchers to extend its use towards other purposes than measuring evaluative 
associations. Second, we found that the personalized motivational IAT was more 
strongly related to the self-reported closeness-distance indices than the 
traditional IAT. On the one hand, this endorses the argument of Olson and Fazio 
(2004) that the personalized IAT is a better predictor of attitudes and behavioural 
intentions, and therefore less contaminated by extra-personal associations than 
its traditional counterpart. On the other hand, the traditional IAT appeared 
equally good in predicting avoidant individuals’ personally pursued goals of 
distance and independence, which suggests that the IAT is not simply reflecting 
culturally shared information or societal views on proximity and distance in 
close relationships.   
In conclusion, the present series of studies confirmed that attachment styles 
play a critical role in the goals adopted by an individual to regulate proximity or 
distance within attachment relationships. In testing this assumption, the IAT 
appeared to be a useful tool for assessing implicit motivational constructs. 
Therefore, we argue that it is valuable to continue working with the IAT in 
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attachment research, because this task can easily be adapted for measuring a 
range of attachment themes and as such advance our understanding on the 
cognitive and affective components of attachment working models that operate 
at an automatic level.  
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SELF-CONCEPT IN ADULT 
ATTACHMENT 1
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We report a study that was designed to investigate attachment-style 
differences in the implicit self-concept and to evaluate the psychometric 
properties of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) in the context of attachment 
research. Two variants of the IAT were used to assess implicit relational self-
esteem and relational anxiety after stress induction. Results showed that both the 
relational self-esteem and relational anxiety IAT (1) were meaningfully related 
to individual differences in attachment style and (2) predicted cognitive and 
affective reactions to attachment-related distress in addition to and beyond self-
report measures of attachment. These results provide evidence for the reliability 
and validity of the IAT as an index of the implicit attachment self-concept.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Dewitte, M., & De Houwer, J. (in press). On the role of the implicit self-concept in adult 
attachment. European Journal of Psychological Assessment (invited article for Special Issue). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Implicit measures of psychological constructs constitute one of the most 
important and exiting developments in recent research on psychological 
assessment. Implicit measures can be defined as the outcomes of measurement 
procedures that reflect the to-be-measured construct in an automatic manner 
(e.g., De Houwer & Moors, 2007). When the constructs of interest are aspects of 
personality, implicit measures thus attempt to capture the automatic impact that 
personality can have on behaviour. Research has shown that implicit measures of 
personality can be related in a meaningful manner to actual behaviour and often 
allow one to predict behavioural responses above and beyond what can be 
predicted on the basis of self-report measures (e.g., Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 
2002; Schnabel, Banse, & Asendorpf, 2006). In the present study, we explore the 
usefulness of implicit measures in the context of adult attachment. Given that 
automatic processes are assumed to play a crucial role in attachment behaviour, 
implicit measures could provide a particularly useful contribution to research on 
this topic. As such, adult attachment represents an ideal subject to further 
explore the value of implicit measures in the assessment of individual 
differences.  
One of the most prominent ideas of Bowlby’s (1969, 1982) attachment theory 
is that early attachment experiences are internalized into mental representations 
of the self and others that coordinate cognition, affect, and behaviour in close 
relationships. These representations are also called ‘internal working models’ 
(IWM) and are thought to be core features of personality and the foundation of 
individual differences in attachment styles. Such individual differences can be 
organized within a two-dimensional space anchored by the models of self and 
others which, in combination, yield four prototypic attachment styles: secure 
(positive self and positive other), preoccupied (negative self and positive other), 
dismissive (positive self and negative other), and fearful (negative self and 
negative other) (Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994). More recently, an emotional and 
behavioural regulation interpretation of the two underlying dimensions has been 
recommended, reframing individual differences in terms of anxiety and 
avoidance (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998). These dimensions map 
theoretically onto the models of self and others, respectively. Integrating both 
frameworks, attachment anxiety is assumed to be associated with negative 
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beliefs about the self and others, whereas attachment avoidance would be 
characterized by positive self-views and negative expectations about others. 
Given the broader social-cognitive interest in the self-concept, the present 
study focused specifically on attachment-related differences in self-
representations rather than other-representations. Evidence from self-report 
studies is largely consistent with theoretical assumptions that attachment security 
is related to more positive beliefs about the self, whereas attachment anxiety is 
associated with lower self-esteem. With regard to attachment avoidance, findings 
are less coherent, with the majority of studies reporting negative or non-
significant relationships between avoidance and global self-esteem (for a review, 
see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). This absence of an association could be related 
to the fact that self-report measures can reveal only partial information about the 
attachment self-model because such measures are limited to the study of explicit, 
introspectively accessible representations of the self-concept. This is an 
important restriction given that many aspects of attachment working models are 
assumed to operate in an automatic mode (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003), which 
calls for the use of more implicit measurement procedures in the context of 
attachment.  
Since working models have been conceptualized as cognitive-affective 
schemas (Baldwin, 1992), attachment researchers have started to rely on social-
cognitive reaction time methods for investigating the accessibility and 
organization of self-representations. For example, using a Stroop colour-naming 
task and a self-description task with positive and negative self-relevant and  
-irrelevant words, it has been demonstrated that secure individuals show access 
to both positive and negative self-relevant traits. Anxious individuals, on the 
other hand, had ready access to negative self-traits, whereas avoidant individuals 
had better access to positive self-traits (e.g. Mikulincer, 1995; 1998). In a related 
study, Mikulincer, Dolev, and Shaver (2004) showed that the induction of a 
cognitive load following the imagination of a painful relationship break-up 
heightened avoidant individuals’ access to negative self-traits, as was indicated 
by longer colour-naming latencies on negative self-relevant words in the Stroop 
task. In the non-load condition, attachment avoidance was related to lower 
accessibility of negative self-traits and heightened accessibility of positive self-
traits. These results suggest that avoidant individuals tend to inflate their self-
image by suppressing negative self-attributes. Accordingly, their self-esteem 
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should probably not be regarded as authentically positive, but rather as unstable 
and defensive in nature. 
In another interesting study focusing on implicit self- and other-beliefs in the 
context of attachment, Zayas and Shoda (2005) used an Implicit Association 
Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) for measuring automatic 
evaluative associations regarding the self and a significant other. Their study 
revealed that scores on a Partner IAT (using the categories partner, not-partner 
and pleasant, unpleasant) were related to explicit measures of adult attachment 
styles, whereas a Self IAT (using the categories me, not-me and pleasant, 
unpleasant) was not related to adult romantic attachment. The latter null finding 
is intriguing because, as outlined above, automatic evaluations of the self are 
assumed to be crucial determinants of individual differences in attachment. We 
therefore decided to conduct a study aimed at further exploring the role of the 
implicit self-concept in the context of adult attachment. Drawing on the original 
assumptions of attachment theory, we tried to optimize our chances of finding 
the hypothesized relations between attachment styles and IAT measures of the 
self-model by changing the experimental design used by Zayas and Shoda in 
three ways.  
 First, we changed the IAT to measure relational self-esteem rather than 
global self-esteem. This change follows naturally from the core idea in 
attachment theory that the model of self is construed and embedded in relational 
experiences with significant others. Whereas global self-esteem is contingent on 
different domains (e.g., academic, physical, social) and entails a general positive 
or negative evaluation of the self in relative isolation, the ‘relational self’ reflects 
the extent to which one values the self as worthy or unworthy of love in relation 
to a specific attachment figure. We therefore created a variant of the IAT 
including instructions, labels, and items that explicitly refer to a particular 
relational context. Furthermore, in line with Zayas & Shoda (2005), we assessed 
attachment style with respect to one specific attachment figure because the self-
model is likely to differ as a function of the specific attachment relationship (see 
Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000).  
Secondly, the lack of association between the Self IAT and attachment style 
in the Zayas and Shoda study (2005) could be attributed to the fact that 
automatic self-evaluations were measured in a relatively neutral and stress-free 
context. This is potentially problematic because attachment theory clearly 
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emphasizes the role of working models in regulating proximity and felt security 
when confronted with distress (Collins, Guichard, Ford, & Feeney, 2004). This 
implies that a challenge to the attachment system is required to activate the self-
concept and hence to observe the expected attachment-style differences in 
implicit beliefs and attitudes regarding the self. We therefore induced a distress 
context before administering the IAT, using a procedure in which participants 
were asked to imagine their attachment figure going abroad for a long period of 
time. In relation to this, research has shown that disruptions of proximity to the 
attachment figure (e.g., separation), whether real or imagined, are important 
sources of distress that trigger the operation of attachment processes (Feeney & 
Kirkpatrick, 1996; Fraley & Shaver, 1997).  
Third, in order to obtain a full understanding of the attachment self-concept, 
it is important to go beyond the study of self-esteem, which is just one aspect of 
the self, and to explore other attributes that could be part of one’s self-concept. 
This fits with the general definition of the self-concept by Greenwald et al. 
(2002), who define the self as a cognitive structure that contains all associations 
of the concept ‘self’ with attribute concepts that are characteristic of the 
individual (see also Asendorpf et al., 2002). Given the correspondence between 
the self-model and the anxiety dimension of attachment, another important 
aspect of the attachment self-concept could be the extent to which the self is 
associated with relational anxiety, that is, the fear of being abandoned and 
rejected by significant others. Therefore, we also included an Anxiety IAT, 
which was designed to capture the anxiety component of the relational self-
concept. 
Based on available theories and evidence (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), 
we expected that higher scores on attachment anxiety, as measured by the 
Experiences in Close Relationships scale-revised (ECR-R; Fraley, Waller, & 
Brennan, 2000), would be related to a decrease in implicit relational self-esteem 
and an increase in relational anxiety, as measured by the IAT. For attachment 
avoidance, we expected the opposite, namely a higher level of implicit self-
esteem and a lower level of relational anxiety. With regard to the four-group 
approach on attachment-style differences, as measured by the Relationships 
Questionnaire (RQ; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994), we predicted that the 
attachment styles with a positive self-model (i.e., secure and dismissive) would 
be related to an increase in implicit self-esteem and a decrease in implicit 
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relational anxiety, whereas the attachment styles with a negative self-model (i.e., 
preoccupied and fearful) should show the opposite pattern of correlations. On the 
other hand, because avoidant individuals have been shown to defensively 
suppress negative self-traits and feelings of rejection and anxiety (Mikulincer et 
al., 2004), it can also be expected that higher scores on the ECR avoidance and 
the dismissing item of the RQ will be related to a more negative implicit self-
concept as measured by the IAT.  
Although we expect to find meaningful correlations between the scores on 
the IAT and self-report questionnaires, it could also be that these correlations 
will be low to moderate because both types of measures are believed to tap 
related, though different aspects of a specific construct (Hofmann, Gawronski, 
Gschwender, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). We therefore added other criteria to assess 
the validity of the measures. Most importantly, we registered the thoughts and 
feelings that participants reported spontaneously in response to the hypothetical 
separation scenario and related these to the questionnaire and IAT measures. 
Note that separation experiences are assumed to have important implications for 
one’s self-concept in terms of feeling unworthy and rejected (Bowlby, 1973; see 
also Mikulincer et al., 2004). Hence, if we could demonstrate that the IAT 
measures are related to these thoughts and feelings over and above the traditional 
questionnaires, this would demonstrate not only the validity of the IAT measures 
but also their added value in attachment research. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty-one first year psychology students (42 women, 19 men) at Ghent 
University participated in return for extra course credit. 
Materials and Procedure 
Identification of Attachment Figure and Separation Prime  
First, each participant’s primary attachment figure was identified using the 
WHOTO scale which consists of six questions referring to the three critical 
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features of an attachment figure (proximity seeking and separation distress, safe 
haven, and secure base; Hazan & Zeifman, 1994). For each question, participants 
had to write the name of the person that best served each of these functions. The 
person that was listed most frequently was labelled as the primary attachment 
figure. In case of an exaequo, we chose as the attachment figure the person that 
satisfied the larger number of attachment-related functions (see Fraley, & Davis, 
1997). Because our sample consisted of adolescents and young adults, the 
attachment figure was either a partner, a good friend, or a parent. Then, 
participants were asked to imagine this attachment figure going abroad for one to 
two years and write about thoughts and feelings related to such an event.  
Self IAT and Anxiety IAT 
Subsequently, the two IATs were administered in a counterbalanced order to 
control for task order effects. To minimize error variance, the order of the blocks 
within each IAT was kept constant for all participants (see Hofmann et al., 
2005). In accordance with Greenwald et al. (1998), the IATs consisted of five 
blocks in which participants had to categorise words as quickly as possible into 
different categories by pressing a left (Q) or right (M) response-button. The 
items were presented equally often in a random order. In the first block of the 
Self IAT, participants discriminated target-items by pressing a right key for me-
words and a left key for not-me words. Next, they sorted attribute-items into 
relationally worthy (right) and relationally worthless (left) categories. The third 
stage combined these attributes and targets so that me and relationally worthy 
(right) had to be discriminated from not-me and relationally worthless (left). In 
Block 4, the key assignment for relationally worthy and relationally worthless 
was reversed. Finally, the two test blocks were repeated with the reversed 
response assignment (me - relationally worthless versus not-me - relationally 
worthy). The single-task blocks included 24 trials, whereas the dual-task blocks 
consisted of two sub-blocks of 48 trials. The procedure for the Anxiety IAT was 
identical.  
As labels for the Self IAT, we used the Dutch words for me (items: me, 
myself, I), not-me (items: others, they, them), relationally worthy (items: loved, 
liked, agreeable) and relationally worthless (items: inferior, rejected, 
disagreeable). The stimuli of the Anxiety IAT were identical to those of the Self 
IAT, except that the labels and words of the attribute categories were replaced by 
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relationally not-anxious (items: relaxed, certain, surrounded) and relationally 
anxious (items: abandoned, tense, uncertain). Special efforts were made to 
ensure a good understanding of the category labels. Therefore, the IAT was 
preceded by an instruction screen informing the participants that the items and 
labels referred to their primary attachment relationship.  
Self-Report Questionnaires 
Next, participants completed a Dutch translation of the ECR-R (Fraley et al., 
2000; ECR-R-NL, Buysse & Dewitte, 2004) and the RQ self-report scales 
(Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994; RQ-NL, Declercq, Bogaerts, Lievrouw, & Van 
Poppel, 2003). The ECR-R consists of an Anxiety scale (18 items) tapping fear 
of abandonment and strong desires for interpersonal merger, and an Avoidance 
scale (18 items) assessing discomfort with closeness, dependence and intimate 
self-disclosure. The ECR-R has proven to be internally consistent and adequate 
in terms of construct validity (e.g., Fraley et al., 2000). In the current sample, 
Cronbach’s alphas were high for the Anxiety (.89) as well as for the Avoidance 
subscale (.92).  
The RQ consists of 4 descriptive paragraphs, each reflecting a different 
attachment style (secure, preoccupied, dismissive, and fearful). Based on the 
recommendations by Fraley and Waller (1998), continuous ratings of the four 
prototypes were used by asking the participants to rate each of the descriptions 
on a 7-point scale in terms of how well the paragraph describes how they feel in 
their relationship with their primary attachment figure.  
Finally, the 11 statements of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
(Crowne, & Marlowe, 1964) were administered to control for social desirability 
response biases.  
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses  
IAT analyses were conducted with the D600 scoring algorithm recommended 
by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). The Self IAT score was computed by 
subtracting the mean latencies of the initial combined tasks from the mean 
latencies of the reversed combined tasks, so that larger positive IAT scores 
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reflected higher implicit relational self-esteem. For reasons of clarity, the 
Anxiety IAT score was calculated in such as way that larger positive scores 
reflected higher implicit anxiety. In order to evaluate the internal consistency of 
the IATs, we divided each combined block into two sub-blocks of equal length 
(first half and second half) and then calculated difference scores for these two 
halves. The Spearman-Brown coefficients revealed a good split-half reliability 
for both the Self IAT (.80) and the Anxiety IAT (.72).2 Furthermore, a 
significant positive correlation was found between the two IAT scores, r = .26,  
p < .05. 
Coding of the Responses to the Separation Scenario 
The participants’ spontaneous responses to a hypothetical separation from the 
attachment figure were coded by a coder who was unaware of the attachment 
and IAT scores of the participants. Coding reliability was assessed by 
independent coding of the responses of 35 randomly selected participants by 
another coder. Based on a first reading of the scenario’s, several categories of 
thoughts and feelings were delineated (e.g., feelings of anxiety, sadness, 
jealousy, proud, trust, thoughts about abandonment, infidelity, positive and 
negative consequences for the relationship,…) and the coders counted if and 
how many times these thoughts and feelings were reported by each participant. 
For statistical reasons and reasons of clarity, the different categories were 
aggregated into four main variables of interest: the number of reported negative 
feelings, positive feelings, negative thoughts, and positive thoughts. Inter-coder 
reliability was satisfactory for all judgements (Cronbach’s alphas of .90 for 
negative feelings, .83 for positive feelings, .92 for negative thoughts, and .85 for 
positive thoughts). 
                                                     
2 Given that the primary aim of the present studies was to identify individual differences in the 
implicit self-concept, we did not counterbalance the order of response assignment in the IATs (see 
Gawronski, 2002; Hofmann et al., 2007). Therefore, the IAT-effects cannot be interpreted in 
absolute terms. Yet, for the interested reader, we do report that participants generally evaluated 
themselves as being more relationally worthy and less relationally anxious (Cohen’s d of 1.16 for 
the Self IAT and .87 for the Anxiety IAT).  
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Correlations among the IATs and the Attachment Questionnaires 
As presented in Table 1, the Self IAT was significantly related to preoccupied 
attachment, as measured by the RQ, and attachment anxiety, as measured by the 
ECR.3 The Anxiety IAT was related only to preoccupied attachment, as 
measured by the RQ. This indicates that the more anxiously attached individuals 
had less positive implicit self-concepts. No significant relations were found with 
the other attachment scales. 
Regressions 
To examine the predictive validity of the IATs, we performed a series of 
regression analyses with reported positive and negative thoughts and feelings as 
criterion variables and the IAT and attachment scores as predictors.3 The 
analyses with the ECR and the RQ were conducted separately and are presented 
in Table 2. In a first series of regressions, the ECR anxiety and avoidance scores 
and their interaction term were entered in Step 1, and the Self and Anxiety IAT 
in Step 2. The regression analysis on reported negative feelings revealed that the 
ECR attachment scores made a marginally significant contribution in Step 1, R² 
= .11, p < .10, whereas the Self and Anxiety IAT showed an independent 
contribution when entered in Step 2, ΔR² = .12, p < .05. Both avoidant 
attachment, as measured by the ECR, and the level of implicit relational self-
esteem and anxiety, as measured by the IAT, predicted feeling less negative 
about the imagined separation. With regard to the prediction of positive feelings, 
it was found that the attachment scores made a significant contribution in Step 1, 
R² = .12, p = .05, but the Self and Anxiety IAT did not add significantly to this 
prediction, ΔR² = .01, p > .10.  
                                                     
3 Because the ECR defines attachment security in terms of low scores on anxiety and 
avoidance, we also conducted (separate) regression analyses on the Self and Anxiety IAT with 
attachment anxiety, avoidance, and their interaction term as predictors. The interaction term 
between attachment anxiety and avoidance was not significant, t < 1. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. ECR anxiety  .08 -.34*** .17 .64*** -.11 -.28** .07 -.00 .21 -.28** -.08 -.03 
2. ECR avoidance   -.50*** .41*** -.13 .53*** .07 -.19 -.33*** .00 -.23 -.08 .11 
3. RQ secure    -.55*** -.15 -.33*** .21 -.08 -.14 -.30** .17 -.08 -.36*** 
4. RQ fearful     -.09 .20 -.02 -.04 -.00 .14 .02 .10 .20 
5. RQ preoccupied      -.15 -.29** .26** .20 .19 -.20 .12 -.05 
6. RQ dismissive       -.17 .01 -.07 .09 -.18 .12 -.04 
7. Self IAT         .26** -.29** -.30** -.01 -.08 -.06 
8. Anxiety IAT         -.34*** -.21 .05 -.10 .01 
9. Neg feelings          .36 .08 .04 -.02 
10. Neg thoughts           -.16 -.07 .14 
11. Pos feelings            .11 .09 
12. Pos thoughts             .11 
13.Soc desirab  ility              
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Correlations among all measures 
Table 1 
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Specifically, only a significant main effect of attachment anxiety emerged, 
indicating that the more anxiously attached individuals felt less positive about 
the imagined separation. The regression analysis on reported negative thoughts 
revealed no significant effects of the ECR attachment scores, R² = .06, p > .10. 
There was, however, a marginally significant increment in explained variance 
from Step 1 to Step 2, ΔR² = .08, p < .10, indicating that the Self IAT tended to 
predict fewer negative thoughts about the imagined separation. The regression 
analysis on reported positive thoughts revealed no significant effects, ps > .10. 
Next, the above reported regression analyses were repeated, entering as 
predictors the RQ secure, fearful, preoccupied, and dismissive scores in Step 1 
and the Self and Anxiety IAT in Step 2. These analyses revealed a significant 
independent contribution of the IAT measures on reported negative feelings, ΔR² 
= .13, p < .05. More specifically, it was found that the Anxiety IAT significantly 
predicted more negative feelings about the imagined separation. The RQ 
attachment scores did not reveal significant effects. The regression analyses on 
positive feelings, positive thoughts, and negative thoughts showed no significant 
relations, ps >.10.4
Social Desirability 
In order to control for the influence of self-presentation tendencies on the 
relation between attachment style, the IATs, and cognitive and affective distress 
responses, we conducted the same regression analyses as reported above, but 
entered social desirability in Step 1, the attachment scores in Step 2, and the 
IATs in Step 3. Controlling for social desirability did not affect the pattern of 
results in any of the analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 We also explored whether the order of IAT administration (Self IAT – Anxiety IAT vs. 
Anxiety IAT – Self IAT) would moderate the relationship between the IAT, the attachment scores, 
and the criterion variables by entering task order and the interaction terms into the regression 
analyses. Neither the order main term nor the interaction terms were significant, Fs < 1, indicating 
that the pattern of results was not affected by task order effects. 
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Table 2 
Regressions on cognitive and affective separation responses as a function of self-
reported attachment style (ECR and RQ) and Self and Anxiety IAT 
 Negative  
feelings 
Negative  
thoughts 
Positive  
feelings 
Positive  
thoughts 
Predictors β t β t β t β t 
ECR anxiety -.06 -.49 .15 1.15 -.28 -2.16** -.10 -.75 
ECR avoidance -.27 - 2.12** .07 .51 -.22 -1.63 -.04 -.32 
ECR anx X avoid .01 .05 .10 .75 -.01 -.04 .15 1.09 
Self IAT -.22 -1.73* -.24 -1.74* -.10 -.70 -.12 -.81 
Anxiety IAT .24 -1.87* .13 -.99 -.10 -.73 -.11 -.77 
 β t β t β t β t 
RQ secure -.14 -.86 -.23 -1.45 .16 .98 .06 .33 
RQ fearful -.04 -.28 -.02 -.09 .13 .81 .11 .70 
RQ preoccupied .02 .14 .10 .74 -.24 -.1.66 .18 1.24 
RQ dismissive -.14 -1.06 -.01 -.07 -.21 -1.52 .14 .96 
Self IAT -.21 -1.53 -.23 -1.66 -.15 -1.03 -.05 -.38 
Anxiety IAT .27 2.10** .08 .58 -.01 -.05 -.15 -.11 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results of the present study showed that the levels of implicit relational 
self-esteem and implicit relational anxiety, as measured by the IAT, (1) were 
meaningfully related to individual differences in attachment style, as measured 
by the ECR and RQ, and (2) were able to predict attachment-related thoughts 
and feelings in addition to and beyond self-report measures of attachment. This 
supports the value of the IAT as a reliable and valid index of the implicit 
attachment self-concept.  
Regarding the relation between individual differences in attachment style and 
automatic evaluations of the self, our findings showed that attachment anxiety, 
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as measured by the ECR and the RQ (i.e., preoccupied attachment), was 
associated with lower implicit relational self-esteem and higher implicit 
relational anxiety. This fits with the theoretical description of anxious 
individuals as feeling anxious, worthless, weak, and unloved, especially when 
dealing with (attachment-related) distress (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). 
Avoidant attachment, in contrast, showed no significant association with either 
the self-esteem or the anxiety component of the implicit self-concept. On the one 
hand, this fits with previous self-report studies revealing inconsistent (i.e., 
negative to non-significant) results regarding the relation between self-esteem 
and avoidant attachment (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). On the other hand, 
studies using reaction time measures did show a positive self-view in avoidant 
individuals (Mikulincer, 1995, 1998) and even found that their self-view became 
negative when a cognitive load was added, which points to the instability of the 
avoidant self-concept (Mikulincer et al., 2004). However, the emphasis of these 
studies on global positive and negative evaluations of the self impairs an 
accurate comparison between previous and present results, because we 
specifically focused on the relational self within a particular attachment 
relationship. In this context, it is worth noting that avoidant individuals tend to 
dismiss relational sources of self-esteem, which may be further linked to their 
preference for self-reliance and interpersonal distance. As such, their self-view is 
likely to depend on the specific domain (e.g., achievement, social) in which it is 
assessed (see Carnelley, Israel, & Brennan, 2007; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). 
Furthermore, the Mikulincer studies have relied on the emotional Stroop task for 
measuring implicit self-representations and this task does not allow one to draw 
conclusions on implicit self-esteem as such, but rather focuses on the 
accessibility of self-relevant traits.  
The fact that we used an attachment-related distress prime may also provide a 
possible explanation for the lack of relationship with attachment avoidance. 
Previous research has shown that an attachment-related threat such as separation 
strengthens anxious individuals’ self-devaluation in an attempt to elicit 
compassion and proximity of the attachment figure. The self-view of avoidant 
individuals, on the other hand, was found to be unaffected by relationship threats 
because they defensively suppress attachment needs as a means to keep their 
independence and self-control. An ego-oriented threat such as failure, on the 
other hand, did elicit the expected positive self-view in avoidant individuals 
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(Mikulincer, 1998; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). Hence, future research should 
incorporate both attachment-related and -unrelated threat contexts to examine 
more accurately the effects of threat on implicit relational self-esteem and 
anxiety as a function of attachment. With regard to attachment security, it is 
rather intriguing that no relationship was found between the IAT measures and 
the secure item of the RQ, especially when considering that secure individuals 
have been found to display a stable positive self-view that is unaffected by the 
induction of threat (Mikulincer, 1998).  
The present study was also concerned with establishing the psychometric 
qualities of the IAT for assessing the implicit self-concept in the context of 
attachment. As is usually the case with IAT measures, split-half reliability was 
good. In addition, the observed correlations between the IAT and self-report 
measures of attachment style can be regarded as evidence for the convergent 
validity of the IAT scores. The fact that the present study did find theoretically 
meaningful correlations whereas other studies (e.g., Zayas & Shoda, 2005) did 
not, could be related to the fact that we induced relational distress and used 
variants of the IAT that focused on relational self-esteem and relational anxiety, 
rather than global self-esteem. Also note that the Anxiety IAT was related to 
explicit reports of attachment anxiety as measured by two independent 
attachment questionnaires that differ considerably in terms of format, which 
further supports the idea that both measures are tapping a common underlying 
psychological construct. 
Correlations between self-report and implicit measures are, however, a 
somewhat ambiguous indicator of the validity of implicit measures. On the one 
hand, it can be assumed that both types of measures converge in a theoretically 
meaningful manner because they are believed to tap related constructs. On the 
other hand, implicit measures are assumed to capture features of the construct 
that cannot be captured by self-report measures. Also, current views on adult 
attachment could be incorrect in their predictions about how implicit and self-
report measures should be related. We therefore also examined whether the IAT 
measures allowed predicting spontaneous affective and cognitive reactions to an 
imagined relational threat over and above what could be predicted on the basis of 
self-report measures. With respect to the ECR, both IATs added incremental 
validity over self-reported attachment style in predicting negative feelings 
reported after the induction of a (hypothetical) threat to the attachment 
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relationship. Also when the RQ scores were entered into the analysis, the IAT 
measures, especially the Anxiety IAT, made a unique contribution to the 
prediction of negative feelings, whereas self-reported attachment style did not. In 
addition, the Self IAT was the only variable that could predict negative thoughts 
in response to an imagined separation.5 More specifically, we found that lower 
implicit relational self-esteem was related to a higher number of reported 
negative thoughts and feelings, whereas higher implicit relational anxiety was 
associated with reporting more negative feelings. This fits with theoretical 
predictions.6 The fact that the IAT measures had incremental predictive validity 
in relation to self-report measures of attachment supports the validity of these 
implicit measures. It also underlines the importance of supplementing traditional 
self-report questionnaires with indirect measures of self-evaluations that are able 
to capture the automatic cognitive-affective components of the self-concept.  
With regard to the predictive value of self-reported attachment styles, we 
found that attachment anxiety, as measured by the ECR, was related only to the 
number of reported positive feelings. This finding was somewhat unexpected. 
Although it is theoretically possible for anxious individuals to report less trust, 
sympathy, respect, etc. when confronted with a hypothetical separation from the 
attachment figure, it is more likely to find a relation with reported negative 
feelings because anxious individuals would be highly sensitive to relationship 
threats and react to separation with great distress and despair (Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2003). The negative relation between avoidant attachment and reported 
negative feelings, on the other hand, does seem fully in line with theory and 
research showing that avoidant individuals dismiss negative emotional states and 
inhibit feelings of rejection, separation, or loss (Fraley & Shaver, 1997; 
Mikulincer, et al, 2004).  
Although our results clearly demonstrate the usefulness of the IAT for 
assessing the implicit attachment self-concept, there are still some limitations 
that need to be discussed. First, the predictive value of the IAT regarding distress 
                                                     
5 Note that when the IAT measures were entered separately into the regression analyses, both 
the Self and Anxiety significantly predicted the number of reported negative feelings at the .05 
level and thus showed both incremental validity above and beyond the ECR and RQ scores. 
 
6 The Pearson correlations between the IATs and negative thoughts and feelings further 
support these conclusions (see Table 1).  
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responses was rather low. This could be attributed to the fact that participants 
were exposed to an imagined, and not a real, separation threat which is likely to 
produce less intense distress reactions. Also note that, unfortunately, no 
manipulation checks were performed to control for individual differences in the 
vividness and ease with which participants imagined the separation scenario and 
these differences could have interfered with the obtained results. A second 
limitation concerns the fact that we measured distress responses only at the 
explicit level. Given that implicit and explicit processes are likely to differ, 
especially in the case of attachment avoidance (see Mikulincer et al., 2004), 
future research should include both implicit and explicit responses to separation 
distress as a dependent variable. In addition, parallel explicit ratings of relational 
self-esteem and anxiety are lacking, which prevented us from providing a more 
comprehensive test of the incremental validity of the IAT in relation to self-
report. Third, we did not include a control condition to compare the influence of 
threat versus no threat on attachment-style differences in the implicit relational 
self-concept. Hence, at this point, it is not entirely clear whether the differences 
between our results and those of Zayas and Shoda (2005) should be attributed to 
the use of a separation-threat prime, to our focus on the relational self instead of 
the global self, or both. Future research is needed to directly examine the 
influence of threat on self-representations by varying the level and source of 
distress before administering the IAT. Finally, not all distress responses were 
predicted as well by the IAT measures and/or attachment questionnaires. On the 
other hand, the fact that the Self and Anxiety IAT were related only to the 
negative, and not to the positive, thoughts and feelings could be interpreted as 
support for the validity of the IAT measures, because this fits with the idea that 
attachment working models serve distress-regulation functions and are thus 
primarily oriented towards coping with negative stimuli (Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2003).  
In summary, the present findings provide first evidence that IAT measures of 
relational self-esteem and relational anxiety have the psychometric properties of 
reliability and validity that justify their use in attachment research. Our results 
also suggest that it is crucial to create the right conditions, in terms of IAT items 
and situational context, to improve the validity of the IAT as a measure of 
attachment working models. In view of future attachment research, we think it is 
important to further investigate the role of the implicit self-concept by exploring 
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more complex and diverse self-representations in relation to different situational 
contexts and different attachment figures, and by encouraging further use of the 
IAT for assessing the cognitive and affective components of attachment working 
models that operate at a pre-attentive, automatic level.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
A core assumption of attachment theory is that one’s history of attachment 
experiences is stored in a set of mental representations that are automatically 
activated whenever attachment-relevant events occur. Once activated, these 
representations are expected to have a direct impact on cognitive processing, 
emotional appraisal, and behavioural responses. Although it is generally held 
that attachment behaviour is rooted in automatic processes, until recently, the 
automatic nature of attachment working models has remained largely unexplored 
and the precise processes through which they operate are not yet well 
understood. Fortunately, attachment researchers have recently started to integrate 
social-cognitive ideas into the study of attachment dynamics and started to rely 
on experimental paradigms for studying the implicit features of attachment 
system functioning that might not be accessible through self-report. In doing 
this, both theory and research have shifted towards exploring the implicit (i.e., 
automatically activated) content of working models and have put more emphasis 
on the role of several processes that are involved in the activation and regulation 
of the attachment system (see Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002; Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2003). However, current evidence on the automatic aspects of attachment is still 
limited in important ways and many assumptions have not yet been tested. The 
aim of the present research project was to extend and contribute to the growing 
literature on automaticity in the context of attachment. Using various indirect 
measurement procedures, we explored whether and in what way context and 
attachment style are related to implicit representations and cognitive and 
behavioural processes. Hypotheses were most explicitly developed for 
attachment anxiety and avoidance because both dimensions are assumed to be 
associated with cognitive distortions and motivational tendencies that operate in 
opposite ways.1 According to attachment theory, the regulatory strategies 
underlying attachment anxiety and avoidance would be most distinct in the 
                                                     
1 Note that the terms ‘attachment anxiety’ and ‘attachment avoidance’ (as well as anxiously 
and avoidantly attached individuals) could be incorrectly interpreted as reflecting distinct 
categories instead of two continuous dimensions. Therefore, it would be more correct to use the 
labels “individuals scoring higher on attachment anxiety/avoidance” because this better conveys 
the dimensional and continuous aspect of attachment styles. However, we decided to use the 
original labels for reasons of brevity and clarity.  
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processing of incoming emotional information and in the regulation of proximity 
seeking when feeling insecure and threatened (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 
2007).  
In the first part of this dissertation, we presented a series of studies on a 
neglected component of attachment functioning, namely attention. This 
cognitive process is nevertheless of crucial importance in the activation and 
regulation of the attachment system, because it is involved in the appraisal and 
monitoring of environmental changes and attachment figure availability (in 
function of detecting potential threat). In addition, we explored the process of 
proximity seeking, both at the cognitive and behavioural level, as a central 
mechanism for regulating distress. The second part of the project presented a 
series of studies on two important components of attachment working models, 
namely proximity and distance goals as a central regulator and motivator of 
cognitions and behaviour, and self-representations as an integral part of 
appraisal processes and behavioural responses.  
We begin this general discussion with a summary of our main results and 
elaborate on the most relevant findings. Next, theoretical implications of our 
results will be discussed in relation to some broader considerations regarding the 
current view on attachment. Throughout this discussion, we will also provide a 
number of recommendations and guidelines for future research. Finally, we 
indicate several limitations of our studies.  
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN RESULTS 
STUDIES ON ATTACHMENT PROCESSES 
Attention to Emotional Attachment-Related Information  
Although attachment theory suggests that insecure attachment orientations 
are characterized and maintained in part by attentional biases that shape 
emotional response patterns (e.g., Bowlby, 1980; Main, 1990), little research has 
been directed at investigating the relation between attachment style and 
attentional processing of incoming information that is emotionally significant 
and potentially relevant to attachment concerns. According to the theory, the 
extreme negative emotional responses associated with attachment anxiety would 
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result from hypervigilance to negative emotional input. Avoidant individuals, on 
the other hand, are expected to divert attention away from information that could 
potentially activate the attachment system. No research to date has provided a 
clear test of these theoretical assumptions. The research reported in Chapters 1 
and 2 therefore aimed at exploring attachment-style differences in the allocation 
of attention to negative and positive emotional information. In Chapter 1, we 
used a dot-probe task presenting general and attachment-related positive and 
negative words. The results showed that attachment anxiety and avoidance yield 
similar response patterns in attentional processing, namely attentional avoidance 
of attachment threat. This attentional avoidance effect was best predicted by the 
interaction between high scores on attachment anxiety and avoidance, and not by 
their unique main effects. Furthermore, only attention for attachment-related 
threat words was significantly related to individual differences in attachment 
style. No relationship was found with attention for general threat or positive 
words. The observed interaction effect is compatible with the ‘fearful’ pattern of 
attachment that is commonly described in terms of cognitively closure and 
avoidance of negative attachment information (Bartholomew, 1990). It is, 
however, remarkable that no support was found for the expected vigilance-effect 
in anxious individuals. Because the latter is an important prediction of 
attachment theory, the study reported in Chapter 2 was designed to further 
explore the attentional patterns associated with individual differences in 
attachment style by presenting pictures of happy, angry, and neutral faces in an 
exogenous cueing task. Facial expressions would have a higher degree of social 
relevance than words and may signal interpersonal acceptance and rejection. 
Such signals would be highly salient for anxious individuals who are 
characterized by a strong need for approval and a rejection-oriented focus. On 
the one hand, we expected to replicate our previous findings. On the other hand, 
it could also be that angry faces are more potent cues for eliciting the expected 
vigilance in anxious individuals. Interestingly, a similar pattern of results 
emerged as in the study of Chapter 1 and this attests to the reliability of our 
findings regarding the attentional styles associated with attachment anxiety and 
avoidance. More specifically, the results of the second study showed that the 
interaction between high-attachment anxiety and high-attachment avoidance was 
associated with reduced attention for relationally threatening stimuli. Once more, 
this pattern of results can be linked to the cognitive-processing mechanisms 
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associated with fearful attachment. Our results are also in line with findings in 
the general attentional bias literature, showing that individual differences in 
attentional orienting are an interactive function of both the level of anxiety and 
defensiveness (Eysenck, 1997; Ioannou, Mogg, & Bradley, 2004). One way to 
explain the avoidant attentional style associated with insecure attachment is that 
such a pattern could possibly assist in mood regulation by reducing anxious 
mood states in a self-regulatory way. Although we did not make specific 
predictions regarding attention allocation to positive stimuli, the results of 
Chapter 2 revealed that the interaction between attachment anxiety and 
avoidance also predicted reduced attention for positive stimuli, specifically 
happy faces. The fact that this avoidance-effect emerged only when attachment 
avoidance, rather than attachment anxiety, was considered as the moderator 
variable, supports an explanation in terms of the defensive nature of deactivating 
strategies that would limit attention to any emotional material that makes salient 
attachment needs (e.g., Edelstein, 2006). In addition, the second study also, 
unexpectedly, revealed that attachment anxiety was significantly (or marginally 
significantly) related to attentional avoidance of happy and angry faces, whereas 
attachment avoidance yielded no significant main effects. Based on theoretical 
predictions, we would have expected the opposite. We will elaborate on these 
findings later in this general discussion.  
Attention to Attachment Figure-Related Cues 
 Whereas the studies presented in Chapters 1 and 2 focused on selective 
attention in the service of processing incoming emotional information, Chapter 
3 aimed at investigating attention as a regulatory mechanism for optimizing 
proximity goals, once the attachment system has been activated by emotional 
cues. According to attachment theory, the activation of the attachment system is 
not necessarily manifested in actual proximity seeking, but can also trigger the 
cognitive system by activating proximity-related cognitions or mental 
representations of the attachment figure (see Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Woddis, & 
Nachmias, 2000; Mikulincer, Gillath, & Shaver, 2002). Such mental 
representations are likely to direct attentional resources towards attachment 
figure-related cues. 
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In four experiments, we investigated both the normative and individual-
differences component of selective attention to attachment figure-related cues, 
using a dot-probe task in which the name of the attachment figure, the own 
name, and the name of an acquaintance were presented in combination with a 
neutral name. Our results showed that priming with an attachment-relevant 
context (i.e., separation from the attachment figure) automatically activated an 
attentional bias towards the attachment name. This bias was consistently 
associated with attachment anxiety, but not with attachment avoidance. In 
addition, the relation between attachment style and attention was found to be 
specific to the attachment name and not driven by familiarity or salience effects. 
Contrary to the prediction that the activation of the attachment system, and thus 
proximity goals, is dependent on the experience of distress, we found that the 
induction of both a threat and positive attachment context caused people to 
increase attention to attachment figure-related cues. In explaining this result, it is 
important to consider that proximity towards the attachment figure may not be 
driven solely by the attachment functions this person serves. That is, people do 
not always turn to their attachment figure to alleviate distress in times of need, 
but also seek proximity to engage in affiliative, sexual, and exploratory 
activities. Such affiliative goals may have been activated when imagining an 
enjoying day out with the attachment figure. The fact that, after the induction of 
a positive prime context, a significant relationship was found between 
attachment anxiety and vigilance to attachment cues may thus suggest that 
anxious individuals are overly sensitive to pursuing affiliation-related goals. On 
the other hand, because vigilance to the attachment figure emerged in both threat 
and positive contexts, this result may also be interpreted in terms of their 
chronically active attachment system that would be characterized by chronic and 
vigilant monitoring of the attachment figure in function of gaining proximity and 
security. In support of this, research on attachment and affiliation in adolescent 
relationships has revealed that anxious individuals are almost exclusively 
focused on pursuing attachment-related goals, regardless of context (Mikulincer 
& Selinger, 2001). Their chronic focus on gaining security may arise from 
difficulties in inhibiting rejection-related thoughts, which may cause anxious 
individuals to interpret positive affect in negative terms (e.g., Baldwin & Kay, 
2003). 
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Unexpectedly, attachment avoidance did not relate to selective attention for 
attachment figure-related information. Hence, no evidence was found for the 
presumed attentional avoidance of attachment cues associated with attachment 
avoidance. This lack of relationship may in part be explained by the fact that 
threat was induced by a procedure in which participants were asked to 
consciously reflect on a relational threat situation. Given that avoidant 
individuals are found to defensively suppress separation-related thoughts to 
prevent unwanted activation of the attachment system (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 
1997; Fraley, Garner, & Shaver, 2000), it is likely that the use of this specific 
prime interfered with the cognitive processing of attachment figure-related 
information in avoidant individuals. In this vein, the lack of association between 
attachment avoidance and attention to attachment-figure cues may be understood 
as a kind of attentional even-handedness, resulting from the fact that separation 
threat is less subjective meaningful and thus less threatening to them. A similar 
explanation may be given for the fact that no relationship was found between 
attachment avoidance and attention to attachment cues after a positive prime-
induction. In relation to this, it has been argued that avoidant individuals dismiss 
any kind of emotional experience that could potentially activate the attachment 
system or promote interpersonal closeness (Cassidy, 1994). Note that the use of 
a conscious prime may also explain the divergence in results between our study 
and that of Mikulincer and colleagues (2002) in which the subliminal priming of 
a separation threat word slowed down avoidant individuals’ access to their 
attachment figure’s name in a lexical decision task. The use of a subliminal 
word-prime may allow circumventing defensive suppression of distress in 
avoidant individuals and preconciously activate a defensive and inhibitory 
response towards attachment figure-related information. Another important 
difference between our study and that of Mikulincer et al. is that they focused on 
cognitive accessibility of mental representations, whereas we focused on the 
process of attention allocation. 
Taking together the results on attention allocation in the context of 
attachment, it can be concluded that selective attention for emotional and 
attachment figure-related cues did vary as a function of attachment style. This is 
consistent with the attachment literature suggesting that individuals manage their 
close-relationship affect and behaviour in part through selective attention (e.g., 
Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION   223 
Approach-Avoidance Action Tendencies 
In addition to investigating the regulation of closeness at the cognitive level, 
Chapter 4 aimed at investigating proximity seeking as an automatic action 
tendency that is associated with achieving attachment-related goals. Although 
considerable empirical attention has been devoted to the study of proximity 
seeking as a central regulatory mechanism in the attachment behavioural system, 
our studies constitute one of the first systematic attempts to directly examine 
both the automatic and behavioural component of proximity seeking. As such, 
we could provide a more direct test of proximity seeking as an automatic goal-
directed response associated with approach-avoidance tendencies.  
To investigate approach-avoidance tendencies that are automatically evoked 
by attachment figure-related stimuli, we used a stimulus response compatibility 
(SRC) task in which participants had to make symbolic approach and avoidance 
movements towards or away from attachment figure- and acquaintance-related 
words. In two experiments, we investigated both the normative and individual 
differences-component of proximity seeking by inducing a threat and neutral 
context before administering the approach-avoidance SRC task and exploring its 
interaction with attachment style. Our results showed that the induction of an 
attachment-related (i.e., separation) and attachment-unrelated (i.e., academic 
failure) threat context automatically increased behavioural responses oriented 
towards the attachment figure (relative to an acquaintance), compared to the 
induction of a non-threat context. In both experiments, attachment anxiety was 
associated with faster approach (versus avoidance) responses towards the 
attachment figure (relative to an acquaintance) and this relation was not 
influenced by the type of prime condition (i.e., separation, failure, and neutral). 
This again suggests that the attachment system of anxious individuals is 
chronically activated. Attachment avoidance, in contrast, was related to a weaker 
tendency to approach the attachment figure. The latter could, however, only be 
demonstrated in Experiment 2 in which an ego-oriented, attachment-irrelevant 
threat context was induced, but not in Experiment 1 in which a separation threat 
was primed. At first glance, this pattern of results could be explained by the fact 
that a failure prime is more salient to elicit distress in avoidant individuals 
(compared to a separation prime, cfr. supra). Such distress is likely to activate 
their self-regulatory strategies of keeping independence and avoiding closeness 
(e.g., Mikulincer, 1998). The nature of the threat prime can, however, not fully 
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explain the observed pattern of results, because the association between 
attachment avoidance and the approach-avoidance index was found to be 
independent from the presence of threat. Although we have to be cautious in 
interpreting the lack of interaction effects between attachment anxiety, 
avoidance, and prime condition (because of the small sample sizes), the present 
results do suggest, to some extent, that both context and attachment style 
independently influence behavioural responses.  
Interestingly, to our knowledge, this study provides first evidence that 
attachment anxiety does relate to behavioural strategies oriented towards 
approaching the attachment figure. Previous observational research could not 
demonstrate such a relationship (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Simpson, Rholes, 
& Nelligan, 1992). Because overt behaviour is subject to both controlled and 
automatic determinants, other regulatory processes and competing goals may 
detract anxious individuals from seeking actual proximity and eventually impair 
the translation of automatic action tendencies into overt behaviour. This 
indicates that in order to gain a clearer understanding of the behavioural 
responses associated with different attachment styles, it is most important to 
focus not only on behaviour, but also on its proximal determinants, namely goals 
and automatic action tendencies (also see Carver & Scheier, 1998).  
STUDIES ON ATTACHMENT REPRESENTATIONS 
Proximity and Distance Goals 
To gain deeper insight into the motives that drive attachment processes, 
Chapter 5 aimed at investigating proximity- and distance-related goal-
representations that are stored in attachment working models. Although 
attachment theory delineates a number of goal-states, our research focused 
specifically on proximity and distance (independence), because these sub-goals 
are assumed to be most influential in directing cognition and behaviour in the 
service of obtaining felt security. Proximity and distance goals may lead 
individuals to interpret and respond to similar situations in very different ways. 
Furthermore, the pursuit of proximity and distance goals is assumed to be one of 
the most crucial differences between anxious and avoidant attachment, because 
what is regarded as a goal for the one attachment dimension would be an anti-
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goal for the other dimension. There is, however, little empirical work that 
directly assesses attachment goals, especially at the automatic level.  
In three experiments, we used a variant of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
to measure attachment-style differences in the implicit motivation for and 
evaluation of proximity and distance. In addition, we also registered explicit 
reports of these goal-representations. Across experiments, we found that 
attachment avoidance was associated with a stronger implicit motivation for and 
a positive evaluation of distance goals (relative to proximity goals), both at the 
implicit and explicit level and both in a stress and non-stress context. This 
indicates that avoidant individuals tend to overemphasize their need for social 
distance at the expense of establishing proximity and intimacy, probably in the 
service of maintaining autonomy and independence. Furthermore, our results 
suggested that distance goals are chronically activated in avoidant individuals, 
irrespective of the presence of threat. In relation to this, it can be speculated that 
the compulsive and automatic pursuit of avoidance goals serves to reduce their 
fear of intimacy and maintain their habitual defences, which may be further 
linked to self-protection goals (Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000). This behavioural 
rigidity and fixation on one interpersonal goal is likely to result in poor relational 
outcomes. Also note that, although avoidant strategies are regularly believed to 
create dissociations between implicit and explicit responses, we found that 
avoidant individuals’ preference for interpersonal distance does not necessarily 
involve conscious deliberation, but may be well understood as an automatized 
self-defensive response that is able to override a primary goal of the attachment 
system, namely proximity maintenance towards the attachment figure. The 
observed relation between attachment avoidance and distance goals fits, to some 
extent, with the approach-avoidance study, presented in Chapter 4, in which 
attachment avoidance was found to facilitate avoidance-oriented motivational 
processes independent from the presence of threat. Results were, however, not 
completely comparable across studies because the induction of a separation 
threat evoked distance-related responses in the IAT-study, but not in the 
approach-avoidance study. The focus on processes versus representations may 
provide a possible explanation for this divergence in results. That is, several 
other competing goals and regulatory processes may cause that goals do not 
necessarily reach behavioural intention (see Bargh, Barndollar, Gollwitzer, 
Trötsel, 2001).  
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With regard to attachment anxiety, the expected relationship with proximity 
goals was observed only when dependent variables were measured explicitly, but 
not when goal-activation was measured implicitly using the IAT. Remarkably, 
even the induction of a separation threat, which was assumed to make proximity-
related concerns more salient in anxious individuals, was not sufficient to evoke 
a significant association between attachment anxiety and automatic proximity 
goals. This would have been expected based on attachment theory and other 
empirical evidence on automatic goal-pursuit (e.g., Gillath, Mikulincer, 
Fitzsimons, Shaver, Schachner, & Barg, 2006; Rom & Mikulincer, 2003). Note 
that, at the explicit level, anxious individuals did report preferring and 
experiencing lower levels of interpersonal distance and higher levels of 
proximity towards the attachment figure. The lack of relationship between 
attachment anxiety and proximity goals assessed at the implicit level is 
intriguing because the chronic and compulsive pursuit of proximity is generally 
conceived as a defining characteristic of anxious’ hyperactivating strategies, 
which are likely to operate automatically. In Chapter 5, we therefore devoted 
considerable attention to providing possible explanations for this lack of 
association. Among these, an explanation in terms of the relative nature of the 
IAT that (1) is more likely to reflect distance rather than proximity or (2) may 
interfere with anxious individuals’ ambivalent attitude towards proximity 
seeking (cfr. infra), might be regarded as most plausible. Note however, that 
these explanations cannot account for the observed relationship between 
attachment anxiety and responses on the SRC task (Chapter 4) which also 
evokes approach relative to avoidance responses.  
Implicit Self-Representations 
In exploring the implicit content of working models, we did not only focus on 
goal-related representations, but also aimed at investigating another important 
feature of attachment working models, namely self-representations. The beliefs 
that people hold about themselves and others are of great theoretical importance 
because they are assumed to serve or hinder the pursuit and attainment of 
attachment goals, and as such determine in part one’s cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural responses in attachment-relevant contexts (e.g., Pietromonaco & 
Barrett, 2000). Although considerable empirical attention has been devoted to 
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the study of self-representations as a function of attachment style, the majority of 
this research can provide only limited information about the content of self-
models. We therefore designed a study, reported in Chapter 6, in which several 
important adjustments were made to previous studies on the attachment self-
concept. Most importantly, (1) we focused on beliefs about the relational self 
and relational anxiety within a given attachment relationship (instead of global 
positive and negative feelings), (2) we induced a challenge to the attachment 
system by priming a separation-threat context, and (3) we measured the self-
concept at the implicit level. The latter point is crucial because beliefs about 
one’s own lovability and anxiety in relation to the attachment figure are likely to 
be distorted by self-protective motives (e.g., Hinckly & Andersen, 1996). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that these beliefs have become solidified 
through repeated experiences and increasingly automatized over time (see 
Collins, Guichard, Ford, & Feeney, 2004), which calls for the use of measures 
that do not rely on conscious self-report. 
 Two variants of the IAT were used to assess implicit relational self-esteem 
and relational anxiety after the induction of a separation threat. Our results 
showed that attachment anxiety was related to lower implicit self-esteem and 
higher implicit anxiety. No relationship was found with attachment avoidance. In 
addition, we demonstrated that the IAT can provide a reliable and valid index of 
the implicit attachment self-concept. Our results are generally in line with other 
studies showing that the attachment anxiety dimension is most influential in 
modulating self-related responses (for a review, see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). 
Several theorists have argued that this negative self-view is a core vulnerability 
factor underlying attachment anxiety (e.g., Collins & Allard, 2001; Mikulincer, 
1998; Pietromonaco & Barrett, 1997). Because anxious individuals might take 
some of the blame for relational failures, interpersonal rejection, and attachment 
figure unavailability, their negative self-view is likely to encourage 
hyperactivating responses. The resulting heightened experiences of distress and 
overdependence on the attachment figure may, in turn, further damage the 
anxious self-concept by emphasizing their helplessness, neediness, and 
vulnerability to rejection and abandonment. Interestingly, our results provide 
first evidence that anxious individuals’ negative self-evaluation can be activated 
automatically and should thus not be regarded solely as a deliberate and 
conscious self-presentation strategy intended to capture the attention and support 
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of the attachment figure (Cassidy, 1994). This does, however, not imply that 
their negative self-view cannot serve this goal at the automatic level as well.  
Contrary to the theoretical prediction that attachment avoidance is associated 
with a positive self-concept, researchers have suggested that avoidant individuals 
hold a fragile, defensive, and unstable sense of self-worth that may be negative 
in nature (Mikulincer, 1998; Mikulincer, Dolev, & Shaver, 2004). Accordingly, 
it was not clear whether to expect a higher or lower level of implicit relational 
self-esteem and anxiety in avoidant individuals. Unfortunately, our results could 
not provide conclusive evidence on this matter because avoidant attachment 
showed no significant association with either the self-esteem or the anxiety 
component of the implicit self-concept. The use of a separation threat prime (cfr. 
supra), in combination with our focus on the relational self-concept, may 
explain, to some extent, why we did find an association with attachment anxiety, 
but not with attachment avoidance. Unlike anxious individuals’ broad and 
undifferentiated negative self-view, the self-view of avoidant individuals would 
depend on the specific domain in which it is assessed. In relation to this, it has 
been argued that especially anxious individuals value relational sources of self-
esteem, whereas avoidant individuals derive their self-esteem from competence-
based sources and tend to dismiss the importance of the relational self 
(Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2006; Carnelley, Israel, & Brennan, 2007). In addition, 
avoidant individuals are assumed to exclude feelings of anxiety and rejection 
from their self-view (Mikulincer et al., 2004), which may explain the lack of 
association between attachment avoidance and the score on both the relational 
self and anxiety IAT. Further research is needed to investigate whether the 
defensive strategies of avoidant individuals do indeed block access to a part of 
their self-concept that has arisen from past attachment experiences. 
In this context, it is worth noting that the findings on the link between 
attachment anxiety and self-esteem are robust across studies, domains, and 
methodology, whereas most of the evidence on self-evaluations in avoidant 
individuals is rather inconsistent, especially when measured at the explicit level. 
In some studies, avoidant attachment is associated with higher self-esteem (e.g., 
Bartholomew, & Horowitz, 1991; Brennan & Morris, 1997), whereas other 
studies demonstrate a negative or non-significant relationship (e.g., Gentzler & 
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Kerns, 2004; Schmitt & Allik, 2005).2 When measured at the automatic level, 
some studies have shown heightened accessibility of positive traits (Mikulincer, 
1995; 1998); other studies provided evidence for defensive suppression of 
negative traits (after the induction of a cognitive load) (Mikulincer et al., 2004). 
Based on these findings, it has been argued that the self-view of avoidant 
individuals would differ at different levels of responding. This may suggest that 
research on the avoidant self-concept could benefit from studies that focus on the 
way their self-knowledge is organized and how it is influenced by regulatory 
processes, rather than identifying the valence associated with their self-
representations. This would allow us to better understand under which 
conditions, in which domains, and at which measurement levels, avoidant 
attachment is associated with positive or negative self-beliefs. We will return to 
this later in the general discussion. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND BROADER CONSIDERATIONS 
The main objective of this research project was to directly examine several 
automatic processes and automatically activated representations underlying 
individual differences in adult attachment.  In this part, we will discuss some of 
the challenges and problems that arise when studying individual differences in 
attachment system dynamics in order to arrive at a better understanding of our 
findings, to identify several shortcomings, and to offer a perspective for future 
research.  
The Attachment System as a Dynamic Affect-Regulation System 
 The attachment behavioural system is by definition an emotion regulation 
device. Perceived threats automatically activate the system, which causes 
individuals to seek proximity to protective others (or to evoke a mental 
representation of them) as a means to manage distress and restore emotional 
balance. Individual differences exist in how the attachment system is likely to 
function and each of these different regulatory styles are assumed to have 
                                                     
2 In several studies of this research project, we included a measure of global self-esteem and 
did also consistently demonstrate a negative relationship with attachment anxiety and a negative or 
non-significant relationship with attachment avoidance.
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specific effects on the processes that influence the generation, experience, and 
expression of emotions in thoughts, feelings, action tendencies, and behaviour. 
Accordingly, the attachment system includes multiple processes that are 
designed to increase, maintain, or decrease one or more components of an 
emotional response. In studying the relation between attachment style and these 
different regulatory processes, several difficulties can be encountered, resulting 
from the fact that emotion regulation is inherently dynamic in nature (e.g., 
Scherer, 2000). These emotional dynamics can arise from many different sources 
and can be manifested in many different ways, which introduces a great deal of 
complexity in theory and research on the attachment system, especially when 
making theoretical predictions on individual differences.  
 A first source of complexity results from the fact that emotion regulation 
includes multi-componential processes that unfold over time. That is, strategies 
differ in when they have their primary impact on emotion generation and 
regulation. Furthermore, strategies that act at different points in the emotion-
process have importantly different affective, cognitive, and social consequences 
(Gross, 1998, 1999, 2002). In relation to this, it can be argued that emotion 
regulation is not a linear process. Positive and negative feedback loops create 
emotional circuits that allow for continuous change of the state of the system 
(Freeman, 2000). Secondly, the strategies that we rely on to increase, maintain, 
or decrease emotional experiences can operate in different ways at different 
levels of responding (i.e., automatic versus controlled). Third, the processes that 
are involved in emotion regulation are malleable. This implies that regulatory 
strategies are not inherently functional or dysfunctional; their efficiency depends 
in part on the particular situational context. Finally, the regulation of emotions is 
determined by one’s currently active goals (Bargh, 1984; Frijda, 1986). Goals 
coexist in a hierarchy, with higher-level goals determining lower-level goals and 
lower-level goals contributing to the attainment of higher-level goals (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998). The complexity here resides in the fact that higher- and lower-
level goals can exert their influence at different points in the regulation process. 
As such, a certain strategy can serve one goal at a given moment in emotion 
regulation and can be driven by another goal at another moment. In addition, 
higher- and lower-level goals can be in conflict. As a result, one goal can block 
the manifestation of another goal. Furthermore, when regulatory efforts fail in 
inhibiting competing goals, both goals and anti-goals can be activated 
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simultaneously, which impairs effective emotion regulation. Another complexity 
in the interplay between goals and emotion regulation is that there is no one-to-
one relation between goals and regulatory strategies. That is, different strategies 
can serve the same goal and the same strategy can operate in the service of 
different goals. This makes it difficult to reliably identify the goals that modify 
or regulate subsequent processes.  
 Although current formulations of attachment theory do acknowledge the 
dynamic nature of the attachment system (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Shaver & 
Mikulincer, 2002), they still hold on to a rather static view when making 
predictions on attachment-style differences in affect regulation. This is 
particularly the case for attachment anxiety and avoidance, which are assumed to 
be associated with distinct regulatory strategies that yield quite opposite effects 
on emotion regulation. That is, the hyperactivating strategies underlying 
attachment anxiety would increase the experience and expression of negative 
emotions and proximity seeking, whereas the deactivating strategies underlying 
attachment avoidance would decrease emotional and proximity-related 
responses. The results of our studies - and several other studies (e.g., Maier, 
2005; Niedenthal, Brauer, Robin, & Innes-Ker, 2002) - did, however, reveal that 
differences among the insecure attachment dimensions were less clear than 
would have been expected based on attachment theory. This suggests that 
measuring at the automatic level attenuates many of the differences that emerge 
when respondents are asked to provide global and explicit reports of their 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. Understanding the attachment system as a 
dynamical system may allow us to put these results into another perspective. 
That is, according to such a dynamical view, differences and similarities may 
occur among anxious and avoidant individuals at different points in the 
regulation process. Hence, when studying (individual differences in) attachment 
dynamics, theory and research should take into account the timeline of emotion 
regulation, the distinction between automatic and controlled processes, the 
influence of context, and the interplay between regulatory processes and 
attachment-related goals. This clearly complicates theoretical predictions and the 
interpretation of our results. That is, to the extent that attachment anxiety and 
avoidance yield similar (different) effects on outcome measures, we cannot 
simply assume that these effects are driven by the same (different) processes and 
goals. In the following paragraphs, we will elaborate on the complexity of 
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attachment dynamics and illustrate some of the points mentioned above by 
relying on our data where possible.  
The Dynamics of Attention 
The complexity of affect regulation dynamics is probably most apparent in 
research on selective attention for emotional information. That is, when making 
predictions on attachment-style differences in attention allocation, we must take 
into account the time-course of attentional processing and its relation with 
attaining attachment-goals, at different levels of one’s goal-hierarchy. Recall that 
the results of Chapters 1 and 2 could not provide support for the important 
theoretical prediction that attachment anxiety is associated with vigilance to 
negative emotional information. On the contrary, both insecure attachment 
dimensions were associated with avoidance-oriented responses and even 
functioned together in predicting reduced attention for attachment-related threat. 
Importantly, this attentional effect could not be ascribed solely to the moderating 
influence of attachment avoidance, because attachment anxiety was also found to 
moderate the relation between avoidant attachment and attentional avoidance 
(Chapters 1 and 2) and even independently predicted reduced attention for angry 
(and happy) faces (Chapter 2). This is at first sight difficult to account for in 
terms of attachment theory or, even more generally, in terms of schema - (Beck, 
1976) and other theories on anxiety (e.g., Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988) that predict a mood-congruent pattern of cognition in anxious 
individuals. To better understand our results, it may be useful to adopt a 
cognitive-motivational perspective on selective attention, according to which 
attention should be regarded as a functional and dynamic process that serves 
motivational purposes (e.g., affect regulation, goal-directed behaviour). 
Assuming that attention to threat is mediated by the aversive motivational 
system, the cognitive-motivational view has proposed that attentional processes 
can be divided into two major components: (1) initial orienting, which is 
dependent on automatic stimulus evaluation and evokes enhanced attention to 
threat and (2) maintained attention, which may be subject to both vigilance and 
avoidance responses (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Consistent with this view, a range 
of studies have demonstrated that the focus of attention in anxious individuals is 
characterized by a tendency to shift attention towards threat at a pre-attentive 
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stage of processing, which serves to interrupt ongoing behaviour in order to deal 
with the potential threat, followed by avoidance strategies at later stages as a 
means to reduce subjective distress (e.g., Calvo & Avero, 2005; Koster, et al., 
2005; 2007; Rohner, 2002).3 Such vigilance-avoidance responses are likely to 
interfere with habituation to threat and as such maintain anxiety in the long run. 
In this respect, it can be noted that we did present our stimulus material for 500 
ms, which is sufficient to allow more than one shift of attention between 
stimulus locations. Hence, both vigilance and avoidance can occur at this SOA. 
Furthermore, an SOA of 500 ms allows conscious awareness of the stimulus 
material, which may elicit goal-oriented attentional responses that are influenced 
by past and current attachment concerns.4 Based on the cognitive-motivational 
view, our findings may thus possibly indicate that attentional responses in both 
anxious and avoidant individuals are primarily driven by harm-avoidance goals. 
Given that both anxiety and avoidance originate from a history of unsupportive 
attachment experiences, it can be speculated that it is functional to both types of 
attachment insecurity to rapidly detect and then defensively orient attention 
away from information that makes salient their underlying fear.  
                                                     
3 In deriving hypotheses on the attachment-attention link and explaining our results, it is 
intuitively appealing to rely on cognitive theories of trait anxiety. We have to bear in mind, 
however, that although trait anxiety and attachment anxiety are conceptually related and do share 
common variance in accounting for individual differences, they are not redundant. Correlations 
between trait anxiety and attachment anxiety are moderate at best (.54 on average) and in most 
studies on attachment-style differences the obtained effects cannot be explained by trait anxiety 
(see Chapters 1 and 3, also see Mikulincer et al., 2002). Hence, we cannot simply assume that the 
same attentional mechanisms will underlie both types of anxiety, especially when considering 
attachment anxiety as a developmental construct that is interpersonally oriented and strongly 
influenced by attachment-related concerns of proximity and rejection. In this respect, it could be 
that attachment anxiety, especially in combination with attachment avoidance, shows more overlap 
with social anxiety rather than general anxiety. Note that studies on attentional processing in social 
anxiety did also show attentional avoidance of interpersonal threat stimuli at 500 ms (e.g., Chen, 
Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002). In addition, given that fearful attachment is thought to develop 
out of traumatising experiences, our results are also compatible with recent studies on PTSD in 
children demonstrating an association between maltreatment and attentional avoidance of 
threatening faces at 500 ms (Pine, et al., 2005).  
4 Although it may not be completely accurate to talk about ‘maintained attention’ (which 
actually refers to attention at stimulus durations longer than 500 ms), it is still plausible to assume 
that more strategic attentional responses are activated when stimuli are presented for 500 ms.
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Although it may seem plausible to assume that both types of insecurity are 
associated with heightened activation of the fear-system and thus yield a similar 
pattern of processing attachment threat, considerable evidence has shown that 
attachment anxiety and avoidance are associated with different regulatory efforts 
that lead to different emotional responses (for an overview, see Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2007). Also note that the studies reported in Chapters 4 and 6 revealed 
that anxious and avoidant individuals display different distress-reactions in 
response to separation threat. Alternative interpretations that focus on potential 
differences should thus be considered. First, differences may occur at later, more 
elaborate stages of processing. Because longer stimulus presentations are likely 
to evoke ruminative responses (see Mogg & Bradley, 2005), it can be expected 
that the focus of attention of anxious individuals will shift towards vigilance to 
threat, whereas avoidant individuals would maintain their avoidant attentional 
style. This assumption fits with a proposal by Niedenthal and colleagues (2002) 
that differences in the perceptual style of the two insecure attachment 
dimensions emerge only at a later processing-stage. Another consideration is that 
different goal-structures may underlie the tendency of anxious and avoidant 
individuals to avoid emotionally relevant information. Importantly, different 
motives could give rise to similar attentional effects. Hence, attentional 
avoidance does not necessarily reflect an underlying avoidance motive, but may 
also be driven by appetitive motivational features (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; 
MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). In the case of 
attachment avoidance, directing attention away from interpersonal threat words 
may serve to keep arousing material away from awareness as a means to 
ultimately avoid proximity needs and maintain independence. In anxious 
individuals, on the other hand, interpersonal threat stimuli may be avoided 
because such information is incongruent with their goal of maintaining 
proximity to the attachment figure. Appetitive and aversive motives are thus 
likely to function together in determining attentional biases. This could become 
problematic in the case of attachment anxiety because it has been argued that 
these individuals display heightened sensitivity to both reward signals (e.g., 
proximity) and aversive states (e.g., rejection and attachment figure 
unavailability), which makes them prone to ambivalence (see Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2007; Simpson et al., 1992, Vogel & Wei, 2005). The simultaneous 
activation of goals and anti-goals may be, to some extent, reflected in the results 
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of Chapter 2 in which attachment anxiety was found to predict attentional 
avoidance of both positive and negative face expressions. Another way of 
explaining this result is that attachment styles act early on in the regulation 
process by altering the emotional significance of the stimuli. In relation to this, it 
has been argued that cognitive responses in anxiously attached individuals are 
mediated by an oversensitive threat appraisal system that causes them to 
interpret all incoming information in terms of potential rejection or unmet 
attachment needs (Fraley & Shaver, 1998; 2000; see also Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). As such, attentional avoidance of positive stimuli may also serve to 
regulate negative affect. In a related vein, it can be speculated that avoidant 
individuals direct attention away from attachment information because these 
stimuli have less subjective meaning to them (due to attachment system 
deactivation).  
The fact that so many different interpretations can be generated to explain the 
attachment-attention link indicates that we lack a clear understanding of the 
time-course of attention and the motives that drive attachment-related processes. 
Hence, to make further progress in the attachment domain, it will be important to 
further clarify the dynamic relation between attention and mood regulation as a 
function of attachment style, and to examine in what way this relation changes 
over time and is influenced by motivational states. Research on the attachment-
attention link could therefore benefit from including measures of mood, psycho-
physiological recording, and reports of emotional functioning. Furthermore, it 
will be important to directly examine the influence of goals on attentional 
processing of positive and negative stimulus material (using goal-priming 
techniques, see Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007; Gollwitzer, & Moskowitz, 
1996). 
The Dynamics of Proximity Seeking 
The complexity of affect regulation dynamics can also be observed in 
research on proximity seeking and points to some important issues that need to 
be specified and further explored in attachment research. Proximity seeking in 
the context of attachment system activation involves the interplay between 
approach and avoidance motives oriented at attaining felt security. Such 
approach and avoidance motives can be activated at different stages of the 
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regulation process and are organized differently depending on one’s history of 
attachment experiences (see Collins & Allard, 2001, Collins et al., 2004). This 
complicates theoretical predictions on proximity seeking, because we must take 
into account that the influence of approach and avoidance goals on proximity-
related responses may differ at different levels of the goal-hierarchy and at 
different points along the timeline of emotion regulation. 
For instance, it is likely that at some point in the regulation process and under 
certain conditions, avoidant individuals will experience a need for closeness 
towards the attachment figure (e.g. Mikulincer et al., 2000). However, their fear 
of intimacy and need for independence may block or inhibit the expression of 
proximity seeking at other points in the regulation process (e.g., Fraley & 
Shaver, 1998; Mikulincer et al., 2002). The same applies for attachment anxiety. 
Although their intense wish for proximity and support may produce vigilant 
responses and a preparedness to engage in proximity seeking (see Chapters 3 and 
4), this preparedness may not be translated directly into overt behaviour because 
of competing goals related to support unavailability and worries about rejection 
and abandonment (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Mikulincer et al., 2002; Simpson 
et al., 1992). Given that their desire for closeness as well as their sensitivity for 
rejection each take a central position in anxious individuals’ goal-hierarchy, 
these conflicting motives are likely to generate ambivalence towards proximity 
seeking and approach-avoidance conflicts when they are activated 
simultaneously at a given point in the regulation process (e.g., Simpson et al., 
1992; Vogel & Wei, 2005). The dynamic course of goal-pursuit may thus partly 
explain why several studies failed to find a significant association between 
attachment anxiety and support seeking. Some studies even demonstrated a 
negative relationship (for a review, see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007, p.196-199; 
also see Chapter 5).  
Another dynamic aspect that complicates research on proximity seeking is the 
fact that there is no linear relationship between approach-avoidance goals, action 
tendencies, and behaviour (see Elliot, 2006; Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliot & 
Trash, 2002). That is, the same behavioural response can be adopted in the 
service of both approach and avoidance goals, and the same goal can be 
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manifested in both approach and avoidance responses.5 Especially in the case of 
attachment anxiety, it is not clear whether cognitive and behavioural responses 
towards the attachment figure are driven by an underlying approach or avoidance 
motive. Neither is it clear whether and how these motives are hierarchically 
linked. Anxious individuals may, for example, approach their attachment figure 
to gain closeness and support, but this desire for closeness may primarily serve 
to prevent attachment figure unavailability and abandonment. This may be 
further linked to self-protective goals. That is, because anxious individuals 
appraise themselves as weak, vulnerable, and unable to cope with threat 
autonomously, they compulsively rely on their attachment figure to defend 
themselves against the prospect of relationship-loss. It becomes even more 
complicated when considering that the dynamic relationship between approach-
avoidance goals and proximity-related responses may change during the course 
of the regulation process. Accordingly, proximity responses may operate in the 
service of approach goals at one given moment in regulation and serve 
avoidance goals at another moment. 
                                                     
5 Identifying the specific motives that drive proximity-related responses may be of crucial 
importance for understanding attachment-style differences in emotion and behaviour regulation, 
especially when considering that goal-pursuit may evoke different effects and emotions when it is 
impelled by different underlying motives. In this context, it is worth highlighting that avoidance 
motivation is, by definition, aversive in nature because it can lead only to the absence or presence 
of a negative outcome. The constant monitoring of negative possibilities is draining and may be 
experienced as stressful, even when effective in preventing or escaping from a negative outcome. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that avoidance motivation may damage relational functioning and 
self-regulation and, eventually, well-being (Elliot & Sheldon, 1997; 1998). This may be contrasted 
with approach motivation that focuses on a positive goal-object for regulation and can therefore 
lead to the presence or absence of a positive outcome, which evokes different effects and emotions 
(Elliot, 2006; Mowrer, 1960). For example, approaching in order to avoid is likely to elicit 
different emotions than approaching through approach motives (see “relief” versus “joy”, 
Roseman & Evdokas, 2004). Assuming that avoidance-oriented motivational processes underlie 
insecure attachment, it can be speculated that anxious and avoidant individuals are chronically 
preoccupied with avoiding negative outcomes, even when danger is not imminent (see Chapters 3 
and 4). As a result, they are likely to miss positive opportunities. In addition, the over-utilization of 
avoidance motivation may, in a self-fulfilling way, produce the very negative outcomes that it is 
designed to avoid. This may in part explain why avoidant individuals do sometimes experience 
higher levels of physiological arousal in response to a distressing context (e.g., Diamond, Hicks, & 
Otter-Henderson, 2006; Dozier & Kobak, 1992) and why anxious individuals do not attain a sense 
of security through proximity seeking.  
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The Dynamics of Attachment Representations 
The dynamic nature of the attachment system also has important implications 
for attachment representations. Because working models are built within the 
context of the attachment system, attachment representations should be regarded 
as dynamic constructs that are activated or inhibited in the service of affect 
regulation. This implies that regulatory processes influence which goals, beliefs, 
and expectations are activated at a given moment in the regulation process and 
these representations will, in turn, modify or regulate subsequent processes. This 
dynamic and reciprocal relationship between representations and processes 
makes it difficult to investigate the specific content of working models, because 
attachment representations may change depending on the specific context, level, 
and timing in regulation. Another important implication of this dynamic view is 
that people with different attachment styles may not differ that much in the 
content of their attachment schemas, but rather in the processes that influence 
their impact on affect-regulation. It can thus be speculated that secure, anxious, 
and avoidant individuals may share, to some extent, similar knowledge or goals, 
but differ in the degree to which these constructs are easily activated or 
inhibited. Strong affect, competing motives, and regulatory efforts may all 
interfere with the application of certain knowledge within a specific situational 
or relational context (see also Turan & Horowitz, 2007).  
Given that self- and other-views are central to attachment theory, we focus on 
these specific beliefs to illustrate the dynamic relationship between affect 
regulation and attachment representations. The existing evidence on self- and 
other-esteem reveals an interesting pattern of results. Anxious individuals are 
consistently found to hold a negative self-concept (see also Chapter 6), whereas 
the results on other-evaluations are less consistent. In the case of attachment 
avoidance, in contrast, previous studies showed a negative association with 
other-evaluations, but inconsistent evidence on the self-concept (for a review of 
studies on self- and other-evaluations as a function of attachment style, see 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Drawing on a dynamical and motivational account, 
it can be speculated that both anxious and avoidant individuals harbour negative 
feelings about themselves and others (determined in part by their history of 
negative attachment experiences), but that motivational tendencies distort these 
appraisals in the service of affect regulation. Because of their negative self-view, 
anxious individuals primarily rely on others for help with affect regulation, 
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which may cause them to suppress negative features of the attachment figure in 
order to make him/her approach-friendly. Avoidant individuals, in contrast, may 
be more likely to suppress negative self-traits, because they value independence 
and primarily rely on themselves to regulate emotions. Partial support for these 
hypotheses has been obtained by Mikulincer and colleagues (2004) who 
demonstrated defensive suppression of negative self-traits in avoidant 
individuals by imposing a cognitive load during an emotional Stroop task with 
self-relevant and -irrelevant words (see Chapter 6). Inhibition and suppression in 
the context of other-evaluations have not yet been investigated. Furthermore, it 
can be speculated that the negative self-view associated with attachment anxiety 
and the negative other-view associated with attachment avoidance are also 
subject to motivational distortions.  
The above analysis makes clear that, when investigating the specific valence 
associated with self- and other-representations, we should take into account the 
regulatory processes that organise self- and other-knowledge and the goals that 
mediate their impact on affect regulation. In other words, it may be more useful 
to examine the motivational, rather than the affective valence associated with 
self- and other-representations (see Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2001; Elliot, 
2006; Elliot & Church, 1997). Also note that the affective, dynamic components 
of working models may be best captured by implicit measures (see Pietromonaco 
& Barrett, 2000).  
Interindividual Differences are not Fixed 
In the previous part, we have discussed the complexity of attachment system 
dynamics. Another issue that complicates attachment research is that attachment 
styles, and their effect on representations and processes, may vary within a given 
individual depending on the situational and relational context. Through the 
years, attachment phenomena have been examined in a variety of contexts (no 
prime, relational distress prime, non-relational distress prime, supraliminal 
prime, subliminal prime), using different types of attachment style measures 
(categorical, dimensional, self-report, interview), and adopting different 
approaches to assessing attachment style (as a general trait variable or as a 
specific relational variable). This variation may, in part, account for some of the 
inconsistencies in the existing literature and may reflect the current debate 
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regarding the context-sensitivity of attachment styles (Collins et al., 2004; 
Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000). Given that adults have a broad range of 
attachment relationships (e.g., partner, friend, parent, colleagues), it has been 
argued that attachment styles do not reflect only between-subjects variability, but 
can also be regarded as a within-subject variable that may vary across close 
relationships and within a given relationship depending on the situational 
context. At present, little is known, however, about the interplay between state 
(specific) and trait (global) attachment styles. Furthermore, it is unclear whether 
or not context can erase individual differences that have been developed over 
time in close relationships and therefore it is useful to systematically explore 
how situational and relational context influence attachment strategies (see 
Gillath & Shaver, 2007). 
Regarding the association between situational context and attachment style 
within a specific relationship, the studies presented in Chapter 4 suggested that 
attachment anxiety is related to approach responses towards the attachment 
figure independent of context (neutral, relationship-threat, ego-threat). In 
addition, when aggregating studies 2 (separation threat) and 3 (positive prime) of 
the attentional bias studies towards the attachment figure into one study-design 
(Chapter 3), attachment anxiety showed an independent main effect on 
attentional responses. No main effect of prime condition was found, neither an 
interaction effect between prime condition and attachment style. The same 
applies to the studies on proximity and distance goals. When re-analysing the 
results of studies 1 (no prime) and 2 (separation-prime) of Chapter 5 in a 
between-subjects design, a significant main effect emerged of attachment 
avoidance, but no main effect of context and no interaction effect. This seems to 
indicate that the relation between proximity-related responses and relationship-
specific attachment style did not vary depending on situational context. On the 
other hand, we need to be careful in interpreting these results because in some of 
these studies low power may partly account for the lack of interaction effects. 
Furthermore, it remains remarkable that the induction of a separation threat 
almost consistently (except Chapter 5) evoked an effect of attachment anxiety, 
but not of attachment avoidance. In this context, several studies using ‘separation 
reminders’ have revealed that individuals with different attachment styles differ 
in the degree of (reported) distress associated with separation thoughts, 
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suggesting that there are differences in the salience of separation threat.6 More 
precisely, separation from the attachment figure touches on a core theme in 
anxious individuals, which is likely to reactivate their negatively valued 
interpersonal expectations and as such intensify their experience of distress 
through ruminative responses and exaggerated threat appraisals (e.g., 
Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum, & Malishkewitz, 2002). The induction of 
separation threat may, however, be less salient to activate avoidance-related 
processes, because the defensive strategies of avoidant individuals are thought to 
discourage the processing of relational threat to prevent that distress will be 
experienced and attachment needs become salient (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1997; 
Fraley et al., 2000). In support of these assumptions, the studies in Chapters 5 
and 6 did indeed demonstrate that anxious individuals report less positive 
feelings (coding of spontaneous responses) and more distress (as measured by 
VAS scales) in response to an imagined separation. When coding the 
spontaneous responses of avoidant individuals, they were found to report less 
negative feelings and, in fact, less thoughts and feelings overall. Hence, it could 
be that imagining a hypothetical separation from the attachment figure has made 
anxiety-related constructs temporally more accessible, which may have 
facilitated the processing of attachment-related cues. The greater the current 
accessibility of anxious working models, the more likely that an individual will 
perceive the social environment, react emotionally, and behave in a highly 
anxious way (Simpson & Rholes, 2004). In any case, systematic research (with 
larger samples) is needed to investigate the specific contribution of context and 
attachment style in order to better understand to which extent the obtained 
results reflect one’s stable attachment style and/or temporal fluctuations related 
to the use of a specific prime. Moreover, future research should systematically 
include measures of both state and trait attachment style in order to determine 
                                                     
6 It can also be argued that not all relational and situational contexts will necessarily evoke 
attachment processes to the same extent in all individuals (e.g., Simpson & Rholes, 2004). For 
example, secure individuals may rely on others in the service of attachment needs only when they 
experience an intense threat to the self. Anxious individuals, on the other hand, may see many 
situations as threatening and have therefore a greater need to regulate their affect than secure 
individuals. Avoidant individuals are less likely to consciously experience threat and will inhibit 
attachment needs, indicating that they are less emotional reactive (see Pietromonaco & Barrett, 
2000, on individual differences in emotional reactivity).
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the relative ability of both types of attachment variability to predict cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioural responses. 
In addition to varying situational context, it may also be extremely useful to 
determine whether the cognitive and motivational processes that we have studied 
in this dissertation are stable across relationships. This may be particularly 
important in the case of attentional processes because it has been argued that 
attentional biases towards emotional, attachment-related information contribute 
to the perpetuation and generalization of one’s attachment style (e.g., Bowlby, 
1973; Main et al., 1985). Accordingly, the study of automatic processes (and 
representations) may be informative in itself to gain a clearer understanding of 
the relationship between specific and global attachment styles. In relation to this, 
we need to remark that the studies on attention towards threatening information 
presented in Chapters 1 and 2 were conducted in the absence of a specific 
relational context, while we did measure attachment style referring to a specific 
attachment relationship. Considering that attachment processes may differ across 
relationships, this could possibly complicate the interpretation of our findings. 
Note however that the relationship-dependence of attachment processes (and 
representations) still needs to be tested.  
In general, more research is needed to systematically investigate the 
relationship between state (specific) and trait (global) attachment. Collins and 
colleagues (2004) have made several suggestions in this respect and, among 
these, it is intuitively most appealing to assume that insecure attachment 
represents a vulnerability factor that may or may not be expressed, depending on 
the situational and relational context. Another assumption is that trait attachment 
shapes relational experiences and as such shapes relationship-specific attachment 
styles (also see Simpson & Rholes, 2004). In both cases, it will be important to 
determine in what way processes such as attention, inhibition, memory, 
interpretation, and appraisals play a role in the expression of attachment styles 
within and across relationships. In addition, it may be interesting to focus on the 
flexibility with which individuals shift across attachment working models as 
they change relationship contexts (see Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000, on 
‘attachment trajectories’) and to which extent this (lack of) flexibility is 
mediated by attachment processes. ‘Flexibility’ may be an important feature that 
differentiates between secure and insecure attachment (Zimmerman, 1999). In 
relation to this, we want to emphasize that hyperactivating and deactivating 
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strategies should not be regarded as inherently problematic, because such 
strategies may reflect adaptive mechanisms in the context of relationship 
development and functioning (Bowlby, 1980). Accordingly, even secure 
individuals may, from time to time, react to attachment figure unavailability in a 
clinging or avoidant way. Only when established as habitual coping strategies 
that are applied regardless of context and with great intensity, hyperactivation 
and deactivation are likely to contribute to psychological and social difficulties. 
To gain deeper insight into the relative influence of relationship-specific and 
global attachment styles,7 it will thus be of great value to study the rigidity and 
intensity with which individuals rely on hyperactivating or deactivating 
strategies within and across relationships. The relationship-dependence of 
attachment styles also points to the importance of including relationship-
information when studying attachment processes (e.g., relational functioning, the 
attachment style of the attachment figure, his/her (actual) responses to 
attachment needs and so on). This may allow us to examine, for example, 
whether particular patterns of (in)security are tied to particular patterns of 
attachment figure responsiveness. Furthermore, the inclusion of relationship-
information may allow investigating whether automatic cognitive and 
behavioural processes mediate relationship functioning.  
How are (Measures of) Attachment Dimensions Related? 
Finally, the study of attachment-style differences is also complicated by the 
fact that we rely on a measure of attachment dimensions that has been deduced 
from attachment theory and is therefore in itself biased by theoretical 
predictions. Interestingly, almost all of our studies revealed a significant 
                                                     
7 It has been proposed that attachment styles are organized in a hierarchical structure, with at 
the top of this hierarchy the global attachment style, which represents generalized information 
about repeated interaction patterns in a variety of attachment relationships, and at a lower level, 
relationship-specific attachment styles that may or may not be congruent with one’s global 
attachment style (e.g., Collins & Read, 1994). In relation to this, it has been argued that the number 
of significant relationships of each attachment style that a person reports may reveal important 
information on his/her global attachment style and may also inform us about the rigidity of 
attachment styles (see Baldwin, Keelan, Fehr, Enns, & Koh-Rangarajoo, 1996; Rowe & Carnelley, 
2003, 2005).  
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correlation between the attachment anxiety and avoidance dimensions, which is 
not compatible with the theoretical assumption that the motivational tendencies 
underlying anxiety and avoidance yield independent and opposite effects (e.g., 
Fraley & Shaver, 2000). This has important implications for the interpretation of 
our results. We observed that differences among the insecure attachment 
dimensions were less distinct than would have been expected based on 
attachment theory. Do we need to consider this as a theoretical inconsistency or 
is this the result of the way we measured attachment style? To address this 
methodological loop, attachment research should take a multi-method approach 
to the study of individual differences by including multiple indicators of 
attachment style, such as physiological correlates, spontaneous behaviour, 
implicit measures of attachment style (e.g., Anxiety-Avoidance IAT), and 
questionnaires. In this context, we need to remark that numerous studies using 
self-report measures of attachment style have revealed theoretically predictable 
associations between self-reported anxiety and avoidance and a variety of 
implicit measures, physiological reactivity, and observed behaviour (e.g., 
Baldwin, Fehr, Keedian, Siedel, & Thompson, 1993; Baldwin et al., 1996; 
Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Mikulincer et al., 2002, 2004; Zayas & Shoda, 2005). 
Note, however, that findings were often not consistent across studies, especially 
regarding the physiology of attachment avoidance and the proximity behaviour 
of attachment anxiety (cfr. supra, on attachment dynamics). Although these 
studies have been taken as evidence for the validity of attachment-style 
questionnaires as measures of individual differences in implicit processes and 
representations, it remains problematic that the value and validity of self-report 
is determined on the basis of its ability to empirically reproduce the assumptions 
postulated by the theory, while the theory itself has served as the primary source 
of inspiration from which the questionnaire-items were deduced. Nevertheless, at 
this point, we have no other criterion to determine individual differences in 
anxiety and avoidance and we do need to rely on some theory to investigate the 
relation between attachment differences and regulatory processes and 
representations. The central idea of the above reasoning is that we must be aware 
that measures of attachment style, such as the ECR, are just one possible lens 
through which to look at attachment differences and we need to bear in mind that 
this lens may produce a biased view. In the limitations-section, we will provide 
several arguments that promote further use of attachment-style questionnaires. 
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General Conclusion 
It is widely agreed that two independent dimensions (i.e., attachment anxiety 
and avoidance) underlie individual differences in attachment. Both dimensions 
have been associated with distinct regulatory strategies (i.e., hyperactivating and 
deactivating) that have been approached empirically and conceptually as 
yielding independent and opposite effects on cognition, emotion, and behaviour. 
In support of this, a variety of studies have demonstrated that attachment anxiety 
and avoidance are associated with different responses in different contexts. The 
studies presented in this dissertation also provided evidence that particular 
priming-conditions evoke different responses in anxious and avoidant 
individuals (see Chapters 4 and 6) and that attachment-related differences occur 
in attention allocation, automatic proximity-related responses, and automatically 
activated representations (Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). Results to date do, 
however, not support the view that the effects of attachment anxiety on 
emotional and behavioural responding are the simple opposite of the effects of 
attachment avoidance. Current evidence suggests a much more complex pattern 
of relations. Throughout this general discussion, we have put forward some 
theoretical and empirical concerns that may account for this complexity. Most 
importantly, we have suggested that attachment theory and research should pay 
more attention to the dynamical nature of the attachment system that 
continuously changes over time, context, goals, and level of responding. We 
have also discussed the multidimensional nature of attachment representations 
and processes that may vary within a given individual depending on the 
situational and relational context (i.e., within- and between-person variability). 
Finally, we have pointed to the (in)dependence of attachment-style measures.  
Several important implications follow from the dynamical and 
multidimensional view on attachment. First, the fact that the attachment system 
includes multiple components, processes, and emotional circuits that may 
operate in parallel, synchronously, or in conflicting ways at different levels and 
times of the regulation process, complicates theoretical predictions and may raise 
concerns about the integrative span of the attachment model. That is, almost 
every result can be explained by this model, which implicates that the theory 
cannot be falsified. Secondly, it is virtually impossible to capture the complexity 
of attachment dynamics into one single model. A clear understanding of 
attachment dynamics will thus require to develop ‘micro-models’ that focus on 
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specific components and mechanisms involved in attachment-system activation 
and functioning. This decompositional approach may allow us to further specify 
the theoretical predictions on individual differences in attachment strategies. A 
third implication is that we need to consider that, when attachment is measured 
at one point in time, the findings may not always generalize across time or 
context for a given individual. 
Accordingly, it will be important for further research to systematically 
identify at which levels of measurement, under which conditions (in terms of 
context and stimulus material), and regarding which processes and 
representations, attachment anxiety and avoidance yield different or similar 
effects. A systematic analysis of the commonalities and differences among the 
anxious and avoidant forms of emotion regulation may lead to an increased 
understanding both of these specific regulatory strategies as well as of 
attachment system functioning in general. Furthermore, research should focus 
more on the secure-insecure distinction when studying automatic processes and 
representations, because this could be useful for understanding the source of 
differences between functional and dysfunctional emotion regulation in the 
context of attachment.8  
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Throughout the discussion, some general comments and concerns were raised 
that need to be considered in future research on attachment system functioning. 
In this part, we want to formulate some specific hypotheses and research topics 
that may provide direct guidance for further research.  
Our studies on the role of selective attention in attachment system 
functioning have revealed some interesting data that may guide further 
examination of attachment-style differences in attention to emotional and 
attachment-related information. First, it will be important to study the influence 
of attachment style on pre- and post-attentive processes by varying the 
presentation time of the stimuli in the attentional task. Secondly, pictures of the 
real attachment figure (instead of strangers) should be presented because such 
stimuli are more salient in terms of attachment-system activation and may 
                                                     
8 We will elaborate on this at the end of the limitations-section. 
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therefore elicit stronger or even different attentional effects. In relation to this, it 
may also be interesting to explore the role of attachment anxiety and avoidance 
in the appraisal of emotional stimuli by varying, for example, the intensity and 
potentiality of threat. Finally, given that the appraisal of stimuli is likely to 
change under distressing circumstances, it can be speculated that the influence of 
attachment style on selective processing of emotional stimuli will be modulated 
by the current mood state of the individual. In line with the idea that a challenge 
to the attachment system is required to trigger attachment strategies, it could be 
that a sense of subjective distress is needed to activate the presumed attentional 
styles in anxious and avoidant individuals. The induction of state attachment 
anxiety (and avoidance) may thus allow us to test a state-trait interaction 
hypothesis (see also Williams, et al., 1988).  
Another important avenue for future research is to investigate other 
components of attention that could potentially differentiate between attachment 
anxiety and avoidance at the level of emotional processing. In this respect, 
Derryberry and Tucker (1994) have demonstrated that trait anxiety does not only 
influence the orientation of attention, but also the breadth of the focus of 
attention. Based on attachment theory, it can be predicted that attachment 
anxiety will be associated with a broader environmental scanning (i.e., vigilant 
monitoring) followed by a narrowing of attention once threat has been detected. 
Attachment avoidance, on the other hand, may limit attentional scanning in order 
to prevent the detection of information that can potentially activate the 
attachment system. This proposal could be tested by recording cognitive 
processing of threat that is presented outside the focus of spatial attention (e.g., 
Ball, Beard, Roemker, Miller, & Griggs, 1988). Note that such a paradigm could 
also be adopted to explore the monitoring of attachment figure-related cues as a 
function of attachment style. Another attentional mechanism that should be 
explored in the context of attachment is inhibitory functioning. Although 
theoretical accounts of inhibition as a function of attachment are well elaborated, 
little research has been conducted in this area. This could nevertheless be a 
crucial step in arriving at a good understanding of the attachment-attention link, 
because it is likely that the regulatory strategies underlying attachment anxiety 
and avoidance will differ at the level of inhibitory control (e.g., Baldwin, & Kay, 
2003). According to the theory, it can be expected that attachment anxiety will 
be associated with a deficient inhibitory responding to negative information, 
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whereas attachment avoidance would be associated with rigid inhibition of 
negative stimuli. Impaired inhibitory functioning of negative emotional 
information may lead to ruminative thinking, reports of higher distress, greater 
emotional reactivity, and increased storage of negative information in memory 
(see Joorman, 2004; 2006), all of which have been observed in attachment 
anxiety (e.g., Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; Mikulincer & Florian, 1995, 1998; 
Mikulincer et al., 2002). In relation to this, it may also be useful to explore in 
what way attachment-style differences in selective attention relate to higher-
order cognitive processes such as interpretation, memory, and general beliefs 
about the attachment figure and the attachment relationship.  
In addition to further exploring the link between selective attention and 
attachment, a second important direction for future research is to focus more 
systematically on (successful and unsuccessful) goal-pursuit as a function of 
attachment style. More specifically, we need to investigate in which way goal-
pursuit is enabled and influenced by the activation and inhibition of goal-
relevant knowledge. Regulatory deficiencies may originate from an ill-organized 
goal-hierarchy. Because the latter is likely to include both goals and anti-goals 
that continuously compete for access (see Carver & Scheier, 1998), it may be 
useful to explore at which level, in which context, and at which point in time, 
proximity and distance goals are activated or inhibited and influence subsequent 
processing. A prominent hypothesis in research on proximity seeking is that 
goal-pursuit in anxious individuals is marked by ambivalence. This hypothesis 
has, however, not yet been directly tested. It will therefore be important for 
future research to explore whether anxious individuals do indeed experience 
difficulties in inhibiting goals and anti-goals and how these goals further 
influence emotional and behavioural responses. Furthermore, future work might 
use priming techniques for making interpersonal goals temporally accessible (see 
Bargh, 1997), in order to determine the causal role of goals in shaping 
relationship perception, information processing, and behaviour. To gain deeper 
insight into attachment style-differences in goal-pursuit and self-regulation, 
research should also include measures of goal expectancies, goal-commitment, 
goal-persistence, and goal-disengagement in the context of close relationships 
(see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007).  
Third, more direct tests are needed to investigate the role of threat- and goal-
related influences on self- and other-appraisals. Such tests may require randomly 
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assigning subjects to different experimental conditions in which the level and 
source of motivation and the presence of contextual threat cues is systematically 
varied. Furthermore, to better understand the relation between attachment style 
and other-representations, it will be important to systematically examine the 
hypothesis - raised in recent attachment research - that anxious individuals hold 
a mixed, ambivalent attitude towards their attachment figure and that this 
attitude may vary depending on the particular situational context (Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2007; Pietromonaco & Barrett, 1997, 2006; also see de Liver, van der 
Pligt, & Wigboldus, 2007, for a possible procedure to test ambivalent attitudes). 
In this regard, it is worth noting that, so far, only a few studies have focused on 
perceptions of the attachment figure and most of this research has been 
conducted with the use of explicit measures. Hence, more research is needed that 
includes implicit measures to investigate automatically activated other-
representations (e.g., Banse & Kowalick, 2007; Zayas & Shoda, 2005). Future 
research efforts should also take into account the relationship-dependence and 
malleability of the self by examining whether one’s self-concept varies under 
different situational and relational conditions (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). 
Additionally, because the self- and other-views of anxious and avoidant 
individuals are assumed to be fragile and defensive in nature (cfr. supra), it may 
be interesting to explore whether attitudes towards the self and the attachment 
figure differ when measured at the implicit and explicit level and to specify the 
joint role of implicit and explicit evaluations in predicting emotional and 
relational functioning. This may be particularly important when considering that 
inconsistencies between implicit and explicit features of working models can 
have a detrimental effect on attachment experiences (Crittenden, 1990; Main, 
1990) and on the development of psychopathology in general. Furthermore, 
assuming that inhibitory processes play a key role in keeping a defensive 
positive self- and other-view in insecure individuals, this may cause internal 
tensions and psychological distress, which is likely to result in self-regulatory 
failures and emotional disturbances. It will thus be of great value for both theory 
and research to further examine the exact role of self- and other-representations 
in attachment system functioning, to determine in greater detail which goals they 
serve, to identify the (automatic) processes that mediate their impact on affect 
regulation, and to focus on the role of emotions as an organizing force in how 
people think about themselves and others.  
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 Finally, the majority of attachment research has been based on correlational 
studies investigating the relation between attachment style and cognition, 
emotion, and behaviour. Although such studies provide valuable insights on the 
correlates of attachment anxiety and avoidance, they do not provide direct 
evidence on the causal role of attachment styles on emotional and behavioural 
regulation. To this aim, experimental studies are needed that manipulate 
attachment styles and examine their influence on information processing and 
automatically activated representations. Given the intra-person variability of 
attachment styles (cfr. supra), research has demonstrated that specific attachment 
styles can be made temporarily accessible using priming techniques (e.g., guided 
visualisation of a specific attachment relationship) and that these primed 
attachment styles have measurable effects on subsequent processing (e.g., 
Baldwin et al., 1996; Mikulincer & Arad, 2001; Pierce & Lydon, 2001; Rowe & 
Carnelley, 2003). In a related vein, experimental studies in which crucial 
appraisals or processes are manipulated (such as the appraisal of proximity 
seeking viability or approach-avoidance action tendencies) could provide 
important information about the selection of particular attachment styles and 
strategies. In addition to cross-sectional designs, attachment research could also 
benefit from follow-up studies that allow investigating the predictive value of 
attachment processes and representations in shaping emotional and behavioural 
relationship-responses over time.  
LIMITATIONS 
There are several limitations of the present studies that need to be discussed 
and deserve further research.  
First, because we did not pre-select participants based on their attachment 
style, our samples did probably not include truly high-anxious and high-avoidant 
individuals. In combination with the relatively small sample sizes in our studies, 
this may possibly account for the fact that the obtained effects and correlations 
were generally small to moderate. Hence, the present findings should be 
replicated with larger, more representative (i.e., pre-selected) samples. On the 
other hand, it should be noted that our studies did reveal theoretically meaningful 
relations, despite the fact that the distribution of our samples - in terms of 
attachment scores - was not optimal.  
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Secondly, in all studies, the ECR was administered after the reaction times 
tasks and in the same experimental session, so we cannot rule out the possibility 
that the participant’s answers on the ECR are affected by thoughts and feelings 
elicited in the experimental situation. We should not, however, put too much 
weight on this issue because it is unlikely that participants are aware of the 
experimental link between their performance on the reaction time task and their 
responses on the ECR. Furthermore, we think that measuring attachment style 
before the manipulation would be more problematic because this might activate 
chronic attachment-related schemas that could affect responses on the reaction 
time tasks. In any case, it will be important for future research to measure (trait) 
attachment style in advance (i.e., before the experimental session) in order to 
exclude the potential influence of order-effects.  
Third, the present samples included a disproportionate number of women. 
This prevented us from investigating possible gender-differences in attachment 
processes and representations. Although we cannot think of theoretical or 
empirical reasons to expect such differences in attachment system functioning 
(see research on the lack of gender differences in attachment style, Schmitt et al., 
2003), this issue should receive more careful attention in future research.  
Fourth, not all our studies did control for the possible effect of trait anxiety or 
global self-esteem on our dependent variables. This is nevertheless important in 
arriving at a good understanding of the relation between attachment style and 
attachment processes, particularly when investigating attentional biases, because 
the literature indicates a clear association between attention to threat and trait 
anxiety (see Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997, for a review). In 
response to this comment, we need to mention that the study in Chapter 1 did 
demonstrate that the attentional effects were specific to attachment style and 
could not be accounted for by trait anxiety. Furthermore, there is other 
accumulating evidence that, although both trait anxiety and self-esteem are 
closely related to attachment anxiety and avoidance, they consistently fail to 
explain the psychological effects of these attachment dimensions (e.g., 
Mikulincer & Florian, 2000; Mikulincer et al., 2000; Mikulincer et al., 2002).  
A fifth concern is related to the fact that our samples mainly consisted of 
students. As a result, great variability exists in the relationship partners that 
served as a primary attachment figure. Across studies, it could be observed that 
49 % of our participants depicted a romantic partner as attachment figure, 27 % a 
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good friend, 21 % the mother, and 3 % the father. Because too few interactions 
occurred within each type of attachment relationship and because only about half 
of the participants were involved in romantic relationships, we did not have 
enough statistical power to adequately compare response patterns across 
relationship types. This limitation will need to be addressed in future work that 
samples a larger number of particular kinds of relationships (e.g., romantic 
partners and best friends). Although attachment is assumed to operate in the 
same way throughout the life span, we should bear in mind that important 
differences may exist between, for example, mother-child attachment in 
adulthood and romantic attachment, especially in youngsters who are 
experiencing their first romantic loves. In this context, it is also worth noting that 
the selection of the primary attachment figure was based on a 6-items self-report 
scale (i.e., WHOTO scale, Hazan & Zeifman, 1994), which may have elicited 
responses that are influenced by momentarily amorous experiences. Given that it 
would take at least 2 years to develop a ‘full-blown’ attachment relationship 
(Fraley & Davis, 1997), it is not always certain whether the partner of a 18 to 20-
year old student does actually function as a security-provider in real life. On the 
other hand, we want to emphasize that the studies in which participants had to 
respond to attachment figure-related cues did reveal theoretically meaningful 
relationships that differed systematically as a function of attachment style. This 
precludes an alternative interpretation of our findings in terms of general 
closeness and intimacy. Nevertheless, when relying on a sample of students, 
careful attention is needed to specify in detail whether a given relationship 
actually meets the criteria for an attachment relationship.  
Sixth, because the WHOTO scale defines attachment relationships with 
respect to their security- and proximity-providing functions, one should take into 
account that this measure is biased towards security-enhancing attachment 
figures and may thus miss figures to whom a person is more insecurely attached 
(Trinke & Bartholomew, 1997). This may be an important restriction in terms of 
the present dissertation, because the majority of our research questions focused 
on biases associated with attachment anxiety and avoidance in relation to a 
specific attachment figure. Further research should use other scales, such as the 
Attachment Network Questionnaire (Trinke & Bartholomew, 1997), to identify a 
broader range of attachment figures and to examine cognitive and behavioural 
reactions within diverse attachment relationships. Furthermore, an important task 
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for future research is to delineate indicators of an attachment relationship that are 
not confounded with security or insecurity.  
Seventh, in most of our studies we used only one type of distress prime to 
activate attachment processes, and this prime referred to a specific relational 
threat, namely separation from the attachment figure. As described earlier, the 
effect of this specific threat prime is likely to vary as a function of attachment 
style and differences in the salience of separation threat may influence the 
processing of attachment-related cues. Future research should therefore 
incorporate both attachment-relevant and -irrelevant situational contexts. We 
should also note that our distress prime required conscious processing. This may 
have aggravated the intensifying effect of attachment anxiety on the experience 
of distress and the defensive reaction of avoidant individuals in response to an 
imagined separation. In this respect, subliminal priming could offer a solution to 
circumvent the potentially confounding effects of conscious deliberation and 
could also be useful to examine the effects of preconsciously activated distress 
on attachment anxiety and avoidance (see Mikulincer et al., 2000; 2002). 
Nevertheless, we think that a conscious visualisation prime may still offer valid 
information because (1) most of the threats that people face in real-life are of a 
supraliminal kind and probably processed consciously, (2) subliminal priming 
effects, especially word-priming, are short-lived and unstable (Bargh, 1989; 
Becker, Moscovitch, Behrmann, & Joordens, 1997), and (3) it seems unlikely 
that our participants consciously and deliberately attempted to shape their 
responses in a self-enhancing or hypothesis-confirming way, because they were 
generally not aware of the research aims. Also note that, when using a 
visualisation task, the activation of distress and its subsequent effects on 
information processing may still be called automatic in the sense that they occur 
efficiently and in the absence of intention, awareness, and control (see Moors & 
De Houwer, 2006). As a final remark on the priming-issue, we want to note that 
our threat primes were relatively benign and hypothetical, which may have 
produced less intense distress reactions (especially in secure individuals). This 
may, in turn, partly account for the relatively small effects observed in our 
studies. Further research should examine attachment processes and 
representations in the context of actual threat or after imagining an idiosyncratic 
and real-experienced threat situation.  
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Eight, the exclusive reliance on self-report measures to assess individual 
differences in attachment style may possibly complicate the interpretation of our 
findings (cfr. supra). Because self-report scales involve conscious, deliberate 
answers that can be biased by cognitive limitations, social desirability concerns, 
and other motivational tendencies, it could be argued that measures such as the 
ECR and the RQ cannot provide a valid index of one’s attachment orientation. 
Although self-report may indeed be limited to indexing only conscious 
appraisals, several arguments can be raised that promote their value and further 
use in attachment research (see also Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Shaver & 
Mikulincer, 2002). First, because people spend a great deal of time thinking 
about their close relationships, most people have sufficient experience to provide 
valuable information about their relationship cognitions, feelings, and behaviour. 
Secondly, self-presentation tendencies may be part of attachment-related 
strategies. For example, avoidant individuals may deliberately present 
themselves as autonomous and distant because this fits their goal of 
independence. For the same reason, anxious individuals may present themselves 
as emotional, weak, and vulnerable as a means to elicit support from the 
attachment figure. Also note that, although motivational tendencies may have a 
different influence on self-reported and automatic responses, research has shown 
that automatic and controlled processes can also operate in the same direction to 
achieve a goal and that implicit motives are often manifested in conscious 
appraisals (Chartrand, & Bargh, 2002). Accordingly, the subjective nature of 
self-report measures does not necessarily impose a constraint on their validity to 
tap attachment styles. Third, it can be argued that people are typically not aware 
that their responses on a questionnaire such as the ECR are influenced by past 
attachment experiences stored in attachment working models. Accordingly, it 
can be speculated that self-report questionnaires do reflect, to some extent, 
automatically activated attachment working models (see De Houwer, 2006, 
2007). Nevertheless, it may be an important challenge for future research to 
develop implicit measures of attachment style and to investigate their relation 
with attachment processes and representations, in combination with explicit 
reports of attachment anxiety and avoidance.  
A final issue concerns the fact that our research questions primarily focused 
on the cognitive-motivational mechanisms associated with attachment anxiety 
and avoidance. Little attention has been devoted to discussing possible 
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implications of our results regarding the psychology of attachment security. Note 
that some of our results may nevertheless speak to the issue of attachment 
security, because several studies did also investigate the normative component of 
attachment system functioning (i.e., primary attachment strategy), which largely 
corresponds with security-based strategies. On the other hand, when focusing 
specifically on the relation between attachment security, as measured by the 
ECR, and attention, action tendencies, goals, and self-representations, none of 
our studies did actually demonstrate a significant relationship with attachment 
security as defined by low scores on anxiety and avoidance. The lack of 
association with attachment security may be, to some extent, explained by the 
fact that the ECR is probably not an optimal measure for assessing attachment 
security. Because the ECR can provide only scores on the two insecurity 
dimensions, it has been argued that this questionnaire better assesses the high 
ends of the anxiety and avoidance dimensions than it does the low or secure ends 
of each dimension (e.g., Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000).9 In relation to this, 
several researchers have made some interesting recommendations to improve the 
measurement of attachment styles. One of these suggestions is to rotate the axes 
of the two-dimensional space (along the secure-fearful axis and the anxiety-
avoidance axis) and to devise a unidimensional scale that measures individual 
differences in attachment security versus insecurity. This measure would be 
particularly useful for examining the specific characteristics of attachment 
security, because the latter should no longer be studied in terms of the vague 
absence of anxiety and avoidance. Theory and research on attachment security 
(see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004; 2007) clearly indicates that this attachment 
pattern is characterized by several unique features that are distinct from 
attachment insecurity (e.g., coping with distress in terms of open cognitive 
processing, functional emotion regulation and adaptive, flexible behaviour). The 
ECR or ECR-R could then be used in studies that focus more explicitly on the 
                                                     
9 Unfortunately, we did not systematically include other attachment-style questionnaires that 
can provide an index of attachment security, such as, for example, the Relationship Questionnaire 
(Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994). Note, however, that other questionnaires have been criticized as 
well. The RQ, for example, may cause interpretative difficulties because this questionnaire is 
derived from the prototypical approach on attachment and contains single-item scales, which are 
subject to reliability-problems and measurement errors (see Thurstone, Likert). Also note that we 
did include the RQ-measure in our study on the implicit self-concept (Chapter 6), but we could not 
find a relationship between attachment security and implicit self-representations.  
256                                                                                                                         GENERAL DISCUSSION 
vulnerabilities underlying specific forms of attachment insecurity, namely 
anxiety and/or avoidance. Note that this two-sequential measurement procedure 
may also fit well with the process-model of Mikulincer and Shaver (2003) in 
which perceived attachment figure (un)availability and the associated sense of 
felt (in)security constitute a key difference in attachment system functioning. 
Hence, a task for future research will be to create a measure for assessing overall 
attachment security. 
Finally, we should note that the ECR has been criticized for other reasons as 
well. Importantly, the ECR-anxiety scale has only one reverse-coded item and all 
other items are formulated negatively, which makes this subscale vulnerable to 
response biases. In addition, the ECR-avoidance scale primarily consists of 
positively formulated items that must be reverse-coded. This could possibly 
affect the relationship between the avoidance dimension and attachment 
correlates (especially in the case of positive relationship-responses). The 
aforementioned comments indicate that, despite the widespread use of the ECR 
in attachment research, further developments are needed in the measurement of 
self-reported attachment style. 
 
 
Despite these limitations, the studies reported in this dissertation make a 
number of significant contributions to attachment research. Given the growing 
interest in the automatic processes underlying attachment system functioning, 
the present studies provide an important first step in exploring the attentional 
processes and motivational tendencies associated with attachment anxiety and 
avoidance, and addressed the need for additional research on the implicit content 
of attachment working models. We hope our findings will encourage researchers 
to further explore the role of both implicit and explicit processes in social 
judgement and behaviour, and to broaden their scope on attachment dynamics by 
studying the interface between information processing, motivation, and emotion 
regulation. Such a multilevel approach will be of key relevance to better 
understand the regulatory processes and cognitive structures that contribute to 
the development and maintenance of attachment (in)security.  
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De hechtingstheorie (Bowlby, 1962, 1982) is een zeer invloedrijk theoretisch 
model in het onderzoek naar interpersoonlijke relaties. Deze theorie postuleert 
dat relationele ervaringen uit het verleden opgeslagen worden in mentale 
representaties die automatisch geactiveerd worden in hechtingsrelevante 
situaties. Eens geactiveerd, hebben deze representaties een directe (en vaak 
automatische) impact op cognitieve processen, emotionele appraisal en gedrag 
(Collins, Guichard, Ford, & Feeney, 2004). Deze mentale representaties en 
cognitief-motivationele processen functioneren samen in een 
hechtingsgedragssysteem, dat gezien kan worden als een emotieregulatie-
systeem dat geactiveerd wordt in een bedreigende context en primair gericht is 
op het bekomen van veiligheid door nabijheid te zoeken ten aanzien van de 
hechtingsfiguur. Een belangrijke assumptie van de hechtingstheorie is dat er 
individuele verschillen bestaan in de activatie en regulatie van het 
hechtingssysteem, op basis waarvan er verschillende hechtingsstijlen 
onderscheiden kunnen worden (zie Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007, voor een review 
over hechtingsverschillen).  
Veilige hechting ontstaat vanuit steunende interacties met een beschikbare en 
responsieve hechtingsfiguur en wordt daarom gekenmerkt door positieve 
overtuigingen over zichzelf en anderen. Veilig gehechte individuen zijn in staat 
om hun emoties op een constructieve manier te reguleren door middel van 
probleemoplossende vaardigheden, cognitieve reappraisal, en het zoeken van 
nabijheid ten aanzien van de hechtingsfiguur, al zijn ze zich ook bewust van hun 
eigen coping-vaardigheden. Onveilige hechting, daarentegen, wordt gekenmerkt 
door een historiek van verwerpende, afwijzende of inconsistente zorg van de 
hechtingsfiguur. Omdat onveilig gehechte individuen herhaaldelijk ervaren 
hebben dat het zoeken van nabijheid ten aanzien van de hechtingsfiguur niet 
effectief is in het reduceren van angst, dienden ze alternatieve strategieën te 
ontwikkelen om met gevoelens van onveiligheid en ontreddering om te gaan. 
Algemeen worden er twee vormen van onveilige hechting onderscheiden. Elk 
van beide zou worden gekenmerkt door specifieke regulatiestrategieën die 
verondersteld worden een tegenovergesteld effect te hebben op het verwerken 
van emotionele informatie en het reguleren van nabijheidzoekend gedrag. 
Angstige hechting wordt getypeerd door hyperactiverende strategieën die zich 
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manifesteren in hypervigilantie voor bedreigende informatie, catastroferende 
appraisals, ruminatie, intense angstreacties, hevige negatieve emoties, een 
negatief zelfbeeld, en overdreven, persistent nabijheidzoekend gedrag ten 
aanzien van de hechtingsfiguur. Vermijdende hechting, daarentegen, wordt 
gekenmerkt door deactiverende strategieën die gericht zijn op het inactiveren 
van het hechtingssysteem door het vermijden van emotionele en 
hechtingsgerelateerde stimuli en het onderdrukken van nabijheidzoekend gedrag. 
Vermijdende individuen hechten veel belang aan onafhankelijkheid, houden 
(emotionele en fysieke) afstand ten aanzien van de hechtingsfiguur en steunen 
vooral op zichzelf in het omgaan met gevoelens van onveiligheid (die ze in de 
eerste plaats trachten te onderdrukken).  
Hoewel er algemeen aangenomen wordt dat het hechtingssysteem 
hoofdzakelijk gedreven wordt door automatische processen (Baldwin, 1992, 
1995; Collins et al., 2004; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 2007), is er nog maar 
weinig onderzoek verricht naar de impliciete inhoud van hechtingsschema’s en 
de specifieke cognitief-motivationele processen die betrokken zijn in de activatie 
en regulatie van het hechtingssysteem. Dat kan gedeeltelijk toegeschreven 
worden aan het feit dat men in het verleden vrijwel uitsluitend gebruik maakte 
van zelfrapportagematen, die evenwel beperkt zijn tot het meten van bewust 
toegankelijke inhouden. Recent worden er daarom steeds vaker experimentele 
paradigma’s gebruikt, die toelaten om hechtingsgerelateerde processen en 
representaties op automatisch niveau te bestuderen (Baldwin et al., 1993, 1996; 
Mikulincer, Gillath, & Shaver, 2002). Desalniettemin is de huidige evidentie met 
betrekking tot automatische hechtingsprocessen beperkt en zijn vele assumpties 
van de hechtingstheorie nog niet systematisch getoetst.  
De doelstelling van dit onderzoeksproject was om na te gaan in welke mate 
en op welke manier context en hechtingsstijl gerelateerd zijn aan impliciete 
representaties en automatische cognitief-motivationele processen. In een eerste 
reeks studies hebben we ons gericht op het bestuderen van een tot nu toe 
verwaarloosd aspect van hechtingsfunctioneren, namelijk selectieve aandacht 
voor bedreigende informatie en informatie gerelateerd aan de hechtingsfiguur. 
Dit is nochtans een cruciaal proces in de activatie en regulatie van het 
hechtingssysteem omdat het betrokken is in de appraisal en het monitoren van de 
omgeving en de beschikbaarheid van de hechtingsfiguur (in functie van het 
detecteren van potentiële bedreiging) (Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985). 
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Daarnaast hebben we het proces van nabijheid zoeken bestudeerd als een 
automatische actie-tendens die (automatisch) geactiveerd wordt in een 
bedreigende context. In het tweede deel van dit onderzoeksproject hebben we 
ons gericht op het onderzoeken van een aantal schema-inhouden die een cruciale 
rol spelen in het reguleren en motiveren van cognitie, emotie en gedrag, namelijk 
afstand- en nabijheid-doelen en zelfrepresentaties. Beide inhouden werden op 
automatisch niveau gemeten.  
De studies in hoofdstuk 1 en 2 hebben aangetoond dat angstige en 
vermijdende hechting geassocieerd zijn met een gelijkaardig aandachtspatroon, 
namelijk het wegrichten van aandacht van hechtingsgerelateerde bedreigende 
informatie (hechtingsbedreigende woorden in hoofdstuk 1 en foto’s van 
bedreigende gelaatsuitdrukkingen in hoofdstuk 2). Bovendien bleek dit 
aandachtseffect het best voorspeld te worden door de combinatie van hoge 
scores op angst en vermijding. Dit resultaat kan mogelijks verklaard worden 
door de emotieregulerende functie van aandacht, waarbij het vermijden van 
bedreigende informatie gezien kan worden als een defensieve respons ten 
aanzien van informatie die onderliggende angsten activeert (Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). We vonden geen evidentie voor de theoretische voorspelling dat 
hechtingsangst gekenmerkt wordt door een vigilant aandachtspatroon. Om deze 
assumptie verder te toetsen zal het belangrijk zijn voor toekomstig onderzoek om 
een onderscheid te maken tussen vroege en late aandachtsprocessen, omdat het 
mogelijk is dat vigilantie eerder zal optreden op een pre-attentief niveau (vroege 
detectie van bedreiging).  
In hoofdstuk 3 hebben we vier studies gepresenteerd waarin aangetoond 
werd dat in een hechtingsgerelateerde bedreigende context (separatie van de 
hechtingsfiguur) mensen geneigd zijn om hun aandacht te richten naar de 
hechtingsfiguur. Dit kan gezien worden als een vorm van nabijheid-zoeken op 
cognitief niveau. Daarnaast konden we aantonen dat dit aandachtseffect sterker 
uitgesproken was voor angstig gehechte individuen, wat bewijs levert voor hun 
hyperactief hechtingssysteem (Mikulincer, Pereg, & Shaver, 2003). Er werd 
echter geen evidentie gevonden voor de assumptie dat vermijdende hechting 
geassocieerd zou zijn met het vermijden van informatie gerelateerd aan de 
hechtingsfiguur. Dit resultaat kan mogelijks verklaard worden door het feit dat 
we gebruik maakten van een hechtingsgerelateerde prime. Eerder werd 
aangetoond dat vermijdende individuen separatie-gerelateerde gedachten 
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onderdrukken om aldus activatie van het hechtingssysteem te voorkomen (Fraley 
& Shaver, 1997; Fraley, Garner & Shaver, 2000). De afwezigheid van een 
verband tussen vermijdende hechting en selectieve aandacht voor 
hechtingsstimuli zou dus gedeeltelijk kunnen worden toegeschreven aan het feit 
dat separatie-bedreiging weinig betekenisvol en dus weinig bedreigend is voor 
vermijdende individuen. 
De studies in hoofdstuk 4 konden aantonen dat de inductie van een 
hechtings-gerelateerde (separatie) en een hechtings-ongerelateerde (academisch 
falen) bedreigende context automatisch een sterkere toenaderingsrepons ten 
aanzien van de hechtingsfiguur activeert (in vergelijking met een neutrale 
context). Hechtingsangst bleek geassocieerd te zijn met een sterkere 
toenaderingsrespons ongeacht de context, wat opnieuw bewijst levert voor hun 
chronisch- en hyperactief hechtingssysteem. Vermijdende hechting, daarentegen, 
was geassocieerd met een verminderde toenaderingstendens ten aanzien van de 
hechtingsfiguur en dit enkel na de inductie van hechtings-ongerelateerde 
bedreiging. Het is belangrijk om op te merken dat dit de eerste studie is die een 
verband kon aantonen tussen hechtingsangst en gedragsreponsen, wat suggereert 
dat onderzoek zich niet alleen moet toespitsen op het bestuderen van reëel 
(observeerbaar) gedrag, maar ook op de proximale determinanten van gedrag, 
namelijk automatische actie-tendenzen en doelen.  
In hoofdstuk 5 hebben we drie experimenten gerapporteerd waarin we 
konden aantonen dat een vermijdende hechtingsstijl geassocieerd is met een 
sterkere impliciete motivatie voor en positieve evaluatie van inter-persoonlijke 
afstand binnen de hechtingsrelatie. Belangrijk is dat het verband tussen 
vermijdende hechting en afstand-gerelateerde doelrepresentaties teruggevonden 
werd zowel op impliciet als expliciet niveau, en zowel in een bedreigende als 
neutrale context. Dit toont aan dat het nastreven van afstand bij vermijdende 
individuen niet enkel gemedieërd wordt door bewuste processen, maar ook 
gezien moet worden als een automatische motivationele respons. In het geval 
van angstige hechting kon het verband met nabijheid-doelen enkel 
teruggevonden worden op expliciet niveau, maar niet wanneer doel-activatie 
gemeten werd op impliciet niveau. Verder onderzoek is nodig om te bepalen 
onder welke condities hechtingsangst wel of niet gerelateerd is met nabijheid-
zoeken, om zo tot een duidelijker begrip te komen van onze resultaten. 
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  Tenslotte hebben we in hoofdstuk 6 aangetoond dat hechtingsangst 
geassocieerd is met een lagere impliciete zelfwaarde en een hogere impliciete 
angst na het induceren van een hechtingsgerelateerde bedreigende context 
(separatie). Vermijdende hechting bleek niet geassocieerd te zijn met impliciete 
relationele zelfrepresentaties. Dit resultaat kan deels toegeschreven worden aan 
de hechtingsgerelateerde context-prime en het feit dat we zelfwaarde binnen een 
inter-persoonlijke context gemeten hebben (Carnelley, Israel, & Brennan, 2007).  
Algemeen kan worden gesteld dat onze resultaten aantoonden dat de 
verschillen tussen angstige en vermijdende hechting minder sterk uitgesproken 
zijn dan verwacht zou worden op basis van de hechtingstheorie. Om deze 
resultaten in een breder perspectief te plaatsen, hebben we in de algemene 
discussie van deze doctoraatsthesis een aantal complexiteiten besproken die het 
onderzoek naar individuele verschillen in hechting bemoeilijken. In eerste 
instantie hebben we gesuggereerd dat de theorie en het onderzoek naar hechting 
meer aandacht zou moeten besteden aan de dynamische aard van het 
hechtingssysteem. Dit impliceert dat, in het maken van predicties over 
hechtingsverschillen, we rekening moeten houden met het tijdsverloop van het 
emotieregulatie-proces, het onderscheid tussen impliciete en expliciete 
processen, de invloed van context, en het samenspel tussen regulatie-processen 
en doelen op verschillende niveaus van de doelenhiërarchie (zie ook Gross, 
1998, 1999, 2002). Op basis van deze dynamische visie op hechting, kunnen we 
dus stellen dat er zowel verschillen als gelijkenissen kunnen optreden tussen 
angstige en vermijdende hechting op verschillende punten in het regulatieproces.  
Daarnaast dient onderzoek ook rekening te houden met de multi-
dimensionele aard van hechtingsstijlen die kunnen verschillen binnen één en 
dezelfde persoon, afhankelijk van de situationele en relationele context (intra- en 
inter-persoon variabiliteit). Daarom zal het belangrijk zijn voor toekomstig 
onderzoek om (de variabiliteit of stabiliteit van) hechtingsrepresentaties en -
processen te bestuderen over verschillende situationele contexten en relaties 
heen.  
Als derde complexiteit hebben we de inter-afhankelijkheid van de (maten) 
van hechtingsangst en -vermijding besproken. Enerzijds doelt dit op de 
bevinding dat, in bijna al onze studies, de scores op de twee dimensies onderling 
gerelateerd waren, wat niet strookt met de theoretische assumptie dat angst en 
vermijding orthogonale dimensies zijn. Anderzijds hebben we benadrukt dat de 
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vragenlijsten om hechtingsangst en -vermijding (ECR) te meten afgeleid zijn van 
de theorie en daarom ook vertekend zijn door theoretische predicties. Met andere 
woorden, we moeten ons ervan bewust zijn dat hechtingsvragenlijsten zoals de 
ECR slechts één mogelijke bril zijn om naar hechtingsverschillen te kijken en 
deze bril kan mogelijks een vertekend beeld geven. Daarom zou toekomstig 
onderzoek meerdere hechtingsstijl-indicatoren moeten opnemen, zoals psycho-
fysiologische maten, spontaan gedrag, impliciete maten van hechtingsstijl en 
vragenlijsten.  
Tot slot willen we benadrukken dat dit onderzoeksproject een eerste 
belangrijke aanzet vormde tot het bestuderen van automatische processen binnen 
de context van volwassen hechting en dat onze studies een aantal interessante 
bevindingen opleverden die verder onderzoek naar hechtingsgerelateerde 
verschillen in aandacht, nabijheid zoeken en (impliciete) schema-inhouden 
kunnen sturen. 
 
